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LAW’S MORAL LEGITIMACY AND THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTICIPATION 
ENIOLA ANUOLUWAPO SOYEMI 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2017 
Major Professor: Judith A. Swanson, Associate Professor of Political Science 
ABSTRACT 
Legal positivism posits that the observation of how officials and citizens treat the legal 
system’s rules combine to constitute law’s existence. This is not an understanding 
verified by cases such as Nigeria’s legal system. Using historical evidence from the UK 
National Archives, and examples of recent court cases, I attempt to show that although 
such legal systems do, in fact, exist, they defy positivism’s conceptualization. They 
suggest that while the legal legitimacy of law is one thing, it does not account for 
obedience; and neither is the social fact of obedience necessary in defining legal validity.  
This thesis aims to suggest that far from being an outlying case, Nigeria provides 
interesting philosophical illumination about what positivism does not explain about legal 
systems in general—namely, what determines obedience. This thesis uses the political 
philosophies of Aristotle and Rousseau to construct a philosophical understanding of the 
basis for obedience to law. It suggests that it is by participation in the function of a legal 
system, that law is shown to a given population to have a specific purpose that is tied to 
the moral nature of the state. This thesis asserts that participation serves to illuminate 
law’s moral legitimacy as an especial type of legitimacy that is, in a sense, prior to its 
legal legitimacy and as what explains obedience separately from law’s legal validity, 
 viii 
which simply explains its plain existence.  
This thesis further uses a field experiment centred on a transportation system in Lagos, 
Nigeria to test, empirically, the hypotheses generated by its theoretical investigations 
that: 
1: the greater a people’s direct participation in creating their laws, the greater they 
perceive of the law’s moral legitimacy. 
and  
2: The greater the people’s belief in the law’s moral legitimacy, the greater their 
free obedience to the law. 
The results suggest that the manner in which citizens are allowed to participate on the 
formulation and enactment of rules affects the extent to which they go on to obey those 
rules. These results, further, give empirical grounds for the thesis’ theoretical 
combination of an Aristotelian understanding of law’s authority with a reformulation of 
Rousseau’s argument that participation is necessary for, and derived from, freedom.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis aims to answer the question: what explains the voluntary obedience of any 
given citizenry to the laws of their state? In other words, what gives the body of laws that 
are upheld in any given political territory an especial type of legitimacy that may be said 
to account for the citizenry’s willing and unforced obedience to those laws? It is the 
contention of this thesis, that wherever such a case of legitimate law may be found, it is 
the participation of the citizenry in the framing of their body of laws and legal system that 
accounts for the citizenry’s understanding of this especial legitimacy. It is, further, the 
contention of this thesis that this legitimacy, which it seeks to establish as a moral 
legitimacy, given by the particular nature of political society, ought, in accounting for 
free obedience to law, also to be understood as composing a fundamental aspect of law 
and legal system in general.  
The puzzle of law’s legitimacy and what it means when we say that the law is, indeed, 
‘legitimate’, is one that has concerned legal philosophy since, at least, Plato’s Crito.1 
Socrates, awaiting his death in an Athenian prison cell in 399 B.C., is in conversation 
with his friend Crito who wants him to escape. Socrates says, should he attempt to evade 
his sentence the city would ask him: “Do you intend to do anything else by this exploit … 
than to destroy both ourselves the laws and the entire city…? Or do you think it is 
possible for that city to exist … if the decisions of the courts do not prevail[?] … Shall 
we say to them, [Socrates asks Crito]: ‘Yes, that is what I intend, for the city wronged 
                                               
1 In A.D. Woozley, Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato’s Crito (London: Duckworth, 1979), 
p.150. 
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us.’ [Crito says:] ‘Emphatically that, Socrates.’” In fact, Socrates accepts the verdict and 
is poisoned.  
The difficulty between what the law is, what the law ought to be, and the city’s purpose 
in deciding the matter between law’s legal legitimacy and a legitimacy of another kind, 
seemed most evident to Socrates. However, legal philosophy’s most prominent 
contemporary tradition, legal positivism, in essence, maintains that the legitimacy of law 
is entirely accounted for in the law’s legal legitimacy. Or rather, that the law’s legal 
legitimacy is all that matters to the question of the legal system’s existence, and which 
accounts for, and depends on, the system’s ability to command the adherence of its 
officials to its rules and the compliance of citizens.2  
According to John Gardner, the distinctive philosophical thesis that unites all legal 
positivists under legal positivism is that “[i]n any legal system, whether a given norm is 
legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its 
sources, not its merits.”3 Gardner is correct that this is certainly the most fundamental 
proposition that positivists have sought to put forward. But if this simple thesis were the 
total of what legal positivism seeks to expound, then not only could this dissertation have 
nothing further to dispute, but it should also be thought that legal positivists would 
themselves find their own philosophical endeavours quite uninteresting.  
                                               
2 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); see also Chapter 4 of this 
thesis, ‘Legal Positivism and the Existence of Legal System’.   
3 John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 ½ myths’ in American Journal of Jurisprudence, (Vol. 46/ 2001) 
p. 199. 
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The fact is that both the more traditional versions of legal positivism as expounded most 
famously by H.L.A. Hart, as well as its more modern iterations, have attempted to say 
something beyond what Gardner suggests. They have attempted to explain the law’s 
authority in a sense that goes beyond the simple evidence of the positive sources for its 
existence.4 They have attempted to suggest, albeit implicitly, that the fact of the law’s 
legal validity being dependent on “social facts”, as Scott Shapiro calls them, is not only 
what is, but what ought to be.5  
It is against the critique of those such as Ronald Dworkin that Hart maintains that his 
purely explanatory and “descriptive” account of law, which lies unattached to any 
particular legal system or culture, “is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims.” 6 As 
I expand on in Chapter 4 of this thesis, Hart is quite right that it is indeed possible to 
maintain a descriptive explanation of law. I, however, suggest, differently from Dworkin, 
that Hart fails to do so. In Hart’s defence, however, Dworkin’s proposition, as Hart 
correctly interprets it, that “the truth of any proposition of law ultimately depends on the 
truth of a moral judgement as to what best justifies and since for him moral judgements 
are essentially controversial, so are all propositions of law,” goes much too far.7 
Like Dworkin, most legal theorists have, in their criticisms of legal positivism, focused 
on the distinction that positivism seeks to maintain between the law’s positive existence 
                                               
4 See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
5 Scott Shapiro, Legality, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
6 Op. cit., Hart, Concept of Law, pp. 239-240.  
7 Ibid, p. 253.   
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and the matter of its moral justifications.8 For in its description of law, legal positivism 
says  
“that in any legal system, a norm is valid as a norm of that system solely in virtue 
of the fact that at some relevant time and place some relevant agent or agents 
announced it, practiced it, invoked it, enforced it, endorsed it, or otherwise 
engaged with it. It is no objection to its counting as a law that it was an appalling 
norm that those agents should never have engaged with. Conversely, if it was 
never engaged with by any relevant agents, then it does not count as a law even 
though it may be an excellent norm… As Austin famously expressed the point … 
‘the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another’.”9  
Perhaps, the most scathing criticism of positivism came from Professor Lon Fuller, 
whose derision of positivism was tempered only by his respect for Hart’s intellectual 
reinterpretation. “It is a cardinal virtue”, Fuller writes,  
“of Professor Hart's argument that for the first time it opens the way for a truly 
profitable exchange of views between those whose differences center on the 
distinction between law and morality. Hitherto there has been no real joinder of 
issue between the opposing camps. On the one side, we encounter a series of 
definitional fiats … When we reply, ‘But it doesn't look like that to me,’ the 
answer comes back, ‘Well, it does to me.’ There the matter has to rest. This state 
of affairs has been most unsatisfactory for those of us who are convinced that 
‘positivistic’ theories have had a distorting effect on the aims of legal 
philosophy.”10  
Fuller states that in vigorously rejecting a confusion between “what is” and “what ought 
to be”, Hart’s exposition may not only serve to maintain what Fuller calls “intellectual 
clarity” and “moral integrity”, but further to enable conversation between positivists and 
                                               
8 The major criticism of legal positivism has been that it has critically failed to fully comprehend the 
true nature of morality and its fundamental connection with law. See John Finnis, ‘Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1978); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986).  
9 Op. Cit., Gardner, p. 200. 
10 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart in Harvard Law Review 
(Vol. 71, No. 4/ Feb. 1958), p. 631. 
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those whose arguments against positivism do indeed also rest on a distinction between 
law and morality.11 Nonetheless, Fuller finds the positivist position “unacceptable … on 
the double ground that its intellectual clarity is specious and that its effects are, or may 
be, harmful.”12 In the end, even of Hart’s own iteration and of those who subscribe to it, 
Fuller objects that they are primarily concerned  
“to preserve the integrity of the concept of law. Accordingly, they have generally 
sought a precise definition of law, but have not been at pains to state just what it is 
they mean to exclude by their definitions. They are like men building a wall for 
the defense of a village, who must know what it is they wish to protect, but who 
need not, and indeed cannot, know what invading forces those walls may have to 
turn back.”13 
For Fuller, the Hartian conception of law failed, in attempting to demarcate law from 
morality, to even engage the proper understanding of morality from which it aimed to 
preserve law, and possibly morality also. In doing so, it was focused on irrelevant, or at 
least less important concerns, and was unable to see all the crucial ways in which the law 
was inescapably intertwined with a proper and logical conception of morality. And this 
was precisely because, like previous iterations of positivism, it had also failed to 
adequately define and logically comprehend morality itself.14 
Despite a long-standing body of critiques against positivism, particularly from natural 
law theorists, I believe only a few theorists have objected to legal positivism on the 
                                               
11 Ibid, pp. 630-631. 
12 Ibid, p. 631. 
13 Ibid, p. 635. 
14 Ibid, pp. 635-638. Fuller states: “If we felt that the law itself was our safest refuge, would it not be 
because even in the most perverted regimes there is a certain hesitancy about writing cruelties, 
intolerances, and inhumanities into law? And is it not clear that this hesitancy itself derives, not from a 
separation of law and morals, but precisely from an identification of law with those demands of 
morality that are the most urgent and the most obviously justifiable, which no man need be ashamed 
to profess?” p. 637. 
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grounds of logic as this thesis aims. What this thesis takes particular aim at is the fact that 
legal positivism has attempted to suggest that in being legally valid on the basis of its 
legal “sources”, as Gardner holds, it views that there is no further explanation or enquiry, 
so far as law in particular is concerned, that is necessary to account for why officials of 
the legal system treat legal rules in a certain way or why ordinary citizens decide to fall 
under the law’s command that it be obeyed. And yet, in doing so, it provides the ‘social 
fact’ of the behaviour and actions of officials and citizens as its account of law’s legal 
validity, and thus, offers, whether or not it intends to, legal validity as the only evident, or 
positive, explanation for that same behaviour.  
In other words, in relying on the behaviour or actions of system officials to determine the 
existence of law, and yet providing no other reason for said behaviour besides the 
positive evidence of the law’s existence, within positivism’s philosophical theorem, the 
behaviour of officials is explained only by the law’s legal legitimacy. In not wishing, or 
being concerned, to provide any reasoning apart from what it thinks of itself as 
empirically observing of law’s positive existence,15 the fundamental problem with the 
main proposition of legal positivism is that it is tautological.16 As a result, legal 
positivism does not provide a genuine and sufficient explanation of one of the most 
                                               
15 As Gardner notes, legal positivism’s main proposition aims to give no guidance as to what people 
ought to do; neither moral, nor even legal—simply to say irrespective of all other considerations, 
when a law, by virtue of the social fact of its establishment, is a law. Op. Cit., Gardner, pp. 202-204. 
16 For Hart, and the legal positivist tradition that largely follows in his footsteps, the legal legitimacy 
of law is explained by two criteria: the valid existence of primary (laws guiding ordinary human 
conduct) and secondary rules (rules guiding the judgment and conduct of officials in relation to the 
primary rules); and obedience. Obedience by ordinary persons to the primary rules and adherence by 
legal official to the secondary rules being necessary and sufficient criteria for legal validity, 
obedience/adherence is explained only by the law’s legal legitimacy. Op. Cit., Hart, pp.79-117. 
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interesting aspects of law— its ability to compel, irrespective of sanctions, the adherence 
of officials and the obedience of ordinary citizens.  
My aim, in this thesis, is to separate the issue of the law’s validity in a plain sense from 
the question of how officials and citizens behave, which positivism confounds. I aim to 
partially maintain positivism’s explanation for validly existing law on one hand, and on 
the other, to offer a different and separate explanation for obedience and the behaviour of 
officials. I offer a conception of moral legitimacy through participation as accounting for 
a particular kind of authority in law that explains adherence by officials and obedience by 
citizens; and which I suggest is not only necessarily prior to, but further explains, the 
acceptance of the law’s legal authority as given to it by the existence of its sources.  
Plainly, I suggest that it is the acceptance of law’s legal authority, and not legal validity 
itself, that is evidenced by the behaviour of officials; and this behaviour is the result of 
the law’s achieving a prior moral legitimacy. As such, the behaviour of officials and/or 
citizens is not a criterion, nor is it evidence, of the law’s simple legal legitimacy but of its 
moral legitimacy, in a particular sense. And neither does the legal legitimacy of law, i.e.: 
its existence, serve as sufficient explanation for said behaviour.  
In counter to a legal positivist understanding of the nature of law’s authority, which I 
suggest ought not to be conceived outside of the specific context and philosophical 
understanding of political society – as legal positivists are wont to do – this thesis 
elaborates participation’s significance in giving the law a specific kind of legitimacy that 
accounts for obedience. The thesis does so by combining political and legal philosophy 
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with the empirical methodologies of comparative politics and the subfield of African 
Studies. The thesis brings together the political philosophies of Aristotle17 and 
Rousseau18 in formulating a philosophical understanding of the specific use and nature of 
law within political society—a formulation that I believe enables a correction of the 
positivist flaw in legal philosophy.  
I use Nigeria as an illuminating historical and experimental empirical setting to both 
provide practical illustration of the positivist flaw and as a means of testing, empirically, 
the logical consequences of my philosophical examinations. I use historical evidence 
from the UK National Archives at Kew Gardens, where my research was focused 
between June and August, 2016, to set out the logical case that accounting for obedience 
to a system’s laws, in other words, the acceptance that the law has legal authority, 
requires something beyond the mere presence or technical existence of that legal system. 
I use the historical development of Nigeria’s legal system to evidence that where a 
citizenry has not participated in the foundations of its own legal system, obedience will 
be lacking.  
                                               
17 My analysis of Aristotle focuses on textual analysis of the following primary texts: Aristotle (Trans. 
Hugh Tredennick), Metaphysics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935); Aristotle (Trans. 
David Ross), Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Aristotle (Trans. Carnes 
Lord), Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
18 My analysis of Rousseau focuses on textual analysis of the following primary texts: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (Trans. Allan Bloom), Emile or On Education, (Basic Books, 1979); Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(Trans. Judith R. Masters), ‘On the Social Contract’ in Roger D. Masters (ed.), On the Social Contract 
with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (Trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters), The First and Second Discourses (NY: 
St. Martin’s Press 1964). 
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Further, between January, 2015, and May, 2016, I conducted a field experiment using a 
bus transportation system in Lagos, Nigeria. My aim was to provide empirical grounding 
and examination for this thesis’s philosophic inquiries and the hypothetical consequences 
to which they give rise. These are that: 
1: the greater a people’s direct participation in creating their laws, the greater they 
perceive of the law’s moral legitimacy. 
and  
2: The greater the people’s belief in the law’s moral legitimacy, the greater their 
free obedience to the law. 
The effort of bringing Aristotle together with Rousseau is not a seamless one. In fact, it 
may be a rather foolish one. For one thing, these philosophers differ is so many 
fundamental ways that how each uses specific words and concepts is often the entire 
opposite of the other. For instance, where Rousseau believes the sense of sight in humans 
to be the most deceitful of the physical senses, Aristotle finds it most useful.19 Aristotle 
praises wisdom as the highest form of knowledge and for being the most difficult to 
attain because so far does it take man away from his most base senses in requiring the use 
                                               
19 Aristotle says, “All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the 
senses… and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is 
contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of 
all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions.” Op. Cit., 
Metaphysics, p.3. For Rousseau, on the other hand, sight brings us to error. “Thus, of all our senses 
sight is the most defective”, and is to be repressed and subjected to the more superior sense of touch. 
Op. Cit., Emile, pp. 137-140. 
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of his reason. For Rousseau, the only gainful utility of “reason’ is to bring man closer to 
these very base senses. 20  
Where Aristotelian reason calls for an interpretation of sensory experience that rightly 
distinguishes men from the other animals21, for Rousseau, reason calls each man to trust 
the independence and primacy of her senses so that she be indistinguishable – in her 
absolute freedom from other men – from the other animals of nature. Indeed, even the 
very conception of freedom as the fundamental philosophical basis from which Rousseau 
derives participation, and his entire theoretic22 forms, for Aristotle, part of an 
understanding of the ‘deviancy’ of democratic regimes.23  
Crucially, it is not that Aristotle does not countenance the value of participation. As Jane 
Mansbridge notes, Martha “Nussbaum explicates the ways in which Aristotle’s words [in 
the Politics] can imply that active participation in the political life of a well-functioning 
polis ‘is a necessary condition for the development and exercise of the individual’s other 
excellences’.”24 However, as Mansbridge also notes, in actuality “Aristotle did not say 
anywhere that participating in the decisions of the state makes an individual develop in 
character, justice, or goodness. Rather, he stated explicitly that living under the laws of a 
good polity help develop the justice, goodness, and proper quality of character that he 
                                               
20 See Op. Cit., Metaphysics pp. 7-11. See also chapter 6 of this thesis: ‘The Puzzle of Freedom’.  
21 Ibid, Metaphysics, pp. 3-4. 
22 See Patrick Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will: Freedom of a Particular Kind’ in Political Studies 
(1991).  
23 See Chapter 5 of this thesis, ‘The Essence of Justice’. 
24 Jane Mansbridge, ‘On the Idea that Participation Makes Citizens Better’ in Stephen L Elkin and 
Karol Edward Soltan (eds.) Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions, (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), footnote no.3, p. 294. 
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sought.”25 In fact, as I further suggest in Chapter 5 of this thesis, although Aristotle does 
indeed suggest, as Mansbridge admits, that the coming together of the many may lead to 
good judgement26, this is subordinate to what arises from the individual excellence of few 
men.  
In the discord between Rousseau and Aristotle, however, I find a fruitful union. The 
question of what makes the law legitimate in an especial way that allows it to command 
voluntary obedience is a question that requires Aristotle’s understanding of the authority 
of correct laws and their purpose that arises from the fundamental nature of political 
society on one side, and a reformulation of Rousseau’s explication of freedom, and a free 
obedience, enabled by participation, on the other.  
It is through the expression of the relative freedoms and ends of each citizen, upon which 
I suggest participation finds its necessary basis, and to which it gives voice, and through 
which, I suggest, the citizenry gains a practical view of itself as a single community. It is 
the common advantage of this community, as Aristotle describes it, that the law intends 
to serve; and it is through participation that the citizenry is enabled a crucial view of the 
law’s intention. It is in enabling the citizenry a practical view that the law has a moral 
basis in preserving the communal interests of the society that, through participation, what 
we learn from Aristotle in the abstract is, I suggest, made a practical reality evidenced by 
obedience. An obedience that I argue is itself only the outward evidence that legally valid 
laws are taken to be authoritative in a sense prior to the purely legal reasons given by law 
                                               
25 Ibid, p. 293. 
26 Ibid, 294.  
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for its own legal authority.  
Further, Aristotle’s critical understanding of law’s authority as the specific result of the 
nature and end of the political community, whose own establishment is by nature27 is 
critical to this thesis’ ability to answer its case against legal positivism. Aristotle’s 
understanding of justice, and of the correct nature of communal living acts as a further 
correction to Rousseau himself. A correction that enables a modified understanding of 
freedom, and therefore of the true purpose of participation to the moral legitimacy, and 
authority, of law. It is a conception that aims to bring the just authority of good laws 
together with a proper understanding of the role that free men need have in the matter, 
and to which, in drawing fundamentally from Aristotle, the latter need not be opposed. 
The issue of the law’s being morally legitimate by participation is not simply an abstract 
one that enables a necessary, but largely theoretical, correction to legal positivism; for it 
matters practically to the daily life of the citizen. This is particularly the case with regards 
to the citizens of those states whose legal systems have tended to come about in a rather 
contrived manner and without the participation of those who have had to live under them.  
Although the flaw in positivism’s logic can partially be ascertained without the use of a 
practical case, its full extent cannot be comprehended without a concrete understanding 
of what political society – which is not a mere theoretical construction – actually is or is 
                                               
27 As Wayne Ambler notes, in advancing “that the city is the supremely authoritative association, that 
… encompasses all other associations, and … aims at the most authoritative good,” Aristotle 
represents a unique departure from both the major philosophers that came before and after him who 
challenged the city’s authority either by maintaining a distinction between nature and law or by 
making it the particular reserve of a certain type of city. Wayne H. Ambler, ‘Aristotle’s Understanding 
of the Naturalness of the City’ in The Review of Politics (Vol. 47, No. 2/ Apr. 1985), pp. 163-164. 
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like. As such, this thesis uses Nigeria as a particularly interesting case that practically 
illustrates the dilemma that legal positivism neither explains adherence by officials or 
obedience by citizens and nor is adherence/obedience a necessary criterion of legal 
validity.  
Further, a correct philosophical understanding of law’s nature matters very much not only 
to countries like Nigeria but more widely to the literature in the African Studies subfield 
of Comparative Politics where much examination tends to treat African countries as 
reified or romanticised entities. Many of these countries are, thereby, examined as 
anomalous constructions for which unique analytical frameworks are required in 
separation from that which ought to apply everywhere; in other words, in absentia of 
philosophy. My use of the Nigerian case thus has the further aim of contributing to 
correcting the inexcusable dearth of modern philosophical analysis purposefully gained 
from, and applied to, ‘Africa’.   
Although the Nigerian legal system is sufficiently established to be said to exist in the 
plain sense that all the fundamental components of a judicial system are there found, few 
seem to take notice of the law.28 The country verifies the image of Africa as a place 
where, with few exceptions, the rule of law is absent.29 As such, Nigeria presents a kind 
                                               
28 For Executive disobedience of the Supreme Court, See: Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Supreme Court and 
Federalism in Nigeria’ in Journal of Modern African Studies (Vol. 46, No. 3/ 2008). For judicial 
maladministration, see Okechukwu Oko, ‘Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of 
the Problems and Failures in Nigeria’ in Brooklyn Journal of International Law (Vol. 31, Issue 
1/2005). For more examples, including citizen disobedience, see John Ademola Yakubu (ed.) 
Administration of Justice in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse Press). 
29 Jennifer A. Widner, Building the Rule of Law (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
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of middle case that yet adheres to the less than positive analysis of African countries that 
generally emerges from the literature in African Studies, where it is concluded that 
African countries are in a state of disrepair.30  
Much scholarly consensus suggests that this seemingly generalizable malaise stems from 
central organizations cut off from their societies.31 As Peter Ekeh has famously noted, the 
moral connection between the private and the public realm that is at least theorized to 
exist in Western societies could not be found in African ones about which he states,  
“there is a private realm in Africa. But this private realm is differently associated 
with the public realm in terms of morality. In fact there are two public realms in 
post-colonial Africa, with different types of moral linkages to the private realm. 
At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and 
sentiments influence and determine the individual’s public behaviour … The 
primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the 
private realm. On the other hand, there is a public realm which is historically 
associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with 
popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the military, 
the civil service, the police, etc. Its chief characteristic is that it has no moral 
linkages with the private realm.”32  
As with Ekeh, the few that have attempted to discern the cause of Africa’s state-society 
disconnection trace it to colonialism.33 In asking, what exactly about colonialism?, others 
                                               
30 Of the 35 countries Rotberg lists as “weak states” as of 2002, 10 are on the African continent; of the 
7 categorized as “failed” in the same period, 6 are African; as is the sole occupant of the “collapsed 
state” category: Robert I. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States; Breakdown, 
Prevention, and Repair’ in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail; Causes and Consequences 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 23-4. Also, Pierre Englebert, Africa: 
Unity, Sovereignty, Sorrow (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
31 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States; State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World (Princeton, New jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
32 Peter Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’, in Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, (Vol.17, No. 1/Jan 1975), p. 92.  
33 Though much of the African politics literature acknowledges the disconnection between Africa’s 
states and their societies, many proceed to focus on the disconnection’s effects. See: Goran Hyden, 
African Politics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional 
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determine that Africa's challenge has always been states built on imported, and 
illegitimate, law.34 The African state and its laws, beginning under colonialism, was 
always coercive, intrusive, and extractive.35 It is a state alien in origin and in purpose;36 
and which continues to reproduce itself despite efforts to uproot it.37 
While some scholars correctly identify defective legal structures as the source of many of 
Africa’s problems, they seem also to transport the idiosyncrasy of the problem’s apparent 
origin to its solution; seemingly believing that the problem is one inextricably attached to 
colonialism, rather than a universal one that presented itself in the African landscape in 
colonialism’s vehicle. So, Basil Davidson notes: “there may be few African frontiers 
today … across which … people do not take themselves and their goods in more or less 
complete defiance of the constitutional law.”38 For him, the solution is Africa’s return to 
                                               
Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart: 
State Failure in Late-Century Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Richard A. 
Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). 
34 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (Yale: Yale University 
Press, 
1994); Basil Davidson, Black Man’s Burden (New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 1992); Peter P. 
Ekeh,  
‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’ in Comparative Studies in 
History and Society (Vol. 17, No. 1/ Jan. 1975). 
35 Ibid, Young, the author tells the story of “bula matari”, the apt nickname for the generally alien, and 
oppressive, authority the colonial African state came to represent. pp. 1-13.  
36 For Mahmood Mamdani, the nature of indirect rule in Africa effected a systemic alienation, which 
continues in the post-colonial era. In indirect rule colonial territories, Mamdani says, the law dually 
applied to the white citizen with rights, on the one hand, and to coerced native subjects on the other. In 
the post-colonial era, the law’s duality has simply been deracialized; giving rights to the urban 
‘citizen’ and ‘subjecting’ the rural peasant, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy 
of Late Colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
37 Op. Cit., Young. 
38 Op. Cit., Davidson, Black Man’s Burden, p.13. 
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its unique tribalism and history.39 The assumption is that imported law equals illegitimate 
law; and once illegitimate, is always so. Africa’s state-society disconnection is, thus, held 
as a unique historical phenomenon. This analytical insistence on Africa’s ‘peculiarity’ 
reinforces many scholars’ tendency to either romanticize the systems of the continent,40 
or determine them to be singularly base.41 The precept that ‘the African’ has a 
philosophical view of her existence that is universally identifiable and applicable to the 
rest of the world does not seem to guide much contemporary work on African politics.42  
It may be that the institutionalization of illegitimate law in Africa is traceable to Africa’s 
colonization; but the basic question of what it means, why, and how the law comes to be 
legitimate, is a universal, philosophical, one. As such, many academics focused on the 
African continent seem neither to advance how ‘the African case’ may help to answer 
aspects of this larger question nor how the parameters we may already have in setting this 
                                               
39 Ibid; also, see Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Responding to State Failure’ in International Security (Vol. 21, No. 
3/Winter 1996-7), in which the author advocates the creation of a ‘Made for Africa’ state structure. 
40 Mudimbe argues that this tendency, due to the pitfalls of recreating a mythical image of Africa’s 
pre-colonial past, has led both Western and African interpreters to construct a false, and often 
destructive, understanding of ‘the African’ as ‘other’: be she noble savage or pure victim of European 
racism. V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); V. Y. Mudimbe, The Idea of Africa (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994). 
41 Goran Hyden, African Politics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 
1993). For both, so rudimentary is the African’s average existence, that his actions are simply the 
practical result of his socio-political environment.  
42 Scholars that have used a philosophical mode have often still ended in asserting ‘the African’s’ 
difference. For example, see Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: the Destruction of Liberia and the 
Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (New York: New York University Press, 1999). In Ellis’ 
analysis of Liberia’s struggle in the 1980’s and 90’s, the author asks: what did cannibalism signify? 
And not: what is missing from Liberia that exists in other places to leave Liberians free to eat each 
other? Consequently, he maintains a view of Liberians as some especial variant of human being. Also, 
Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009). The author performs the same reification of Pentecostalism in explaining 
individual and group responses to Nigeria’s economic and political struggles. 
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question help us to better understand these cases (and cases like them) within the context 
of a broader philosophical framework.43 
So we have, in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, vast territories 
overrun by countless competing armies in a boundless morass of violent lawlessness.44 In 
other places, like the former Sudan, the law sufficiently existed to enable some territorial 
integrity, but it was of such incoherence that it was only a question of when the next war 
would break out.45 Still, in states like Nigeria, “despite … constitutional democracy”, 
almost every pocket operates in near wholesale abrogation of the formal law.46   
Indeed, throughout much of Nigeria’s history – including, ironically, the uneven period 
of democratization and what Richard Joseph has called “civilianization” from the 1970s 
onwards – so far has the country been from the notion of rule according to law that a new 
conception of “prebendal politics” was coined for it. Prebendal politics was the 
characterisation of a political system in which a complexity of overlapping factors, 
including high ethno-linguistic diversity and intense socio-economic contestation within 
                                               
43 Leo Strauss says philosophy is “the discovery… of the nature… of any class of things”; political 
philosophy is the discovery of the nature of the class of political things. Natural Right and History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 81-82. If the state is, everywhere, an “imposition” 
on a pre-existing community intended to serve a purpose the community cannot by itself fulfil – see 
F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books, 1966) p.2, pp. 15-17; Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press) – then the question of what that purpose is 
and its meaning for the derivation of the law’s legitimacy can be answered by examining African 
states as much as anywhere else. The African state being not an alternate class of thing. 
44 Severine Austesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
45 Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007). 
46  Okechukwu Oko, ‘Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and 
Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria’ in Brooklyn Journal of International Law (Vol. 31, Issue 1/2005); 
also, Okechukwu Oko, ‘Lawyers in Fragile Democracies and the Challenges of Democratic 
Consolidation: The Nigerian Experience’ in Fordham Law Review (Vol. 77, Issue 4/ March 2009). 
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a very large territorial population, made it arguably necessary for officials and politicians 
to use their offices of state to personally re-allocate government revenues to the benefit of 
their political supporters and others connected to them, for instance, through ethnic 
belonging.  
The irony of the Nigerian situation in which traditional democracy understood as ruling 
by merit and by laws was supplanted by representation by other means was 
illuminatingly expressed in Joseph’s observation that “Nigerians are compelled to pursue 
democracy for the very reason that they are unable to rely on any government – or agency 
of the government – in which their particular subgroup of the population is not directly 
and effectively represented.”47 This was as against the official resolution passed by the 
1975-76 Constitution Drafting Committee that the “State shall foster a feeling of 
belonging and of involvement among the various sections of the country, to the end that 
loyalty to the nation shall override sectional loyalties.”48 
Joseph’s understanding was intended to highlight a different way of conceptualising how 
the interests of the public could be served by the state in ways besides what he felt to be 
the often rhetorical western liberal understandings of democracy. The fact that this kind 
of ‘unofficial politics’ have, several decades after Joseph’s writings, not solved many of 
Nigeria’s societal problems or significantly increased the connections between the state 
and the citizenry that are necessary to the very the question of nation-statehood that also 
                                               
47 Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second 
Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.4. 
48 Ibid, p. 43. 
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concerned Joseph, may serve to suggest that while there is always scope to do things 
one’s own way, there is no escaping the fundamental nature of political society; and 
which requires the behaviour of all citizens to be governed by known and established 
rules. 
Further, while as Joseph surmises, there is something wrong with, or missing from, 
purely Western conceptions of democracy, the solution cannot be to create ‘Africa-
specific’ understandings that not only serve to further demarcate ‘Africa’ from the rest of 
the world while, ironically, maintaining these flawed Western understandings as the 
norm. What is needed, rather, is to use Africa to correct what is wrong with purely 
Western conceptions of human behaviours and needs that do not belong only to the 
citizens of Western countries, but to everyone who is held to be singularly, and most 
fundamentally, a human being.   
In any case, despite this long-standing portrayal of the general political landscape in 
Nigeria, this thesis uses Nigeria in a narrower manner. As a means of challenging a legal 
positivist framework for what gives law its authority, I necessarily focus on the particular 
behaviours of officials of the legal system as well as those of ordinary citizens with 
specific regard to the rules of the legal system. While the constitutionally unsanctioned 
behaviour of politicians and the citizenry with regards to the wider political system 
provides ample material for painting a richer picture of political society in Nigeria, my 
focus here is necessarily drawn by the logical parameters concerning the existence of 
legal system.   
20 
 
 
What I suggest, in chapters 2 and 3, as being the cause of a legal structure in Nigeria 
which though it ‘exists’, yet fails to command the specific kinds of behaviour demanded 
by legal positivist criteria, is a lack of participation by Nigerians themselves in the 
founding of the country’s legal infrastructure. The fact of Nigeria’s existence, and its 
specific existence as a formal legal entity, being the result of a colonial imposition is not 
one that can be erased.  
Nevertheless, I do not lay out the development of the legal system under the colonial 
period to, tiresomely, romanticise the country’s colonial past. That that is where Nigeria’s 
legal system was developed, and in documented manner, is merely a fact that I present. 
Its utility to this thesis is to show what universal conception was necessarily made devoid 
in the Nigerian context as a result of the colonial imposition. It is for the purpose of an 
examination of participation, that the spectre of colonialism is wheeled into my analysis.  
Contemporary study of participation is not new and has been of interest in modern 
political theory since, at least, the 1980s.49 For Mansbridge, it is clear that participation in 
democratic decision-making changes the characters of participants and makes them better 
citizens.50 As Benjamin Barber outlines, “participation, after all, enhances the power of 
                                               
49 James Bohman, ‘Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy’ in Journal of 
Political Philosophy (Vol. 6, No. 4., 1998), p.1. 
50 “Participating in democratic decisions makes many participants better citizens.” Mansbridge goes 
on, “I believe this claim because it fits my experience. But I cannot prove it. Neither, at this point, can 
anyone else. The kinds of subtle changes in character that come about, slowly, from active 
participation in democratic decisions cannot easily be measured with the blunt instruments of social 
science. Nevertheless, those who have participated actively in democratic governance often feel quite 
strongly that the experience has changed them. And those who observe the active participation of 
others often think they see its long-run effects on the others’ characters.” Jane Mansbridge, ‘On the 
Idea that Participation Makes Better Citizens’ in Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions 
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communities and endows them with a moral force that nonparticipatory rulership rarely 
achieves. Moreover, in enhancing the power of communities, participation enlarges their 
scope of action.”51 For those such as John Rawls, deliberative participation, further, leads 
to a unitary conception of justice and the protection of the rights of those who would 
otherwise be marginalised by society were it not for the possibility of participation’s 
equalising abilities.52  
Other deliberative theorists such as Joshua Cohen go further in suggesting that 
participation or deliberation produces better, or more democratically legitimate, political 
decisions and policies located in the “collective authority” of citizens within societies 
operating under “reasonable” levels of pluralism in which no distinct moral view forms 
the basis of membership of that society.53  
Critically, and in light of this thesis’ particular concern with law, Habermas’s thesis 
understands that  
“modern legal norms require only outward compliance regardless of individual 
motivation but they should, at the same time, have a rational basis that also makes 
                                               
Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan (eds.), (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1999), p. 291. 
51 Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1984), p. 8. For Barber, participation forms the core that 
while antithetical to the notion of modern liberal democracy, which he characterises as “thin 
democracy”, is fundamental to what he calls “strong democracy.” “A distinctively modern form of 
participatory democracy. It rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united 
less by homogenous interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common purpose 
and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their 
altruism or good nature.” p. 117.  
52 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971). 
53 Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed.) 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), pp. 95-102. 
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it possible for persons to accept them as legitimate and thus deserving of 
obedience. The need for legitimation is acute, because such norms must be 
positively enacted without appeal to a higher source of justification, such as a 
shared religious worldview. In view of this duality, one can see that coercible law 
can be accepted as legitimate insofar as it guarantees two things at once. On the 
one hand, as demarcating areas in which private individuals can exercise their free 
choice as they desire, law must guarantee the private autonomy of individuals 
pursuing their personal success and happiness. On the other hand, because its 
enactment must be such that reasonable individuals could always assent to its 
constraints rationally, legitimate law must also secure the public autonomy of 
those subject to it, so that the legal order can be seen as issuing from the citizens’ 
rational self-legislation, as it were.”54 
I suggest, however, that it is not only that laws should be legitimate in a manner beyond 
the authority provided by their legal existence, but that, as matter of the very nature of 
political society, they are. Far less ambitiously than Habermas, I do not argue that 
participation gives the law conceptions that it does not always necessarily have in the 
form of various categories of rights. Rather, I suggest that participation allows citizens to 
see in law a purpose that is always there in the very nature of law’s existence within the 
political community. 
It is with respect to the unifying notion among deliberative theorists that participation 
leads to ‘better’ political decisions that involves participants coming to terms with the 
consensus view over and above pre-determined self-interests that this thesis departs from 
the foregoing literature. As James Bohman summarises,  
“Deliberative democracy is a complex ideal with a variety of forms, but whatever 
form it takes it must refer to the ideal of public reason, to the requirement that 
legitimate decisions be ones that “everyone could accept” or at least “not 
reasonably reject.” Above all, any conception of deliberative democracy is 
organised around an ideal of political justification requiring free public reasoning 
                                               
54 William Regh, ‘Introduction’ to Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of law and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 
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of equal citizens. First such justifications require that citizens go beyond the self-
interests typical in preference aggregation and orient themselves towards the 
common good. Second, such a public orientation must be to improve political 
decision making over aggregation, by making it possible to work out common 
goals and a fair system of social cooperation without presupposing an already 
existing social consensus.”55   
While such an understanding is more focused on the inner legitimacy of the decisions 
produced in the participatory process so that they would be decisions that all free and 
equal persons would, if they were called to, accept, the conception given participation by 
this thesis seeks to make no such claim. Neither, with respect to the particular question of 
law, do I claim or theorise that citizen participation in law making leads to laws that are, 
in and of themselves, ‘better’ than they would be without participation or deliberation.  
The construction of participation, here, lays emphasis on the extent to which the 
deliberative process enables participants, in more clearly seeing the validity of all of their 
distinctive interests together, to achieve insight into the fundamental understanding that 
law aims to enable each person respectively, and all of them together, to live 
determinedly.  
This does not mean that, as maintained by much of the theory in deliberative democracy, 
that participants all have to, or will, agree with the content of individual laws. But rather, 
that in being party to deliberating on these laws they are still, even in disagreement, 
capable of understanding the reasoning behind them and thus better regarding the nature 
of law’s fundamental aim and authority.56 It is in engendering this purposive view of law 
                                               
55 Op. Cit., Bohman, pp. 401-402. See also, Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
56 See Chapter 7 of this thesis, ‘Testing Obedience: A Lagos Transport Field Experiment’.  
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and legal system, and thereby giving it a special kind of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population rather than the internal sanctity of the individual laws themselves – which 
does not necessarily need citizen-participation for the purpose of its derivation – with 
which this thesis is primarily concerned with participation.57  
Indeed, it is part of the fundamental premise of this thesis’ examination that the laws or 
rules that may be generated under participatory conditions may just as easily have been 
generated without them. My argument, however, is that without participation the citizen 
does not gain an especial view of the law, which is indeed a distinctly moral one, and 
which explains obedience.  
My thesis maintains a conceptual distinction between the internal moral goodness of 
individual laws, and the moral legitimacy that pertains to law as a function of its 
particular position within political society and its relation to the communal ends of such 
societies. This is not to deny the relationship between morally good laws and law’s moral 
legitimacy, but rather to better enable examination of the one without confusing it with, 
or for, the other. 
As such, I use participation to explain evidence of obedience to law on the part of 
citizens, and adherence to legal rules on the part of officials. In other words, participation 
                                               
57 It is unlikely, in the extreme, that the entire body of rules or laws that a group of ordinary persons 
within any given society could be made to deliberate on within a participatory setting would be wholly 
morally abominable; for this would have to depend on a society almost exclusively filled with people 
whose internal preferences coalesced into unparalleled iniquity. And here, the explanation for 
obedience could be as simple as that bad people obey bad laws. Although even here, it may require 
more cautious examination than this. In the more likely, and indeed realistically prevalent scenario, 
however, of people who are not devils and yet give their obedience to bad laws, and not simply 
because the law is the law, my thesis aims to explain these also. See also footnote 287 of this thesis in 
Chapter 4, ‘Legal Positivism and the Existence of Legal System’. 
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in this thesis serves to account for the acceptance by these persons of law’s legal 
authority. I theorise that this is because participation generates a particular kind of 
relationship between participants and whatever the law may be, and also between each 
other, that would have been previously absent. Relations that I further theorise are based 
on necessary aspects of man’s nature in the context of political society and the purpose of 
law itself.  
These are aspects of the nature of law and of political society which participation does 
not itself generate but recognition of which is brought closer to the citizenry by way of 
the participatory mechanism. As such, the moral legitimacy that I suggest participation 
reveals in law is not contained primarily in the morality or objective sanctity of the laws 
themselves that may be produced by participation, or indeed without it; but rather, in the 
moral understanding participation enables of the purpose of law in respect of the moral 
interests of each participant, and which participation crucially enables her to gain of all 
others. 
My aim in this thesis is to explore the philosophical grounding or justification, with 
particular respect to the law, if there is any, for why such a claim, as I am making, is a 
true one. And further, to move beyond some of the more theoretical assertions that it 
simply must be true that participation makes better citizens of people by practically 
examining how exactly participation, if it indeed does, alter participants and why.  
Empirical research into areas of participation’s function is nothing new or isolated.58 
                                               
58 As Sulkin and Simon note, “the first empirical study of deliberation was Mansbridge’s (1980) book, 
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Certainly, in deliberative democracy, much literature has been spawned by scholars 
looking into issues from group polarization59, to the feasibility of nationwide deliberative 
sessions.60 Although much of the empirical work that has taken place includes the use of 
highly controlled lab-style experiments61, it is still acknowledged that much experimental 
work in the field “has been purely observational”, and “haphazard.” 62  
In their experimental work on deliberation and the particular question of redistributive 
justice, Christopher Karpowitz and Tali Mendelberg conclude that theorists fail to make 
use of the kind of field experiments that enable the measurement of “real-world” 
variables.63 Simone Chambers describes as “very rich”, this area of empirical research 
that uses “real-world cases as test cases for theoretical claims.”64 It is useful to this thesis, 
then, that the example of field experimental design already also has a firm hold in the 
more empirical realm of comparative politics, where participation’s effects in a number 
                                               
Beyond Adversary Democracy, [in which her] case study analysis of deliberation in a New England 
town meeting and a participatory workplace found that the diversity of interests among individuals 
generally frustrated the goals of citizen engagement and better decision-making.” Tracy Sulkin and 
Adam F. Simon, ‘Habermas in the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an Experimental Setting’ in 
Political Psychology, (Vol. 22, No. 4/ 2001), p. 811. For a survey of the proliferation of empirical 
studies into deliberation see, Simone Chambers, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory’ in Annual Review 
of Political Science (Vol. 6/2003). 
59 Cass Sunstein ‘The law of group polarization’ in Journal of Political Philosophy (Vol. 10, No. 2/ 
2002). 
60 James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (Yale: Yale University 
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61 Tracy Sulkin and Adam F. Simon, ‘Habermas in the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an 
Experimental Setting’ in Political Psychology, (Vol. 22, No. 4/ 2001) pp. 807-826. 
62 Christopher F. Karpowitz and Tali Mendelberg, ‘An Experimental Approach to Citizen 
Deliberation’ at 
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on%20-%20Karpowitz_and_Mendelberg.pdf (accessed 1/5/2017), pp. 10-11 and pp.1-2. 
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64 Op. Cit., Chambers, p. 318. For examples, see Tali Mendelberg and John Olseke, ‘Race and Public 
Deliberation’ in Political Communication (Vol. 17, No. 2/ Apr. 2000) pp. 169-191.  
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of policy-related areas are also being increasingly investigated using field experiments.65  
Although I cannot say whether participation makes people ‘better citizens’ in their wider 
relations with the state and democratic decision-making in general, I do however find, 
with the aid of a field experiment that I explicate in Chapter 7, that with regards to the 
law, or an approximation thereof, participation does alter, if not the character, then the 
perspective that each participant has of herself in relation to all others and vice versa. I 
find also that participation alters the view participants have of their relation to law-like 
rules, and of rules to them.    
                                               
65 For examples, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Towards 
a Redistributive Democracy’ in Politics and Society (Vol. 26, No. 4, 1998) pp. 461-510; Marcatan 
Humphreys, William A. Masters, Martin E. Sandbu, ‘The Role of Leaders in Democratic 
Deliberations: Results from a Field Experiment in Sao Tome and Principe’ in World Politics (Vol. 58, 
no. 4/ July 2006); Benjamin A. Olken, ‘Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: evidence from a 
field experiment in Indonesia’ in American Political Science Review, (Vol. 104, No. 2, May 2010) pp. 
243-267. 
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Chapter 2: On the Establishment of the Nigerian Legal System 
Much of the literature in African studies confirms the image of Africa as a continent on 
which, with few exceptions, the rule of law is absent. Even those countries, such as 
Nigeria, where the law is sufficiently present, verify the understanding that the law in 
Africa, so far as it is there, functions neither efficiently, nor effectively.66 Further, so far 
short do the legal systems of cases such as Nigeria appear to fall from the criteria set by 
established traditions in legal philosophy such as legal positivism, that they would be 
deemed not to exist at all.67  
Over this and the next two chapters, I aim to suggest that the Nigerian case presents an 
interesting example of a legal system that does in fact exist, and has been set up in 
accordance with a positivist understanding of legal legitimacy, but displays features of 
rampant disobedience and procedural abuse that can be explained by an absent moral 
legitimacy. As the latter criterion is not one countenanced by legal positivism, I aim to 
suggest that systems such as those that present themselves in countries like Nigeria are 
not anomalies to established philosophical understandings but, rather, evidence of 
anomaly within these understandings themselves.  
In the present chapter, I outline the historical establishment of the modern Nigerian legal 
system. My aim is to provide empirical basis for my theoretical supposition that 
participation has something crucial to do with why the law and legal system in any given 
                                               
66 See Chapter 1 of this thesis, ‘Introduction’. 
67 See Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, ‘Explaining Disobedience in the Nigerian Legal System’ and 
‘Legal Positivism and the Existence of Legal System’. 
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political society comes to be viewed as legitimate in an especial way and obeyed for 
reasons besides merely its legal validity. Using data sourced from the UK National 
Archives at Kew Gardens in London, where I conducted research between June and 
August 2016, I provide historical evidence that neither the set-up of what now operates as 
Nigeria’s current legal structure, nor many of its substantive laws, were much influenced 
by Nigerians themselves. All archival documents referred to in this chapter can be found 
at the National Archives, Kew Gardens, London. 
In Chapter three, I assert that this lack of indigenous participation in the development of 
the Nigerian legal system, explains the observable and persistent disregard for legal 
procedure that pervades the current workings of the country’s legal system. I provide 
evidence of this current state of malaise using case evidence from both secondary 
literature and the Nigerian Weekly Law Reports, to which I was given access at the FRA 
Williams Law Library in Lagos between January and May 2016.  
For the philosophical purposes of this thesis, I believe that Nigeria, and cases similar to it, 
provide critical theoretical insight that might enable the correction of what I will, in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis, show to be an error in the legal positivist framework within 
legal philosophy. That African cases like Nigeria add to universal philosophical 
understanding is a further contribution I hope to make; thereby contributing to correcting 
a dearth in the literature in philosophy and in African studies, of gleaning and applying 
philosophical understandings from, and to, African spaces. 
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2.1. Historical Foundations of Legality in Nigeria 
On the 28th of February, 1906, and starting with the Lagos Colony, Nigeria was brought 
into legal existence by “Letters Patent passed under the Great Seal of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.” The 1906 Letters Patent declared, by the power 
of King Edward Seventh, that “the Colony of Southern Nigeria should comprise the 
Island of Lagos and such portions of the neighbouring territories as had been annexed to 
His Majesty’s Dominions.”68 Subsequent to the Letters Patent of 1906, the boundaries of 
the Colony of Nigeria were given legal definition in an ‘Order of the King in Council 
defining the boundaries of the Colony of Nigeria’, signed at the Court of Windsor Castle 
and dated 22nd November, 1913. The Order-in-Council reads as follows: 
“The limits of this Order shall be the territories of Africa which are bounded by 
the following line, namely :—A line starting from Beacon No. 12 on the shore of 
the Bight of Benin in a northerly direction along the frontier of the Dahomey to 
the mouth of the Ajara River. Thence the boundary follows the north bank of 
Badagri-Porto Novo Lagoon and the west bank of the Yewa River to a point 
situated due west of the mouth of the Iragbo Creek… Thence it follows the shore 
of the Bight of Benin to the point of starting. All such part of the territories within 
the limits aforesaid as have not heretofore been included in His Majesty’s 
Dominions shall be, and the same hereby annexed to His Majesty’s Dominions, 
and the whole of the said territories are declared to be part and parcel of the 
Colony of Nigeria. 
As and from the date of the coming into operation of this Order, all Laws and 
Ordinances which shall at such date be in force in the territories heretofore known 
as the Colony of Southern Nigeria shall take effect within the limits of this Order, 
and shall remain in force therein until the same shall have been altered or repealed 
by the Governor of the Colony of Nigeria, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Legislative Council, or by His Majesty.”69 
                                               
68 Order in Council 22, November, 1913 ‘Defining the boundaries of the Colony’ in CO 380: Letters 
Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925, Nigeria p. 1. 
69 Order in Council 22, November, 1913 ‘Defining the boundaries of the Colony’ in CO 380: Letters 
Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria, pp. 2-4. 
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Here, then, is the source establishing a norm of legal order within the formalised Nigerian 
territory and giving legal authority to the laws that would come to be enacted within the 
then Nigerian Protectorate. Ultimately, this is the source that not only establishes the 
legal authority of those current Nigerian laws that remain in reference to British law, but 
is also further the source establishing the very concept of modern, formalised, legality 
within the Nigerian territory. In Hartian legal positivist language, this is Nigeria’s 
original ultimate rule of recognition from which all further rules of legal recognition have 
proceeded.70 
By the Supreme Court Proclamation, 1900, the institution of the Supreme Court of 
Southern Nigeria, its Chief Justice, Puisne Judges, and Officers of the Court including the 
Police were established. Its procedural functions and governing rules, including rules of 
arrest, evidence, judgement, and so forth, were further laid out in its constitution.71 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court was held the “Superior Court of Record, and shall 
possess and exercise, so far as circumstances admit, all the jurisdiction, powers, and 
authorities which are vested in or capable of being expressed by Her Majesty’s High 
Court of Justice in England.”72 Also, by an addendum proclamation of the then High 
Commissioner, Ralph Denham Rayment Moor, the regulations for criminal procedure 
were established in the Southern part of the Nigerian Protectorate.73 It was by such 
                                               
70 See Chapter 4 of this thesis, ‘Legal Positivism and the Existence of Legal System’. 
71 A Proclamation enacted by Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (re the Supreme Court), in CO 588: 
Southern Nigeria Proclamations 1900-1906. 
72 A Proclamation enacted by Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (re the Supreme Court), in CO 588: 
Southern Nigeria Proclamations 1900-1906, pp. 2-3. 
73 A Proclamation enacted by Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (re Criminal Law and Procedure), in 
CO 588: Southern Nigeria Proclamations 1900-1906. 
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proclamation, for instance, that the death sentence entered Nigeria as formal legal 
practice, since it was declared that “every sentence of death shall direct that on that day, 
not less than fourteen nor more than twenty-one days after the date thereof, the person 
condemned shall be hanged by the neck until he is dead.”74  
Similar proclamations were declared in the Northern part of the Nigerian Protectorate, 
establishing a parallel legal structure there.75 On the amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria in 1914, “it was considered desirable that the judicial system of the 
Southern Protectorate should be brought in line with that of the north… The Protectorate 
Courts Ordinance provided that justice in the protectorate [of Nigeria] be administered by 
(a) the High Court; (b) Magistrates’ Courts; (c) Native Courts.” 76  Although the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria was relegated to the Colony of 
Lagos, it appears that the composition of the latter, including the Chief Justice, also 
substituted as the same persons composing the High Court of the Protectorate.77  
Upon colonization, many initial laws appear to have simply been brought in by 
proclamations for both Southern and Northern Nigeria. The 1900-1906 proclamations 
instituted laws regarding an array of areas including, but not limited to, lunatics; 
                                               
74 A Proclamation enacted by Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (re Criminal Law and Procedure), in 
CO 588: Southern Nigeria Proclamations 1900-1906, p.21. 
75 See, CO 587: Northern Nigeria Proclamations 1900-1904 and CO 587: Northern Nigeria 
Proclamations 1905-1913. 
76 Correspondence between an administrative officer of the Government of Nigeria and Downing 
Street dated 16 January, 1937 in File CO 583/213/21: Judicial System in Nigeria. On amalgamation, 
see also ‘Report by Sir F. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria’, October 
1919 in Document CO 879: African 1063-1082 See also File CO 583/257/12: Protectorate Courts 
Legislation. 
77 Documents detailing the Constitutions of the Supreme Court of the Colony and the High Court of 
the Protectorate in File CO 583/213/21: Judicial System in Nigeria. 
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evidence; law suits; property; due process; rules of court; marriage; criminal procedure; 
and duties of, and offences relating to, the police.78 These laws remained in effect unless 
“repealed or revoked by or in pursuance of any law or ordinance passed by” the later 
constituted Legislative Council.79 From 1906, the Southern Nigerian Legislative Council 
began enacting laws for Southern Nigeria.80 From February 1914, laws began to be 
enacted for an amalgamated Nigeria by the Legislative Council for the whole Nigerian 
Protectorate.81  
In 1936, the laws of Nigeria went through a process of revision; mainly undertaken by the 
Attorney General. I found no records to indicate that the Legislative Council was 
involved in this procedure. Both in the introduction of English laws into Nigeria and in 
their subsequent revision, guidance seems to have been that “in the Colonies it is the 
practice whenever possible to follow Imperial legislation… The only precaution 
necessary [is] to make sure that the Imperial section in its adaptation to local conditions 
had not been varied in any material particular.”82 
By the 1st October, 1936, the Law Officers Ordinance had made it legal for Crown legal 
advisers to be practising law officers in Nigeria; the offices of Attorney General, 
                                               
78 See CO 588: Southern Nigeria Proclamations 1900-1906. Also, CO 587: Northern Nigeria 
Proclamations 10900-1904 and CO 587: Northern Nigerian Proclamations 1905-1913. 
79 ‘Letters Patent passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom constituting the Office of 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Nigeria and providing for the Government 
thereof’ in CO 380: Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria, p. 4. 
80 See Document CO 592: Southern Nigeria Legislative Council Proceedings 1906-1908. 
81 First laws enacted for Nigeria since amalgamation were done in Legislative Council session of 20th 
February, 1914. See Minutes of that session in Document CO 657/29: Colonial Office Library.  
82 ‘Letter from the Attorney General to the Honorable Chief Secretary, Lagos’, dated 6th June, 1936 in 
File CO 583/213/12: Laws of Nigeria—Revision Of.  
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Solicitor-General, and Crown Counsel of Nigeria were, thereby, created. Being 
European, these law officers were entitled, by that ordinance, “in Courts in Nigeria to the 
same rights and privileges as are enjoyed by the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-
General of England in the Courts in England.”83  
It is in this way that the establishment of Nigeria’s legal structure is asserted by the 
literature in African Studies to have been practically ‘imported’84—for it was brought in 
almost wholesale and with little to no reference whatever either to a specifically pre-
existing Nigerian social environment, nor, more importantly, with regard to a purposeful 
understanding of the ideological and/or philosophical aim of the legal structure for 
Nigerians, and Nigeria itself. 
The Executive and Legislative Councils formed the substantive, physically existing, legal 
pillars within the Nigerian Protectorate. The Legislative Council for the Colony (that is, 
only Southern Nigeria) was given authority, along with the Governor of the Protectorate, 
by an Order-in-Council of 10th August, 1914 to legislate “for matters affecting the whole 
territory of Nigeria.”85 The Council officially became the Legislative Council for the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria by a November 1922 Order-in-Council.86 The 
Legislative Council was responsible for deliberating, approving, recommending, and 
                                               
83 ‘An Ordinance to provide that the Crown Legal Advisers Be entitled to practice in the courts of 
Nigeria Ex-Officio’ in File CO 583/213/15: Law Officers Legislation. 
84 See Chapter 1 of this thesis, ‘Introduction’. 
85 ‘Order of the King in Council providing for the establishment of a Legislative Council for the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria’ in CO 380: Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants 
etc 1906-1925 Nigeria. 
86 ‘Order of the King in Council providing for the establishment of a Legislative Council for the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria’ in CO 380: Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants 
etc 1906-1925 Nigeria. 
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passing new laws and ordinances on the approval of the colonial Governor as ex-officio 
president of the Council.87  
Upon the Legislative Council’s establishment by royal order-in-council, the procedure of 
law-making in Nigeria was a drawn-out process. Bills debated and passed by a majority 
of votes in the Council would then be presented to the Governor who would then be 
engaged in multiple correspondence between the various relevant British administrators 
in Nigeria, including the Attorney-General, and the colonial government in London 
including the Secretary of State for the Colonies, till the latter had given his approval. 
The basic outline for the procedure is set out in the 1913 Letters Patent,  
“When a Bill passed by the Legislative Council is presented to the Governor for 
his assent, he shall, according to his discretion, but subject to any instruction 
addressed to him under Our Sign Manual and Signet or through one of our 
Principal Secretaries of State, declare that he assents thereto, or refuses his assent 
to the same, or that he reserves the same for the signification of Our pleasure. 
A Bill reserved for the signification of Our pleasure shall take effect so soon as 
We shall have given Our assent to the same through one of Our Principal 
Secretaries of State, and the Governor shall have signified such assent by message 
to the Legislative Council or by proclamation.”88  
As such, all laws, which came in the form of ordinances, began with standard wording on 
their title pages: 
                                               
87 ‘Letters Patent passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom constituting the Office of 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Nigeria and providing for the Government 
thereof’ in CO 380, Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria, pp. 
4-5. 
88 ‘Letters Patent passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom constituting the Office of 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Nigeria and providing for the Government 
thereof’ in CO 380, Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria, p. 5. 
See also, ‘Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and 
Commander-in Chief of the Colony of Nigeria’ in CO 380: Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, 
Warrants, etc 1906-1925 Nigeria, pp. 9-12. 
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“BE IT ENACTED by the Governor of the Colony and the Protectorate of 
Nigeria, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council so far as the 
provisions hereof relate to the Colony and to the Southern Provinces of the 
Protectorate, as follows :-”89 
Approved ordinances were then to be sent to the Chief Justice of Nigeria by the Governor 
before finally becoming official law within the protectorate.90 Promulgated laws were 
then further published in the Nigeria Gazette, specifying the date on which said laws 
were to be deemed operational. 91  
The Gazette was a kind of specialised newspaper in which new bills were to be published 
“for two full months … prior to enactment.” The intention was “to give time and 
opportunity for the expression of public opinion, including the opinion of those in 
England interested in Nigeria.”92 The utility of the Gazette, however, in relaying new and 
current laws to the general public, was brought into question in many early sessions of 
the Legislative Council. On considering the ‘Ordinance for the Limitation of Actions and 
for avoiding Suits at Law,’ Unofficial African member, Mr. Sapara Williams notes:  
“I find in this printed copy of the Bill certain objects and reasons which were not 
in the original copy published in the Gazette. First, that it is desirable in a large 
administration such as Southern Nigeria that the law … be clearly laid down so 
that it can be understood by everyone. The expression ‘should be clearly laid 
down so that it can be understood by everyone’ is a phrase getting quite old and 
                                               
89  See, ‘Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and 
Commander-in Chief of the Colony of Nigeria’ in CO 380 Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, 
Warrants, etc 1906-1925 Nigeria p. 10. See also Appendix E in this thesis for an example of an 
ordinance.  
90 ‘Order of the King in Council providing for the establishment of a Legislative Council in the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, 21 November, 1922’ p. 6, in CO 380, Letters Patent, Instructions, 
Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria. 
91 ‘Order of the King in Council providing for His Majesty’s Jurisdiction in the Protectorate of 
Nigeria’ p. 4, in CO 380, Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria. 
92 ‘Report by Sir F. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria’, October 1919 in 
Document CO 879: African 1063-1082, p. 19. See Appendix F in this thesis: ‘Example of the Nigerian 
Gazette’ from File CO 583/255/9: Executive Council Appointments. 
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hackneyed, used when no tangible reasons can be assigned for the introduction 
and passing of measures of doubtful utility and contrary to the interests of the 
Native community so that we unsophisticated Natives can not object.”93 
Mr. S. H. Pearse, Unofficial African member of the Legislative Council in 1914, put the 
matter more clearly: “Mr. Pearse did not consider the Nigeria Gazette a sufficient means 
by which to announce an election date to the public… the majority of the people, apart 
from the fact that they we illiterate [in English] were not subscribers to the Gazette nor 
did they at all see it. Even of the educated person a considerable number were not 
subscribers to the Gazette.”94 
2.2. African Participation in the Executive and Legislative Councils 
Despite the outwardly-ordered establishment of the Nigerian legal system and the 
Legislative Council that was responsible for its maintenance and upkeep, there were deep 
structural problems from the outset. This was most apparent in the make-up of both the 
Executive and Legislative Councils.  
So far as the laws were concerned, it was the role of the Executive Council to advise the 
Governor, and give its consideration concerning cases where a severe legal punishment 
was to be suffered by an offender; for instance, in the case of an imposed death penalty 
sentence. The Executive Council further had a role in giving its advice to the Governor in 
cases where the Governor wished to pardon a convicted offender.95  
                                               
93 Legislative Council Minutes 22nd April, 1910, in Document CO 592/11: Southern Nigeria 
Legislative Council Proceedings 1909-1913. 
94 Legislative Council Minutes, 14 May, 1919, in Document C0 657/29: Colonial Office Library. 
95 ‘Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and Commander-in 
Chief of the Colony of Nigeria’ in CO 380: Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants, etc 
1906-1925 Nigeria, pp. 15-16. 
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The Executive Council was composed of a Chief Secretary to the Government of Nigeria, 
a Chief Commissioner of the Northern Provinces of the Protectorate of Nigeria, a 
Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces, a Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces, 
an Attorney General, Financial Secretary, Commandant of the Nigeria Regiment (Royal 
West African Frontier Force), a Director of Medical Services, a Director of Education,  
“and such other persons as may from time to time be appointed by any Instruction 
or Warrant under Our Sign Manual and Signet or as the Governor, in pursuance of 
Instructions from Us through one of Our Principal Secretaries of State, may from 
time to time appoint by Instrument under the Public Seal of the Colony, or as may 
be provisionally appointed by the Governor in the manner hereinafter.”96 
It appears that for the majority of the life of the Executive Council, the membership was 
entirely European. There was an attempt, during the Second World War, to relieve the 
burden on the colonial Government in Nigeria by expanding the Council’s membership to 
include some temporary unofficial members some of whom would be Africans. In 
telegrams between the Governor of Nigeria and the then Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Lord Lloyd, there appears to be strong opposition from London towards the 
suggestion of any unofficial members being included among the Council’s membership, 
including Africans. This was at least the third time that the inclusion of an African 
membership within the decision-making process of the Executive Council was rejected 
by London.97  
                                               
96 ‘Additional Instructions pass under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Nigeria, respecting the Executive Council thereof’ pp. 1-2 in 
File CO 583/247/13: Constitution - Change of Official Titles – Amendment of Instruments.  
97 See File CO 583/247/1: Executive Council Appointments. 
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The Legislative Council consisted of Official Members including the “Governor as 
President... The members of the Executive Council. The ten senior officials for the time 
being lawfully discharging the functions of Senior Resident in Nigeria, and the Officers 
lawfully discharging the functions of Deputy Chief Secretary to Government, of 
Secretary, Northern Provinces and of Secretary, Southern Provinces. [As well as the] 
General Manager of the Railway, Director of Public Works and Postmaster-General.”98 
Official members of the Legislative Council including the above ex-officio members, 
who composed its official majority, numbered thirty Europeans in total.99  
The Council’s membership was completed by a number of nominated unofficial 
members, both African and European, subordinate to official members, and composed of 
“persons not holding office in Nigeria.” Unofficial members included at least “Four 
European members, nominated by the Governor, and representative as far as may be of 
the Commerce, Shipping, Mining, and Banking of Nigeria and at least a further three 
Europeans including “a member of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, and a member of 
the Chamber of Mines …together with a member resident in Nigeria of any Chamber of 
Commerce which may hereafter be established at Calabar.”100  
This information is verified by a January, 1940 List of Unofficial Members of the 
                                               
98 ‘Order of the King in Council providing for the Establishment of the Legislative Council for the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria’ in CO 380: Letters Patent Instructions Commissions Warrants 
etc, 1906-1925 Nigeria, p.2 This is verified by a 1938 list of Official Members of the Legislative 
Council of Nigeria in CO 583/247/2 – Legislative Council Appointments. 
99 ‘Draft Legislative Council Amendment, Order in Council, 1940’, in File CO 583/247/2: Legislative 
Council Appointments. See also ‘List of Official Members’ in same file. 
100 ‘Order in Council providing for the establishment of the Nigerian Council’ in Document CO 380, 
Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria p.2-5. 
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Legislative Council.101  Twelve African Unofficial Members, nominated by the 
Governor, completed the Legislative Council. Nominated Unofficial members could be 
reappointed for more than one period of 5 years102, preferably no more than twice.103 
Originally, the number of “native members” was intended to have totalled no more than 
six, nominated by the Governor, on the entire legislative body.104 With laws being passed 
by majority vote, it is unclear whether the 12 or so African Members would ever have 
been able to sway enough of the remaining 37 or so European Members to get a majority 
on their proposed bills.  
Further, the fact that the unofficial African members had to be nominated by the 
Governor and appointed to the Council, on approval from London, meant that only 
particular types of Nigerians whom the Governor found favourable found themselves 
members of the Legislative Council. “Mr. Carr is a full negro with an excellent record of 
Government service”, reads the September 1933 letter of one F.J. Pedler discussing the 
recommendations of then Governor of Nigeria, Donald Cameron.105 A 1940 list of 
Legislative Council Unofficial Members shows that Mr. Carr sat on the Council as 
member for the Colony Division between 4th October, 1933 and 3rd October, 1941.106  
                                               
101 See List of Official Members in Legislative Council of Nigeria in File CO 583/247/2: Legislative 
Council Appointments. 
102 Correspondence signed E.H Howell, dated 13/2/40 in File CO 583/247/2: Legislative Council 
Appointments. 
103 See’ Draft Nigeria (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1940’, p. 2 in File CO: 
583/247/2 Legislative Council Appointments. 
104 ‘Order in Council providing for the establishment of the Nigerian Council’ in Document CO 380, 
Letters Patent, Instructions, Commissions, Warrants etc 1906-1925 Nigeria, p. 3. 
105 F.J. Pedler Letter dated 22/9/1933 in File CO 563/588/2: Legislative Council Appointments. – 
Executive: etc.  
106 See List of Unofficial Members of the Nigerian Legislative Council in File CO 583/247/2: 
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Given the type of ‘Africans’ the colonial government would have found suitably 
ingratiated towards the colonial government to appoint to the Legislative Council, it is 
little surprising that the list of Council members shows Mr. Carr as having received an 
Order of the British Empire (O.B.E) and an Imperial Service Order (I.S.O). In the same 
letter, Mr. Pedler notes another of the Governor’s nominations, Mr. Alakija, as a man 
“frequently mentioned in the Lagos press in terms of respect, and is, I believe, the father 
of several sons who have had creditable academic records in the U.K and U.S.A.”107 Mr. 
Alakija also served on the Legislative Council from the 4th of October, 1933 till the 3rd of 
October, 1941. Mr. Benjamin Olisa-Eluka Amobi’s nomination was also recommended 
on the basis of his being “well-educated [and] well-behaved”108— he sat on the Council 
from 12th October, 1933 till 11th October, 1941. 
Although African Unofficial members were nominated to Council on the basis of what 
the Governor felt to be their respectability of character and ‘good behaviour’, as well as 
evidence of a history of affinity for the Colonial Government, based either on previous 
service or other types of attachment to the United Kingdom, there were still those on the 
Council who did not let this interfere with their certain displeasure towards the 
government.  
So much was the African contingent of the Legislative Council in the minority during 
                                               
Legislative Council Appointments. 
107 F.J. Pedler Letter dated 22/9/1933 in File CO 563/588/2 Legislative Council Appointments. – 
Executive: etc. 
108 Donald Cameron August 1933 letter to Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
CO 563/588/2 Legislative Council Appointments. – Executive: etc. 
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most of that body’s life that it regularly caused alarm among the more senior and vocal 
‘African’ members. In one particularly vexing case in 1931, The First Lagos Member, 
The Hon. Dr. C.C. Adeniyi-Jones, records his displeasure at the replacement of an 
African member, the deceased Chief Mba, with a non-African member, Archdeacon 
Basden which, he says, “will render the already small minority of African Membership 
still smaller.”109 The Archdeacon appears to have been put forward for the Legislative 
Council by one Mr. Hemmant without the authority of British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, to whom all such legal matters were referred in London before being enacted in 
Lagos.  
On the part of the British officials in charge of nominating members of the Council, 
particularly one Mr. A Fiddian, it at first appeared that the Archdeacon, who was the 
Secretary of the Niger Mission of the Church Missionary Society, would, as a missionary, 
“better… represent natives than… merchants or other interested parties should.”110 For 
his part, Sir Donald Cameron (Governor of Nigeria, 1931-1935) expressed that he “was 
not particularly in favour of the appointment of missionaries to represent Africans, and 
enquired whether the Ibos had been consulted.”111 Nevertheless, several communiques 
between Downing Street and Government House, Nigeria, between February and April 
1931, suggest that the matter of “finding suitable Africans” out of an “illiterate native 
population” was sufficiently difficult to secure the appointment of the Archdeacon to the 
                                               
109 Extract from Lagos Daily News of 16.2.31’ in File C0 583/177/2, Legislative Council 
Appointments. 
110 Letter dated 6th of February, 1931, in File CO 583/177/2: Legislative Council Appointments.  
111 Letter dated 11th of March, 1931, File CO 583/177/2, Legislative Council Appointments.  
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Council in spite of the disapproval of the existing African members.112  
It was not just with regards to the quantitative issue of their number that the African 
membership seemed at odds with the rest of the Legislative Council. On substantive 
issues of the law and its administration, they rarely seemed to hold any sway over, or be 
taken particularly seriously by, their European counterparts. 
In October 1909, all three African members of the Legislative Council at the time asked 
for the reading of the Seditious Offences Ordinance to be postponed so that it may be 
further considered by the Council and given time, after a translation into Yoruba, for the 
people to be made aware of it. There were three ways one could commit an offence under 
the law: “(1) Bringing into hatred and contempt or exciting disloyalty towards His 
Majesty of the Government of Southern Nigeria… (2) Promoting enmity between 
classes… (3) Statements or reports which make a public officer fail in his duties. If any 
public officer allege that public criticism of any kind weakens his hands in the 
performance of his duties…”113 The African members believed the Bill was being 
introduced by the government to stifle free speech against the colonial government. 
Despite pages of dissent from the African membership, the Bill was given a second 
reading and passed into committee on the very same day. At the Council meeting of the 
6th November, 1909, one month later, the bill was passed with all three African members 
dissenting.114 
                                               
112 File CO 583/177/2: Legislative Council Appointments.  
113 Legislative Council Minutes, 6th November, 1909 in Document CO 592/11: Southern Nigeria 
Legislative Council Proceedings 1909-1913. 
114 Legislative Council Minutes, 8th October, 1909 and Legislative Council Minutes, 6th November, 
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In 1916, the Honourable African Member, Mr. Pearse suggested that the Bill regarding 
the Criminal Code be amended to take into consideration the fact that some of its 
provisions regarding what parties were considered lawfully married and, therefore, not 
subject to giving evidence against their spouses, were not sufficiently considerate of 
Nigerian society. The clauses which read:  
“For the purposes of this section the terms ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ mean 
respectively husband and wife of a Christian marriage; and for the purposes of 
this and the following section the term ‘Christian marriage’ means a marriage 
which is recognised by the law of the place where it is contracted as the voluntary 
union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” And 
“Provided that in the case of a marriage by Mohammedan law neither party to 
such marriage shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to him 
or her by the other party during such marriage.” 
Mr. Pearse’s objection “that these provisions are class legislation, because people in the 
country think that they impose certain disabilities upon marriages other than a Christian 
marriage” would seem astute in a country that, certainly at the time, could not, without a 
high degree of conceit, be called ‘Christian’. Even to this day, many Nigerians, 
                                               
1909 in Document CO 592/11: Southern Nigeria Legislative Council Proceedings 1909-1913. See 
also Legislative Council Minutes 15th February, 1910 in CO 592/11: Southern Nigeria Legislative 
Council Proceedings 1909-1913. African member, Dr. Johnson proposes that it ought to be a law that 
a man convicted of manslaughter ought not to be allowed to continue in the employ of the 
government. Despite the seeming sensibility of the proposal, the Governor Walter Egerton asks him to 
provide a concrete case justifying the motion. Several cases are presented to the Governor in which 
Europeans in the employ of the government had been convicted of killing natives. The Governor, 
disputing the technicalities of the case, begs to leave the matter saying : “All I desire to say on this 
case is that I think it must be very well known to all honourable members that there is a very strict 
Government rule against employing in the Government Service persons convicted of serious offences, 
but to assent to a general motion that in no case shall a person convicted of manslaughter be further 
employed by the Government is, I submit, going very much too far.” Mr. Sapara Williams had noted 
during the previous discussion “there [had]been several cases in which natives who [had] been tried 
and acquitted were dismissed from Service”, giving greater understanding to Dr. Johnson’s comment 
that “we are always at a disadvantage in such matters.”  
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particularly in the south, are still practitioners of non-Western traditional religions, and 
polygamy remains in wide practice. 
Mr. Pearse was told by then-Acting Administrator Moorhouse that he was “not prepared 
to re-open discussion of a matter which has already received the most careful and 
thorough consideration of the Select Committee and the Council.”115 Mr. Pearse’s next 
objection was that it be discussed whether the Criminal Code imposed too high a penalty 
of two-years imprisonment on public servants who, as the law would have it, failed 
“without lawful excuse” to discharge duties required by “any Order in Council, 
Ordinance or Statute.” The term “without lawful excuse”, Mr. Pearse felt, was too wide 
and open to loose interpretation. Moorhouse, seemingly bored with the Unofficial 
Member’s insouciance, again dismissed the objection as having been sufficiently dealt 
with. Mr. Pearse, himself apparently fed-up with being dismissed, finally says: “I will not 
go any further with the objections that I had intended to raise at this meeting, seeing that 
the Committee are not prepared to re-open the discussion on them.”116 
Some seventeen years later, not very much appeared to have changed in the level of 
influence the African members were able to wield over Nigeria’s laws or in the body by 
which these laws were to be given legal authority. In the minutes for the 10th July, 1933 
session of the Legislative Council, Mr. Clinton, the Unofficial African Member for 
Calabar is recorded as having asked:  
                                               
115 ‘Minutes of the Proceedings of a meeting of the Legislative Council, 27th April, 1916’ in Document 
CO 657/29: Colonial Office Library.  
116 ‘Minutes of the Proceedings of a meeting of the Legislative Council, 27th April, 1916’ in Document 
CO 657/29: Colonial Office Library. 
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“seeing that the Gold Coast Government have at present two Africans engaged as 
Acting Puisne Judges and two substantive Police Magistrates, whether the 
Nigerian Government cannot relieve European Political Officers of Judicial duties 
by the appointment of some African Station Magistrates in the more settled 
districts of the Protectorate.”  
The answer given by the Chief Secretary to the Government is simply that such questions 
had been previously answered by the government to the effect that the latter did not feel 
that “suitable Africans” for such posts existed117 and that “under the new Protectorate 
Courts legislation, Station Magistrates will no longer be appointed as at present.”118 
On 29th November, 1937, the issue of marriage again arose. Mr. S.B. Rhodes, 
Honourable African Member for the Rivers Division, brought it to the government’s 
attention that the law on Marriage brought in by the Marriage Ordinance was not being 
properly understood by natives who were continuing simply to have their marriages 
‘blessed’ by various religious bodies according to native law and custom. Mr Rhodes 
suggested that the government make the promulgation of the Marriage Ordinance clearer 
to the general population who seemed to believe that traditional religious blessings 
sufficed to confer new legal status on their marriages beyond native law and custom. The 
response from the government was that Missionary Societies had already been sent to 
explain to the single case of which the colonial government was itself aware, that 
religious blessings “in accordance with native law and custom has no effect upon the 
legality of marriage.” Accordingly, and evidently contrary to Mr. Rhodes’ understanding, 
                                               
117 See Council Minutes 28th January, 1931 – response of the Administrator of the Colony to C.C. 
Adeniyi-Jones in Document CO 657/48: Legislative Council Minutes 1931-1939. 
118 ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the Legislative Council 10th July, 1933’ in Document CO 657/48: 
Legislative Council Minutes 1931-1939. 
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the government felt no further explanation to the wider public necessary.119  
Asked whether it is not “desirable for the government to introduce legislation to 
distinguish indictable offences in the Criminal Code from non-indictable offences” and 
whether “in order also to eliminate many trivial cases from the High Court … will 
Government introduce legislation to distinguish the offences triable by Magistrates (Full 
Powers) from offences triable by the High Court.” In response to these, as well as the 
suggestion of giving Magistrates a higher status, including powers of imprisonment, the 
government simply replies that these matters are under consideration and no further input 
from the African members is elicited on the subject.120  
And asked by the Honourable Unofficial African Member for the Egba Division, Mr. A. 
Alakija, whether “towns or other areas in the Protectorate ever have, like Calabar, a right 
to franchise by electing their representatives to the Legislative Council”, he is replied by 
the government that “it is not possible in the present stage of the political development of 
Nigeria to give even an approximate forecast of the areas to which and the time within 
which direct representation by election of members to this Council will be extended.”121 
It is not clear what difference any admission of elected Nigerian legislative 
representatives to the Legislative Council would have made either to the foundations of 
legal administration in Nigeria or to what was the law itself. Even for the few Unofficial 
                                               
119 Legislative Council Minutes, 29th November, 1937 in Document CO 657/48: Legislative Council 
Minutes 1931-1939. 
120 Legislative Council Minutes 28th November, 1938, in Document CO 657/48: Legislative Council 
Minutes 1931-1939. 
121 Legislative Council Minutes 28th November, 1938, in Document CO 657/48, Legislative Council 
Minutes 1931-1939. 
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African members who were on the Legislative Council, it is clear from the many minutes 
of the Legislative Council that throughout the multiple decades of its existence, the 
African membership, particularly those of the more vocal African Members, were 
constantly ignored or given short shrift by the government.122  
It is possible that an African membership elected by their own Nigerian constituents, 
rather than nominated by the Colonial Government, might have been even more vocal in 
feeling more forcefully their charge of protecting the interests of the Nigerians by whom 
they were elected. Nevertheless, given the complete disdain with which local Nigerians, 
including even the most educated of these, were viewed by the Colonial Government as 
never being quite sophisticated or civilised enough to even know what was in their own 
interest, it is a supposition quite unlikely.  
Within the first few years of the Legislative Council’s existence, this state of disdainful 
affairs was already the cause of much discontent among the Legislative Council’s 
membership. In a 1909 dissent by Honourable Unofficial Member C.A. Sapara Williams, 
on the issues of the 1910 expenditures, the African member writes:  
“If the keen but always fair criticisms suggested by the Native Un-official 
Members are to be ridden over in such a deplorable and roughshod manner by the 
Official Members as depicted so very clearly in every line of this report, and 
without giving any indication of their opinion during the discussion in Committee, 
                                               
122 The rebuffing of questions from African members happens at several points throughout the minutes 
of Legislative Council meetings between 1931 and 1939. See Document CO657/48. See also, 
‘Minutes of a meeting of the Legislative Council, 20th July, 1931’ in Document CO657/48. Adeniyi-
Jones asks why the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has not been extended to cover areas at the time 
under the inefficient provincial courts system. He is told the matter is under consideration. His next 
question is recorded as disallowed.  
 
49 
 
 
then I for one must record my extreme regret that I should have been called upon 
to make such useless sacrifice of my time.”123 
Further, of the handful of motions that were put forward by the Legislative Council’s 
African members, even fewer appear to secure enough votes to be carried. This was in 
contrast to motions and resolutions put forward by European members, and which were 
often either carried unanimously or with a majority vote. In the very few cases where the 
Council minutes record resolutions or motions made by an African member, they are 
almost always lost.124 Indeed, the list of passed ordinances that appear at the end of the 
Legislative Council minutes all appear to first be motioned by a European member, 
usually the Attorney-General (or another Official European Member) and seconded by 
another Official European member before being successfully carried.125  
2.3. Other Foundational Issues 
The large issue of official personnel in the legal system – the fact that the Chief justice, 
other court justices, as well as the most prominent legal advisers, were not drawn from 
the number of qualified Nigerians that may have been available at the time – were not the 
                                               
123 ‘Minutes of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 6th October, 1909’, in Document CO 
592/11: Southern Nigeria Legislative Council Proceedings 1909-1913. 
124 Legislative Council Minutes, 3rd December, 1935, in Document CO 657/48: Legislative Council 
Minutes 1931-1939. The motion by the Member for the River Division that a scholarship fund be 
created for “deserving Nigerian youths to complete their studies abroad” is lost by eight votes to 
eighteen. All members voting for (with the possible exception of one) are African and all voting 
against, European.  
In another rare motion put forward, and seconded, by African Membership, it was proposed that 
action and legislation be introduced to tackle unemployment. The government stated it would give the 
measure consideration and that a committee be appointed to examine it. The motion was withdrawn. 
See Legislative Council Minutes 6th March, 1935 in Document CO 657/48: Legislative Council 
Minutes 1931-1939. 
125 See Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1931-1939, Document CO657/48. 
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only foundational problems faced by the Nigerian legal system.126 A number of issues 
made administrative reform of the legal and judicial system imperative from at least the 
late 1930s. The duplication of superior courts127, the stiflingly low number of persons 
deemed qualified to practice as Supreme Court Judges that meant that European judges, 
having spent “many years in tropical service,” were having “almost complete 
breakdown[s].”128 Complaints to the Colonial Office in London from the Chief Justice, 
made via then-Governor McPherson, note that the shortage in the number of colonial 
judges further meant that there was an arrear “of unheard cases… At the close of 1944 
there were 623 cases outstanding and this figure had grown to 670 by the end of 1947.”129  
Records suggest that although London did not believe it would be able to fulfil the Chief 
Justice’s request for an increase from twelve to seventeen new judges, it did wish to fill at 
least one of the vacancies with one P.C. Hubbard, the ex-Palestine Puisne Judge.130 Some 
fifteen years after recommendations from African members of the Legislative Council 
that there were indeed Africans who were qualified131, and that these be appointed as 
                                               
126 The ordinance enabling Crown legal advisers to practice “ex-officio: in the Courts of Nigeria is 
further documented in a December, 1936 correspondence between Government House of Nigeria and 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in File CO 583/222/3: ‘Law Officers Legislation’. See also 
File CO 583/222/1: Judicial System in Nigeria. 
127 See File CO 583/222/1: Judicial System in Nigeria. 
128 Letter dated 8th June 1948, from Governor Macpherson detailing the position of the Chief Justice to 
one A. Creech Jones, Secretary for the Colonies in File CO 583/298/3: Supreme Court Establishment. 
129 Letter dated 8th June 1948, from Governor Macpherson detailing the position of the Chief Justice to 
A. Creech Jones, Secretary for the Colonies in File CO 583/298/3: Supreme Court Establishment.  
130 Outward Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Macpherson Sent 17th 
November, 1948 in File CO 583/298/3: Supreme Court Establishment. 
131 It was the persistent suggestion of African members such as C.C. Adeniyi-Jones and A. Alakija 
that there were indeed many Africans sufficiently qualified to fill posts in the government’s 
administration. See Legislative Council Minutes 28 January, 1931, 20th July, 1931, 12th June, 1934, 
18th May, 1936, in Document CO 657/48: Legislative Council Minutes 1931-1939. 
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judges and substantive magistrates, the Colonial Government still found Europeans with 
previous experience serving in Palestine preferable.  
Further, there seems to have been a shortage of local men who could be appointed even 
as junior magistrates—a shortage that could only, so far as British officials were 
concerned, be stemmed after the many Nigerian natives wishing to be law officers had 
finished training in law school in England.132 These were all administrative issues in need 
of review. But at the root of them all, from the backlog of cases, to the insufficient 
number of magistrates, to the number of colonial judges who seemed unable to sustain 
themselves in high temperatures, was the greater problem of an indigenous population 
that the Colonial Government could not trust with the establishment or workings of a 
legal system, which was from the outset never set up to be their own. It is this deeper 
issue that explains some of the present disabilities apparent in the Nigerian legal system 
today. 
Some of this understanding is given in the writings of two of Nigeria’s most prominent 
Colonial Governors. Of the Legislative Council, which was the only body concerned with 
legislative enactments containing African members, the first Governor of Colonial 
Nigeria writes, in a 1919 report, that due to the Council being largely composed of those 
representing “unofficial European interests” as well as native unofficials who 
“necessarily represented only the small, though important, class of educated natives of 
the coast”, the Legislative Council could not be viewed as representative of the interests 
                                               
132 Letter dated 28.6.48 detailing discussions with Sir John Verity, Chief Justice, Nigeria in File CO 
583/298/3: Supreme Court Establishment. 
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of the whole native population and certainly not of the interests of those in the north 
“where the intelligent Emirs are in acute divergence in religion and social status from the 
natives of the coast.” In Lugard’s view, and which would be corroborated some nearly 
twenty years later by Governor Bourdillon, “the Council is necessarily deprived of 
initiative, personal knowledge, and debating power.133 In short, the African members 
were too few, and had been made too powerless, to make any significant contribution to 
the substantive workings of the Legislative Council.  
The real process of law-making then, so far as Lugard recounts it, was that laws strictly 
relating to the Lagos Colony were passed by the Legislative Council while “those for the 
[whole] Protectorate … are enacted by the Governor-General after review in Executive 
Council. The majority of Ordinances apply wholly or in part to both [Northern and 
Southern Nigeria] and are passed ‘in so far as they relate to the Colony’ by the 
Legislative Council and assented to by the Governor, who simultaneously enacts them for 
the Protectorate.”134  
Lugard’s explanation of who or what body was primarily responsible for law-making in 
Nigeria after amalgamation seems merely an explanation of technicalities. It was, in the 
large part, the same ordinances passed by the Legislative Council for the Lagos Colony 
that were then enacted by the Governor for the entire Protectorate. And it was the 
Governor who was, in any case responsible for assenting to, upon approval from London, 
                                               
133 ‘Report by Sir F. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, October 1919’ 
in Document CO 879: African 1063-1082, p.19. 
134 ‘Report by Sir F. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria’, October 1919 
in Document CO 879 African 1063-1082, p.20. 
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all bills—be they for the Colony or the Protectorate and which were, as Lugard clarifies, 
mostly the same.  
What is illuminating about Lugard’s report is in acknowledging that the composition of 
the Legislative Council made it an entirely implausible vehicle for representative law-
making in the interests of the whole Protectorate, Lugard is assured, at least with regard 
to himself as at the time holding the position of Governor, that the best representative of 
the legal interests of the whole native Nigerian public was the colonial Governor. The 
patent inability of the system of Legislative Council to sufficiently represent the interests 
of the native population when it came to making laws meant, according to Lugard, that a 
“responsible autocracy [was] preferable.”135  
It is not that there were not those within the British administration that did not see the 
sense of Nigerians being involved in the major structural components of their own 
country, but there were not many; and even those such as they were, were never as 
progressive in their ideas as they imagined. Nevertheless, it was with the notion in mind 
that Nigeria was greater advanced by the increased involvement of Nigerians in their own 
affairs that those such as Bernard Bourdillon (Governor of Nigeria, 1935-1943) defended 
the British method of indirect rule. Bourdillon’s argument was levelled against those who 
believed that in being local agents of foreign British rule, native authorities and indirect 
rule would be an impediment to democratic self-government as it would serve to 
                                               
135 ‘Report by Sir F. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria’, October 1919 
in Document CO 879 African 1063-1082, pp. 19-20. 
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dislocate the sympathies of the population from traditional authorities.136 Bourdillon 
sought to convince those who saw the British administration of indirect rule as being 
problematic and defective.137  
Bourdillon writes in a 1939 memorandum, titled ‘Memorandum on the Future Political 
Development of Nigeria’, “there is no other territory in the British Empire in which we 
have a good chance of guiding a subject people along the road to responsible self-
government with the minimum of friction and the maximum of contentment.” This, 
Bourdillon reasoned, was a result of the fact that the traditional administrations that the 
British had found in Nigeria were not, in many respects dislocated from the “civilised 
methods” subsequently imposed.138 It was on this basis that Bourdillon advocates that 
                                               
136 The problems of indirect rule, as were then viewed by the British, are elaborated in a note in a 9 
October, 1939 note signed ‘J.L. Keith; in File CO583/244/1: Native Administration and Central 
Government, Appointment of Revenue and Functions.  
There is no doubt that whatever the appearance given in Bourdillon’s memorandum on Nigeria’s 
potential for indigenous self-government, his own view of the primary function of the Native 
Administrations was in line with prevailing understanding of them as “agencies of an alien 
government” J.L Keith note. Bourdillon himself describes the Native Administrations as “no local 
authorities” but “an integral part of the machinery of [the colonial] Government … designed with the 
very definite aim of educating the people politically and administratively. See “Apportionment of 
Revenue and Duties as between the Central Government and Native Administrations’, p. 6 in File 
CO583/244/1 Native Administration and Central Government, Appointment of Revenue and 
Functions. The difference, I suppose, in Bourdillon’s views was the limited understanding that the 
“educational” programme of British policy could be more easily absorbed under indirect than direct 
rule and that indirect rule could more easily lead to eventual self-government than direct rule, since as 
he writes in his 1939 memorandum that “if an alien bureaucracy can govern through the agency of 
indigenous institutions, there appears to be no valid reason why a native Central Government should 
not do the same.” See Bourdillon Memorandum on ‘the Future Political Development of Nigeria’, p. 5 
in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
137 This appears to be the view held by Miss Perham, and with which Bourdillon disagrees. See 
Bourdillon Memorandum pp. 4-7 in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
Also see Mr. Dawe’s response to Bernard Bourdillon’s memorandum in File CO 583/244/22; Future 
Political Development of Nigeria. 
138 Bourdillon Memorandum p. 1 in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria.  
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indirect rule through the use of  
“Native Administrations constituted … the best instruments for the good 
government of the people at the minimum expense, but they are also (and this 
point is of the utmost importance) the most flexible and most easily adapted to 
changing conditions. Experience in Nigeria has proved beyond a shadow of a 
doubt that the more the people themselves have had a say in the constitution of a 
Native Administration the more ready they are to acknowledge defects themselves 
and find the remedy. They may be discontented with a constitution that has been 
thrust upon them, but their discontent in that case tends to be driven underground 
and to result in mere stubborn opposition and not in constructive suggestions for 
amendment.”139 
Even here however, Bourdillon’s understanding of a merely political framework for a 
single Nigerian state is not as enlightened as he thinks. Independent “constitutional 
development,” Bourdillon writes in an additional note dated 14th November, 1939, “must 
of necessity be of very slow growth and in such a form that it can be understood by the 
people.” “The conception of a Nigeria represented in respect of all its greatly varying 
divisions, by elected representatives, is not for many years to come, if ever, either 
practicable or desirable.”140  
In any case, so far as the issue of influence over the laws that would substantively apply 
to any political structure that Nigeria could be made to undertake, Bourdillon’s 
memorandum verifies the image given by much of the records of the Legislative Council 
sessions.  
“The third line of progress”, he writes “is that of increasing the importance of the 
part played by the African unofficial members of the central Legislature, with the 
object of making them feel that they are really part of the machine, and that their 
opinions and advice are given full weight. There can be no doubt whatever that 
my predecessor had the confidence of and the respect of the African members of 
                                               
139 Bourdillon Memorandum p. 3 in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
140 Note by Bernard Bourdillon in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
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the Legislative Council… But he did not encourage lively debate in that body; his 
disapproval of initiative on the part of the official members made them hesitate to 
open their mouths… The result was that I found the debates in the Council 
completely lacking in life and the whole proceedings most unconvincing. The 
effect upon the unofficial members was to make them feel that no attention was 
paid to what they said and that the Government had made up its mind before they 
spoke and consequently did not bother to answer their arguments.”141  
Bourdillon’s recommendations were that the Legislative Council be reformed to include 
“adequate native representation from the North”; and either significantly increasing the 
official membership or making the unofficial members number in majority on the 
provision that the latter would be given “a considerable measure of responsibility”, which 
at the time they did not have.142  
As for the Executive Council, Bourdillon’s suggestion to include one unofficial African 
among its membership was not the first of its kind. The suggestion had previously been 
raised in 1930 and had been rejected in a despatch from London by then Secretary of the 
Colonies, Lord Passfield.143 Bourdillon notes in his 1939 memorandum that he again put 
the suggestion to the Council, whose members advised that he not “proceed with the 
proposal for the present.”144  
To Bourdillon’s credit, a record of the 29th September, 1942 Nigeria Gazette suggests that 
                                               
141 Bourdillon Memorandum p.11 in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
142 Bourdillon Memorandum p. 9 in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
143 In 1930, Governor Thomson had written to London to request the appointment of Sir Kitoyi Ajasa, 
OBE to the Executive Council. The response that although Sir Kitoyi was a suitable African, the fact 
that it was perceived that there were none but he and Mr. Carr who could perform that role made this 
proposal premature since once “when they cease to be available, there is not likely to be … a single 
African fit for appointment” to what would inevitably become a permanent position, Letter signed 
V.E.W Hood 1.8.30 in File CO 583 in Box 174/6 – Constitution of the Executive and Legislative 
Councils. 
144 Bourdillon Memorandum p. 12 in File CO 583/244/22: Future Political Development of Nigeria. 
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three African members were finally appointed as unofficial members to the Executive 
Council in October, 1942.145 It also appears that for the last decade or so before Nigeria 
gained independence, the constitution of the Legislative Council was changed to increase 
the Unofficial African membership to a majority of approximately twenty-three Africans 
to twenty-two Europeans.146  
The significance of the historical development of Nigeria’s legal system is two-fold—one 
more pertinent than the other. It is not simply that many of the initial laws that composed 
the Nigerian legal system, and the system itself, were simply shipped in wholesale via 
telegram. It is further that having established the Nigerian legal system, from the creation 
of a courts system, to the implementation of a criminal code and a system of police, 
prisons, and legal sanctions, Nigerians were then prevented from having any say in how 
that system ought to operate, nor were they minimally, nevermind intimately, allowed to 
be involved in the administration of that system.  
The effect is that even the notion of the development of Nigeria’s legal structure as 
something that Nigerians have intricately worked on and that has grown to be the 
embodiment of values that they have given it, and which reside in themselves also, rather 
than as something that was simply hand-delivered into their midst and the work of which 
is better located in London than it is Lagos or Abuja, is simply illusory.  
This historical lack of ownership, and of Nigerian participation in the building of a legal 
structure whose purpose it has only, in the last few decades, been capable of determining 
                                               
145 See Appendix F in this thesis. See also File CO 583/255/9: Executive Council Appointments. 
146 File CO 1018/34: Nigeria-General, pp.2-4. 
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for itself, continues to be displayed in the current function of Nigerian legality. As will be 
shown in the next chapter, examination of many of the cases that have proceeded through 
the Nigerian courts in the more recent post-Independence era suggest that it is a legality 
that, in many respects, continues for its legal sanctity to rely on its British constructors; 
and for which many Nigerians, including those who ought to be the system’s most ardent 
defenders—that is, judges, have shown themselves to lack a most basic respect.   
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Chapter 3: Explaining Disobedience in the Nigerian Legal System 
3.1. The Nigerian Legal System Today  
Despite gaining Independence on 1st October, 1960, till at least 1963, the connection 
between the now-independent Nigerian legal system and that of the United Kingdom was 
apparent in more than just the written law. Various correspondence between the British 
High Commission in Lagos, The Royal Courts of Justice, the British Attorney General, 
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, suggest that appeals from the Federal 
Supreme Court of Nigeria were still given hearing at the Privy Council in London on the 
basis that “Orders in Council determining appeals will be given effect in Nigeria … and 
… no alteration will be made in Nigerian law which would necessitate any change in 
procedure of the Privy Council.”147 
Regardless of the appearance given by the persistent attachment of the Nigerian legal 
system to British law, it was certainly not the case that prior to becoming a protectorate 
under the British Empire, there was no form of law in what is now modern-day Nigeria. 
“In the territories now constituting the southern states and some parts of the territories 
which now form the northern states the law in force was unwritten customary law,”148 
including the existence of indigenous courts. Nevertheless,  
“the introduction of English law into the British Colony of Lagos [and eventually 
into the whole Nigerian protectorate] marked a turning point in the history of the 
legal system of Nigeria… [T]he three classes of English law received during this 
                                               
147 Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, stamped 28 October, 1963 in File 
LO/2/896: Nigerian Appeals to the Privy Council  
148 Akintunde Olusegun Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited, 1979) 
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period – the common law, equity and English statutes – are today, more than one 
century after the first reception, still sources of Nigerian law.”149  
The sources of Nigerian law today are “(1) Nigerian legislation, … (2) received English 
law comprising (i) the common law; (ii) the doctrines of equity; (iii) statutes of general 
application in force in England on January 1, 1900; (iv) statutes and subsidiary legislation 
on specified matters (b) English law made before October 1, 1960 and extending to 
Nigeria (3) Customary law, (4) Judicial precedents.”150 
The received English law, unlike its 19th century introduction are now those laws that 
have been “introduced into Nigeria directly by Nigerian legislation.”151 On the other 
hand, English law extending to Nigeria “consists of statutes and subsidiary legislation 
made on or before October 1, 1960 [the day of Nigeria’s Independence,] and not yet 
repealed by an appropriate authority in Nigeria.”152 
A court’s ability to administer the received English Law and the ways in which the 
received law is to be applied are usually provided for in the “enactment which created the 
court and subsidiary legislation made under the enactment. For instance, various High 
Court enactments, the magistrates’ courts Laws of the southern States and the District 
Courts legislation of the northern States contain such provisions.” The enactments of the 
various received laws are essentially the same in wording. Section 2 of the Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, for instance, reads as follows: 
                                               
149 Ibid, p.20. 
150 Ibid, pp. 55-56. 
151 Ibid, p.81 See also B.O. Nwabueze, The Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (London: Butterworth 
&Co., 1963), pp. 17-19.  
152 Ibid, Obilade, p. 81. 
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“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and except in so far as other 
provision is made by any Federal or State enactment, the common law of England 
and the doctrines of equity, together with the statutes of general application that 
were in force in England on the first day on January, 1900, shall be in force in the 
Lagos State.” 
(2) The statutes of general application referred to in subsection (1) together with 
any other Act of Parliament with respect to a matter within the legislative 
competence of the Lagos State which has been extended or applied to the Lagos 
State shall be in force so far only as the limits of local jurisdiction and local 
circumstance shall permit and subject to any Federal or State law.”153 
There are, in addition, the myriad state laws that modify the nature and force by which 
English Law may apply, subject to the clause contained in the above subsection (2) – that 
English Common law is in force dependent on any local enactments also in force and 
relating to it. So, for instance, the procedural rules of the High Court of the western states 
of Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo, for instance, provide that it is the procedure and practice 
currently in force in England that shall also be in force in these states. The eastern states, 
on the other hand, have in their statute receiving English Law that the procedures and 
practices of the eastern courts are to be exercised in the manner that obtained in the “High 
Court of Justice in England” on the last day of September, 1960. Further, where a local 
enactment exists covering the “subject matter of a rule of the received law”, it is the 
former, not the latter, that is to be applied.154 It is in this way, that “the influence of 
received English statutory laws as a source of Nigerian law has been … affected by 
changes instituted by Nigerian legislation.”155  
As Akintunde Olusegun Obilade notes, however, this process of making indigenous to 
                                               
153 Ibid, pp.69-70. 
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the Nigerian context, English laws both past and present, has been a very gradual,156 and 
partial, one. It is to be wondered whether, when the Honourable Unofficial African 
Member of the Legislative Council stated in a 1909 session that “the Common Law of 
England, the doctrines of Equity and the Statutes of general application which were in 
force in England on the 1st January, 1900, were brought into force in this Colony by the 
Statute Law Revision Ordinance No. 3 of 1908157”, he could have imagined these would 
be of any relevance to an independent Nigeria over one hundred years later.158  
It is the contention of this thesis that what may be generously described as a system now 
sub-optimally functioning is the result of a distinct lack of ownership of the Nigerian 
legal system by Nigerians themselves. A system which, despite being set down in ordered 
fashion, rested as the historical documentation evidences, on the persistent inability of 
Nigerians to participate either in the formation of the system’s foundations or to have any 
meaningful influence in the laws that now make-up a sizeable portion of Nigerian law.159 
3.2. Contempt, Abuse, and More Abuse 
The image given by much of the secondary literature of the Nigerian legal system today 
as one not operating in full health is verified by far too many cases in the Nigerian 
                                               
156 Op. Cit., Obilade, p. 77. 
157 Legislative Council Minutes of the 8th October, 1909, in Document CO 592/11: Southern Nigeria 
Legislative Council Proceedings 1909-1913. 
158 It is a point of no small importance that as Obilade notes, “One of the notable characteristics of the 
Nigerian legal system is the tremendous influence of English law upon its growth. The historical link 
of the country with England has left a seemingly indelible mark upon the system: English law forms a 
substantial part of Nigerian law.” Op. Cit., Obilade, p. 4.  
159 As Obilade writes: “Although the reception of English law was effected by local legislation, it 
should be noted that the legislation was passed not by a body of indigenous people but by the British 
Administration.” Ibid, p. 20.  
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Weekly Law Reports (NWLR). In particular, cases of abuse-of-court process so pervade 
the reports that it is questionable whether the Nigerian judicial system has any time, or 
capacity, to justly deal with cases of more substantive law.  
Take, for instance, the 1999 case in which the respondent, one Dr. Ojo, lent the sum of 
N500,000 to the appellant, Mr. Akintunde. The monies borrowed were based on the 
agreement that Mr. Akintunde would pay a monthly N40,000 interest. Both parties lived 
in Ondo State, and sometime later a rift occurred between them in which Dr. Ojo is held 
to have become hostile to Mr. Akintunde. On 25th November, 1999 Dr. Ojo took two 
policemen from the police station at Ado-Ekiti in Ekiti State to arrest Mr. Akintunde, 
falsely claiming that the latter had stolen N500,000 from him. Then on 7th March, 2000, 
Dr. Ojo again used the Ekiti State Police to lure Mr. Akintunde on the pretence that a 
settlement would occur, only for Mr. Akintunde to find himself locked up at a police 
station in Ekiti State. Subsequently, Dr. Ojo filed a writ of summons at the Ado-Ekiti 
High Court on which he put forward the imaginary address of the Ekiti Police Station as 
Mr. Akintunde’s address where the writ of summons was served on him, knowing full 
well the latter lived in Ondo State. All events prior to filing the writ of summons appear 
to have occurred without warrant for arrest or indeed any court procedure justifying the 
incarceration of Mr. Akintunde.160  
On 13th March, 2000, Mr. Akintunde was freed from prison, returned to Ondo where he 
actually lives, and appealed against the writ of summons on the basis that the Ekiti High 
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Court had no jurisdiction over a matter issuing from neighbouring Ondo State and further 
objecting to the creation of an imaginary address for him that was within the Ekiti State 
court’s jurisdiction. The court dismissed his objections merely as an irregularity. It was 
only on reaching the Court of Appeal that it was determined that Dr. Ojo had used the 
police to commit unlawful acts, including unlawful arrest and detention, and there was 
“no iota of law” supporting either Dr. Ojo’s conduct or the failure of the lower court 
“without respect for the rules of court and that of law” to dutifully address said 
conduct.161   
Such cases whereby the law is used, as in the above instance, to commit injustice, or in 
many other instances, to subvert swift legal procedure appears as a plague on the 
Nigerian legal system. As such, the law reports frequently give account to cases of ‘abuse 
of court process’ in which persons who dislike judgements given against them proceed to 
knowingly manipulate the judicial process in a manner that only serves to debilitate the 
procedure of law in Nigeria.   
On 29th August, 2000, in African Reinsurance Corporation v JDP Construction Nigeria 
Limited, the respondent in the case filed a suit claiming various monetary reliefs 
amounting to USD 2,755,618.85 against the appellant. Instead of filing a statement of 
defence, the appellant in the case went ahead and raised preliminary objection on the 
grounds that the trial court had no jurisdiction. On 26th October, 2000, the judge in the 
case, B.O. Shitta-Bey J, dismissed the objection; she further ordered the appellant to file a 
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statement of defence within 7 days. Rather, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal 
and then filed an application for a stay of proceedings at the trial court. The trial court 
duly dismissed the application for a stay, only to have the appellant file an application for 
a stay of proceedings at the Court of Appeal. The latter court also refused. The appellant 
then appealed against the appeal court’s decision to the Supreme Court. While this 
application with the Supreme Court was still pending, on 25th March, 2002, the appellant 
filed yet another application in the Supreme Court for an interim order that any 
proceedings before the High Court “be stayed or that judgement not be delivered.” While 
the appellants applications to the Supreme Court were yet to be heard, the High Court 
made judgment in favour of the respondent awarding her monetary claims against the 
appellant. The latter proceeded to appeal against the High Court’s judgment to the Court 
of Appeal. When the latter court again dismissed the appellant’s appeal, the appellant on 
29th November, 2002, filed another application before the Supreme Court to set aside the 
High Court’s judgment. In this case, the Supreme Court determined a clear abuse-of-
court process.162  
Such cases dealing with abuses of judicial procedure so pervade the Nigerian law reports 
that they now appear to outnumber serious cases in need of swift judgment. Another case, 
in which the ruling of the Supreme Court serves to emphasise the misuse that perpetually 
appears to be made of Nigeria’s judicial process, involved the death of one Mr. Friday 
Ojichie.163 In Agwasim v. Ojichie, the respondents, David Ojichie and Mrs. Cecilia 
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Ojichie, the dependants of the deceased, filed an action for damages at the High Court of 
Delta State. The Ojichies claimed negligence against the appellants as the owners and 
drivers of the bus that collided with the vehicle in which Friday Ojichie was a passenger 
near Okuokoko village along Ughelli/Warri Road on 31st December, 1986. The High 
Court delivered judgment in favour of the Ojichies on the 25th August, 1997 and awarded 
damages against the appellants in the amount of N453,970. Dissatisfied with the ruling, 
the appellants filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the 
25th January, 1999. Again displeased with this ruling, the appellants filed two processes 
at the same time. One with the Supreme Court asking it to set aside the Court of Appeal’s 
dismissal, and another yet again with the Court of Appeal asking it to restore the appeal 
dismissed on 25th January, 1999. The second motion to the Court of Appeal was heard 
and struck out by the Court on 7th July, 1999. “Still undaunted, the appellants … on 16th 
July, 1999 lodged before [Supreme Court] an appeal against the ruling of the Court of 
Appeal delivered on 7th July, 1999.”164  
In determining an abuse-of-court process and before dismissing the appellants’ appeal 
before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court Justices noted that  
“a litigant has no right to pursue pari passu two processes which will have the 
same effect in two courts at the same time, with a view to obtaining victory in one 
of the processes or in both. Litigation is not a game of chess where players 
outsmart themselves by dexterity of purpose and traps. On the contrary, litigation 
is a contest by judicial process where parties place on the table of justice their 
different positions clearly, plainly and without tricks.”165 
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By the extent, however, to which the law reports are burdened by abuse-of-court cases, it 
is unclear that anybody but the Supreme Court Justices, is aware, or indeed cares, not to 
distort the Nigerian judicial process simply as a way of not accepting trial rulings.166  
Although more numerous and crippling in their effect of grinding the judicial process to a 
halt, abuse-of-court cases are at least those in which the parties to a case acknowledge the 
utility (albeit with malign intent) of the legal system. In many other cases, parties simply 
refuse to obey or adhere to a judgement.  
On 14th February, 2007, the respondent in F.C.D.A v. Koripamo-Agary, filed suit with 
regards to the property at No. 58 Kwame Nkurumah Crescent, Asokor, Abuja. Ms. 
Koripamo-Agary further sought to restrain the appellants – who were then the minister of 
the Federal Capital Territory and the latter’s executive secretary – from evicting her from 
said property, and from, in any way, interfering with the property at no. 58 until the time 
of the hearing of the suit. On 19th February, the trial court at Abuja made the order 
restraining the appellants from evicting Ms. Koripamo-Agary and from interfering with 
the property. On 20th February, the court bailiff served the appellants with certified copies 
of the court order as well as the suit on notice. A week later, on the 27th of the same 
month, the appellants served Ms. Koripamo-Agary with a letter ordering her leave the 
property at no. 58 within 48 hours or be forcefully ejected. On 1st March, 2007, the 
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appellants forcefully removed Ms. Koripamo Agary from the property.167  
In many cases, so flabbergasted are contemnors in a case that they should be found guilty 
for their contempt, that they inevitably appeal. Take, for instance, a case where a party 
files a motion at the Chief Magistrates Court to have his dead father buried at a particular 
site. His affidavit, containing nothing in abrogation of the relevant requirements of the 
Burials Law of Ogun State, is granted by the court. Only for the court to be made aware 
that the deceased had no right to be buried in the particular area due to the fact that the 
site was actually a community building, and not the deceased’s personal property, and in 
which the deceased had only been allowed to live while he was in the employ of the then 
Baale (Chief) as a farm hand. Upon realising that the application for burial had not 
disclosed the real facts, the Chief Magistrate’s Courts proceeds to set aside its own order 
and further orders that the body be exhumed and buried in a more appropriate setting. In 
Odu v. Jolaoso, Mr. Olufemi Odu, son of the deceased, then appealed to the High Court 
to set aside the Chief Magistrate’s exhumation order. His appeal was dismissed. He 
further appealed to the Court of Appeal, but then abandoned the appeal—all the while in 
contempt of the order by the Chief Magistrate to exhume his father’s body. At the High 
Court, committal proceedings for Mr. Odu’s contempt were filed by the respondents to 
the case, but these failed on account of not having been properly issued in accordance 
with the rules of the High Court. By the time the respondents renew committal 
proceedings, Mr. Odu had filed an action at the High Court claiming title to the land 
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which he evidently did not own. During this action, the judge hears the application for Mr 
Odu’s committal for contempt and the application succeeds with Mr. Odu being granted 
bail in the amount of N50,000. Persisting with an appeal to the Court of Appeal against 
the High Court’s contempt judgement, Mr. Odu questioned whether the lower court was 
right to convict him of contempt and label him a contemnor despite the Chief 
Magistrate’s court having already determined him so and the matter before the High 
Court being merely what punishment he ought to face. Determining that an award of bail 
was a far lenient punishment than an immediate remand to custody, which Mr. Odu 
deserved, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Odu’s appeal. This case, which began in 
1995, was carried on till 2005 because, undeterred that a court order should in any way 
circumscribe what he was and was not able to do, Mr. Odu filed yet another appeal with 
the Supreme Court, which was summarily dismissed with the additional award of 
N10,000 against Mr. Odu.168  
It is not only ordinary citizens who fail to revere the Nigerian legal system, but those, 
also, in positions of executive leadership, on whose example to the rest of society, the 
system most surely relies. In A.G. Lagos v A.G. Federation, the Supreme Court ruled, in 
December 2004, that the Federal Government had no right to withhold federal transfers 
meant for the Lagos State Local Government Council. The 2004 ruling relied on a 2002 
Supreme Court ruling in A.G. Ogun & Ors v. A.G. Federation, in which the Court 
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determined that it was the responsibility of the Federal States to manage and maintain the 
monies allocated by the federal government to their Local Government Areas (LGAs) 
and not that of the federal government. Justice Michal Ogundare stated: “the Constitution 
intends that everything relating to local government be in the province of the State 
Government rather than in that of the Government of the Federation.”169  
The government, however, refused to comply with the decision in the case of five states, 
Lagos among them. When Lagos State brought the case before the Supreme Court in 
2004, the Court reiterated its previous decision. “But the federal executive, to the chagrin 
of Chief Justice Uwais, held on to the disputed funds… Although an informal political 
settlement secured a partial release of the funds in February 2006 … the federal executive 
continued to withhold portions of these funds until” after, in fact, the President had left 
office, nearly three years after the initial ruling in May, 2007.170 
Indeed, so ubiquitous have been the incidents of executive disobedience of the Supreme 
Court under the presently operating 1999 constitutional order, that the Nigerian Bar 
Association went on a nation-wide strike in March 2006. The level of infraction against 
Supreme Court decisions was even enough to prompt rebuke of members of the executive 
and their various agencies by then-Chief Justice Uwais, who noted: “disobedience to 
Court orders … in a democratic set-up like ours … is an affront to the Constitution and a 
clear evidence of bad governance. Those in authority and their agencies cannot pick and 
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choose what Court orders to obey.”171 
So far as the executive is concerned, when it is not a clear case of disobedience, then it is 
often one of ensuring that the only possible judicial outcome is the one that the 
government is willing to obey. By the time of the 2007 general elections, then President 
Olusegun Obasanjo had been in a protracted and bitter public feud with his Vice-
President, Atiku Abubakar.172 The issue made its way to court when then-Vice President 
Atiku file a case with the Supreme Court regarding his disqualification in contesting the 
election under the “banner of his new party, the Action Congress. Less than eight days 
before the presidential election, the Supreme Court set aside two days … for the parties to 
present their cases. Soon after… the federal government … declared public holidays on 
those days, thus making it impossible for the court to adjudicate on the matter.”173 
I believe the case of executive disobedience of the country’s laws and its persistent 
failure to abide by the rulings of senior courts, is a particularly worrisome tendency that 
serves to fundamentally weaken the Nigerian legal system. It may be, however, that the 
sanctity, or coherence, of any legal system, does not rely solely, or even most 
significantly, on the issue of obedience by ordinary citizens. As Raz queries of those who 
suggest that obedience is the only criterion by which it ought to be determined that a legal 
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system is fulfilling its most primary functions, 
“how should cases of disobedience be counted?... How should the number of 
opportunities to obey the law be counted? How many opportunities not to murder 
does one have during a year?... Do the facts that a person did not murder 500 
times and he committed murder only once… add up to a … ration of efficacy…? 
Are all violations of all laws of equal importance…? Is the fact that a man breaks 
his contract or that he does not heed a road sign as detrimental to the existence of 
the legal system as the fact that he deserted from the army or conspired to 
rebel?”174 
What certainly does matter, however, are the ways in which the rules of the country’s 
legal system are treated by officials of that same system.175 As such, it is a damning 
situation in the Nigerian context that even in cases where the parties lawfully adhere to a 
court’s decisions, and/or do not attempt to purposefully abuse the processes of the 
judicial system, there appears to be the ever-present likelihood that the authority of the 
legal system will be put under strain not by ordinary persons but by law officers 
themselves—most especially judges176.  
In the November 1982 case, Abbas v. Solomon, the appellants in the case claimed “title to 
a piece of land at Akesan in Epe, Lagos State, possession and general damages for 
trespass and injunction.” While the High Court dismissed their claim to the title, it upheld 
their claims for trespass and injunction. “The trial court awarded N10.00 as damages for 
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trespass and made an injunction restraining the respondents from further trespass. On the 
21st June, 1983, the appellants returned to court claiming the respondents had disobeyed 
the court’s orders and trespassed on their land. “The respondents filed a counter-affidavit 
in which they denied trespassing on the appellant’s land. They maintained that they 
merely remained in their respective houses and had not trespassed further on the land of 
the appellants.” 
Over two years later, on 15th July, 1985, the respondents appeared in court as ordered and 
“were summarily ordered to be remanded in prison custody for contempt of court without 
an opportunity to showcase why they should not be committed to prison.” Further hearing 
was adjourned till over three months later. On 18th October, 1985, appellants counsel 
applied for the respondents to be committed to prison. “The trial court, following this 
application and, without hearing the respondents or inviting them to show cause why they 
should not be committed to prison for contempt… as stipulated by law, proceeded 
summarily to find them guilty of contempt of court and sentenced them to a term of six 
months imprisonment in the first instance.” On 31st July, 1990, the Court of Appeal, 
Lagos Division, declared the High Court’s contempt ruling a nullity, describing the 
“procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge in the committal proceedings as bizarre, a 
travesty of justice and consequently null and void.”177 
Still more worrying are the cases where lower court judges deliberately do not abide by 
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judgments of the Supreme Court. In the 2002 Supreme Court case A.G. Ondo State v. 
A.G. Federation, the Attorney General of Ondo State was joined by the Attorneys 
General of the rest of Nigeria’s thirty-five states in filing suit against the Attorney 
General of the Federation. The action sought to query the constitutionality of the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000, which claims jurisdiction with the 
federal states. The Act, promulgated by the National Assembly, aims to prosecute the 
violation of Nigeria’s corruption laws by public officials.178 The suit also sought a 
permanent injunction against the Attorney General of the federation in exercising his 
powers within the jurisdiction of the states. “The Supreme Court held, in a unanimous 
decision, that the Act was constitutional. The Court held that since, by virtue of Section 4 
(2) of the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to make laws for the 
Federation respecting any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List, it follows 
that the National Assembly is [so] empowered” on the matter.179  
Nevertheless, on 31 December, 2003, an Abuja High Court went on to restrain the 
“Attorney-General of the Federation from investigating allegations of financial 
impropriety levelled against the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji 
Ghali Na’Abba, pending the determination of the substantive suit. The injunction was 
granted based on an ex parte motion.”180 
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To be sure, judges who deviate not only from the Constitution but also from the internal 
rules of the judicial system, including the refusal of lower courts to abide by Supreme 
Court judgments, have been vehemently opposed by those seemingly more upstanding 
among the judiciary.181 For instance, in the above case of the 2003 injunction granted by 
the Abuja High Court, the Chief Justice of Nigeria issued warning that these injunctions 
contravened “the tenets of fairness, equity, transparency and responsibility.”182 Still, the 
incidence of malfeasance by judges of their own system is of such a rate that, judicial 
rebuke notwithstanding, “citizens, lawyers and even eminent jurists now openly 
acknowledge that the judicial system is no longer a realistic forum for obtaining 
justice.”183 
3.3. Making Sense of Disobedience 
The foregoing cases are not intended to suggest that ordinary Nigerians are somehow 
peculiar simply in disobeying the law. If a number of the citizens of any state, were not, 
for whatever reason, inclined to disobey or disregard the laws and legal procedures, such 
a state should be held as an unheard-of exemplar in needing no legal code to impose a 
system of sanctions on those who will, most assuredly, disobey, or manipulate, the laws. 
The aim, instead, has been to depict the fact that there is, at all levels of Nigerian society 
– by both ordinary citizens, by members of the executive branch of government, and by 
officers of the law themselves including lawyers and judges – a distinct lack of respect 
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for the legal system. 
The issue is not simply that Nigerians, like the citizens of any other state, are disobeying 
some of the laws or finding ways not to be held accountable by them. Rather, the manner 
in which many approach the legal system – even after disobedience – suggests that so 
very little is their regard for the system itself that they neither fear it nor comprehend that 
its rules should be of some consequence either to the society in general or to themselves 
in particular. That this appears to be the case even among many members of the judiciary 
– who are still forced in many instances to base their judgements on pre-independence 
case law decided by British judges184 –  as regards their own rules of judicial conduct, is 
even more staggering.  
There is a sense in which the system, while it may have a legal authority that appears to 
be valuable to internally or procedurally sustaining the life of the system itself, however, 
appears to have almost no authority over people who behave towards it with a seemingly 
bottomless disdain. That somehow the Nigerian legal system is not viewed as having the 
right, although it keeps attempting to show that it does, to purposefully influence and 
order the lives of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction is not merely a legal 
issue but a far larger problem in which justice, procedural or otherwise, appears rarely to 
be the end purpose to which the workings of Nigeria’s legal system have been ordered.  
I suggest that the lack of Nigerian influence in the making both of a substantive portion 
                                               
184 See Ejembi v. A.G, Benue State, NWLR (16) (2003), part. (846), pp. 337-379; Odu v Jolaoso, 
NWLR (16) (2005), part (950), pp. 178-203. 
77 
 
 
of what remain its laws, and crucially in the establishment of the legal framework itself 
within which all Nigerians are consigned, offers some explanation of the current state of 
legal affairs. I suggest that the seemingly ingrained lack of respect that is now shown by 
so many among the public, and within the legal system itself, is not a result of a 
technically faulty or invalid system, but rather a legal system, the moral purpose of 
which, has never been made clear or historically evident to the population that it aims 
now to compel—and certainly not to the judges and law officers who ought to be its 
staunchest guardians.  
This must not be mistaken to mean that this thesis is asserting that there is something 
inherently wrong with British laws in, and, of themselves. After all, many of the laws that 
have, here, been presented as constantly being abrogated are now made legally legitimate 
by Nigerian legislation. And indeed, the laws forbidding murder and theft cannot be 
claimed to have been especially founded by any single territory. The point that undergirds 
this thesis, however, and to which this chapter, and the one preceding it, have aimed to 
give empirical basis, is that it may not, critically, be only what the laws themselves are 
that inspires a population to legal obedience; but rather the manner of their creation and 
establishment over a given people.  
This is a process of creation and establishment in which the participation of those to 
whom most matters the outcome and purpose of the legal system ought to be of the 
highest importance. It is this thesis’ contention, in fact, that it is by the participation of 
those who aim to be ruled by a given set of laws, in the creation and establishment of 
those rules, that the latter are shown to have a moral legitimacy that accounts for 
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obedience to them.  
A further fact of no small consequence, and documented by the historical evidence 
presented in the previous chapter, is that in the Nigerian legal system, lawyers and judges 
are left bereft of a critical pride and confidence in the historical development of a legal 
structure to which neither they nor their forebears have been more than tokenistic parties.  
The tumultuous nature of Nigeria’s ongoing political development makes it necessary to 
address the issue of the various military coups and dictatorships that the country has 
faced. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has undergone multiple iterations of 
military rule and regime overthrows by military coup-plotters. The first coup by the 
military led to the overthrow of the independence government in January, 1966. The 
second coup, again in 1966, installed Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon. A 1976 coup led to the 
assassination of General Murtala Mohammed, and brought in then-Lt. General Olusegun 
Obasanjo as the country’s new military ruler. Again, in 1983, another military coup 
brought then Major General Muhammadu Buhari to power only for him to be overthrown 
by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985. In 1993, the last of Nigeria’s coups brought in 
General Sani Abacha, who ruled until his death in June 1998.185 
This history may be seen to be relevant in two ways to the questions this thesis is asking 
about the cause of legitimate law, its relation to obedience, and how the specific case of 
                                               
185 See Max Siollun, Oil, Politics, and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966-1976), (New 
York: Agora Publishing, 2009); Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘Are Things Falling Apart: the Military and the 
Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Vol. 34, No. 2/ Jun., 
1996), pp. 193-225; Toyin Falola and Julius O. Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second 
Republic:1979-1984  (Zed Books, 1985).  
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Nigeria illuminates on answers that may apply universally. First, it may be thought that in 
using the Nigerian case, it would have to be seriously considered that laws issuing from a 
military dictator would be viewed by the population, and officials of the legal system 
themselves, as being of an inherently different, and a less legally legitimate, nature, 
neverminding any other sources of ‘legitimacy’ that law may be argued to have, and as 
such would not be obeyed. Second, it may be suggested that the incidence of coups and 
military dictatorship, in and of themselves, provide valid example of a level of rule-
breaking within the Nigerian system that itself signifies a fundamental lack of respect for 
the system, and which might itself explain the incidence of Nigeria’s coups and military 
dictatorships.  
Beginning with the last, while it might be that Nigeria’s military history could serve as 
part of the valid evidence of the non-acceptance of the legal system’s legitimacy, I, 
however, hesitate to use them as such. Instead, I stick more narrowly to evidence of non-
compliance to specifically legal rules within the legal system because these most closely 
adhere within a logical argument of proving that a legal system can exist despite 
disobedience and lack of adherence by officials to the legal system’s rules—these being, 
as I explain in Chapter 4, the parameters of the argument concerning the technical 
existence of legal system. While the issue of military overthrow of elected governments 
do indeed serve to give the wider, and more general, image of a country politically 
discontented, I do not believe they ought to be used as evidence in this more focused 
discussion.  
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More problematic, is the fact that the question of coups, and other types of ‘contentious 
politics’, are often the product of far wider political considerations and explanations – 
from political grievance and economic and resource contestation, to class, and other 
structural explanations of a regime’s strength and its ability, or lack thereof, to withstand 
a coup –  than they are simply a failure to accept the legitimacy of the legal system and 
its body of laws.186  
To the first issue, even though coups do often entail the enactment of new rules and new 
legal system officials, they would have to involve the more specific and complete change 
to the identity of the legal system to be of relevance to this thesis’ argument against legal 
positivism. So that in the case of a full-blown revolution, for instance, in which the legal 
infrastructure including the judiciary is upended, we might say that the legal system there 
no longer receives general obedience and that this, more than anything else, is what 
validly explains the internal breakdown of the legal system.187  
                                               
186 For economic explanations of deep rupture to political/governing systems, see Carles Boix, 
‘Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World’ in World Politics, (Vol. 
60, Issue 3, 2008), pp. 390-437. 
For structural explanations, see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative 
Analysis of France, Russia, and China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Barrington 
Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press Books, 1966). 
For explanations relating to ethnicity, grievance, and state weakness/regime stability, see James D. 
Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’ in American Political Science 
Review (Vol. 97, No. 1/ February 2003), pp.75-90.; Jack Goldstone, ‘Toward a Fourth Generation of 
Revolutionary Theory’ in Annual Review of Political Science (Vol. 4/ June 2001) pp. 139-187.  
187 See Hart, who explains that there may be cause in extreme cases of revolution, enemy occupation 
or where the government has been overrun by banditry to examine these as the cause of a legal system 
no longer validly existing. Even these, as Hart says, will not lead to legal system’s cessation all at 
once and “the stage at which it is right to say in such cases that the legal system has finally ceased to 
exist is a thing not susceptible of any exact determination.” In the absence of these extremes, however, 
Hart asserts: “the normal, unproblematic case where we can confidently say that a legal system exists, 
is just one where it is clear… crudely put, that the rules recognized as valid at the official level are 
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This is not the case in Nigeria where most of the laws currently in force since the return 
to democracy in 1999, are contained in the Laws of the Federation, 1990, which 
underwent a revision exercise by the Law Revision Committee. The laws made after 
1990 and till the end of military rule up till December 2000 also appear to have been 
formally incorporated into the present system operating under the 1999 Constitution; 
those that have not appear to have been repealed.188  
To the extent that this thesis is not primarily concerned with the moral sanctity of 
individual laws but rather with the question of the acceptance of the ‘legitimacy’ of a 
body of laws and the connected legal apparatus, that is to say, law and legal system, 
based on the evidence of the law’s valid existence that the legal system sets for itself. 
Except insofar as determining that a body of laws validly belongs to a single legal 
system, then the issue of the specific decrees issued under military regimes would not 
seem to be problematic in the Nigerian case and to the logical parameters of this thesis’ 
argument.189  
Still, it may be that, in an obvious sense, these disruptions to the continuity of the 
Nigerian legal system are more to blame, or at least equally so, for the current fact of 
disobedience in the Nigerian legal landscape, as is the nature in which the legal system 
                                               
generally obeyed. This is the core case that positivism presents and the reason why I focus, in the 
Nigerian case, narrowly on evidence of disobedience to the specifically internal rules of the existing 
legal system.” Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 117-118.  
188 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, at http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFNMainPage.htm (accessed 
29/4/2017); also Guide to Nigerian Legal Information, at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Nigeria.html (accessed 29/4/2017) 
189 For further explanation on the ‘identity’ of legal systems, see Joseph Raz, Chapter 5, ‘The Identity 
of Legal Systems’ in the Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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was developed under the colonial period. It may, therefore, be as Crawford Young has 
suggested that Africa’s colonial history no longer explains the malaise of countries such 
as Nigeria. “The Bula Matari (crusher of rocks) personification of the colonial state”, 
Crawford says, “in the everyday expression of the Congolese subject in Belgian colonial 
times lived on in Mobutist colonial post-colonial times … [but now bore little 
resemblance to] the shrivelled, dishevelled, and fragmented superstructure of Congo’s 
governance in the Kabila age.”190 And as Jennifer Widner has shown of the development 
of the Tanzanian courts, it is the concerted and systematic effort of Tanzanian judges, and 
the courts themselves that has not only enabled the previously absent robustness of 
judicial independence in Tanzania, but has further led to the acceptance of the Tanzanian 
legal system among the wider society.191 
It is indeed part of what this thesis seeks to establish that Nigeria, and perhaps many 
other African cases, are not to be treated as being analytically dissimilar to the nature of 
non-African states. In giving an account of the developmental foundations of Nigeria’s 
legal system, this thesis is not attempting, blanketly, to lay ‘blame’ for the system’s 
current malfunction at colonialism’s door. But, rather, to establish the necessity of 
participation as being at the root of the proper order of any legal system. The particular 
absence of participation in Nigeria’s case, happens to have been the result of the colonial 
experience, but which may find its way into other systems by other means, is one that this 
                                               
190 Crawford Young, ‘The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African 
Political Dynamics’ in African Affairs (Vol. 103, No. 410/2004) p. 24.  
191 Jennifer A. Widner, Building the Rule of Law, (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001). 
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thesis fully believes is rectifiable within the prevailing legal dispensation by Nigerians 
themselves. 
Throughout the rest of this thesis, I aim to argue that it is by participation in establishing 
the manner, and foundation, of one’s own laws, by which a particular kind of moral 
purpose is revealed in them. It is by this moral purpose, made apparent to the citizenry by 
their participation, that I aim to suggest that voluntary obedience to the law is obtained.  
Some would suggest, however, that the moral purpose of the law – if there even is such a 
relevant thing so far as the legitimacy of the law should be concerned – is neither here 
nor there when assessing the nature of legal system. To legal positivism, the traditional 
school of thought most prominent in legal philosophy, we must assess this evidence of 
rampant disobedience in Nigeria’s legal system, and the specific failure of the system’s 
officials to adhere to the system’s rules, as evidence of something more basic than a 
neglected moral purpose in wake of the absence of an indigenous participation—and that 
is, that the Nigerian legal system does not, in fact, exist.   
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Chapter 4: Legal Positivism and the Existence of Legal System 
4.1. ‘Law’, ‘law’, and ‘the law’ 
Law as we have been speaking of it, is that aspect of the canon of legal requirements that 
defines the basic characteristic(s) that set ‘the law’ apart from any other type of rule-
based requirement. Though it may be quite distinct in different times and spaces, Law in 
the sense to which this chapter adheres, gives to all particular bodies of law a 
commonality by which we may distinguish their ‘existence’ – that is, their very nature – 
as Law.192  
That Law, or indeed any specific body of laws, finds its characteristic meaning and 
function only within political society may seem an obvious and uninteresting point; but it 
is neither. As the Nigerian case suggests, to try to conceive of what Law is, or ought to 
be, outside of a rigorous schema of what constitutes political society, and most critically, 
of its unique purpose – and as legal positivists tend to do – is to apprehend the detached 
tail of an animal. It is a mistake that I believe is duly corrected by the introduction of 
                                               
192 Scott Shapiro does a good job of explaining the intention behind the use of the word ‘Law’ as 
distinct from ‘the law’ or from the dictionary term ‘law’. He highlights its proper reference as “a 
philosophical effort to understand the nature of law in general” in Legality (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 7. The understanding is not too difficult to grasp 
even for those who maintain a cultural relativist position as to the question of what the particular of a 
specific society is or should be. One can maintain that there is no set book of laws that all societies 
should have (I don’t think that there is anyone who does not indeed maintain this view) and yet see the 
logic that there is a necessary something or a set of things that can be held to apply across all 
particular legal structures which define the property(ies) of a structure being Law and not something 
else.  If one can speak of The State despite the number of particular and differently constructed state 
entities that cover the earth, then one can speak of Law. There might also be a grammatical issue that 
is confusing because we speak of The State not State. But within legal philosophy, the dominant 
terminology employed is Law, whilst the law is used to refer to particular states or cases of legal 
requirement. Since I am, here, concerned with legal philosophy, I must respect its terminology. See 
further, Legality, pp. 3-10. 
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political philosophy, and a correction that will be the purpose of chapters five and six of 
this thesis.  
The present chapter has three main aims.  The first, is to lay out the claim that Law – that 
is, the fundamental nature of anything that can be held to rightfully belong to the group of 
norms, ideas, and rules of behaviour specifically designated with legal authority – is 
defined purely by positivist criteria. By positivist criteria, I mean that which is and can be 
commonly observed within society and not that which ought to be. This is the view that is 
largely held by legal positivists and constitutes what may be understood as the framework 
for the ‘existence criteria’ of Law’s legal legitimacy. It is an understanding that forms the 
basis of a long tradition, and has a strong continuing influence within Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, mainly due to the influential works of H.L.A. Hart.193 As a result, much of 
my examination will focus on Hart. I follow the example of a long line of legal theorists 
whose works would be nearly incomprehensible without Hart—if only, in some cases, as 
a source of their discontent.194 
Having laid out the positivist understanding of Law’s legal legitimacy, I will then attempt 
to examine what I believe to be its major logical flaw—a flaw that I believe is 
                                               
193 In the introduction to the 3rd edition of Hart’s Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), Leslie Green notes that the text is “one of the most influential works in modern legal 
philosophy.” p. xv. She undersells it. As Shapiro more aptly notes, Hart’s conceptualization of legal 
system “provided the critical element missing from previous characterizations of the identity of law 
and hence set the terms on which all research in legal theory has since proceeded”, including 
Shapiro’s own. Legality, pp. 86-87. 
194 See Dworkin Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Indeed, so 
extensive is the basis of Dworkin’s work a critical response to Hart, that Hart himself felt it necessary 
to dedicate much of the Postscript of the 2nd edition of Concept of Law to replying to Dworkin’s many 
explicit and tacit complaints.  
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compellingly brought to light by examination of the Nigerian case; the subject of this 
thesis’ second and third chapters. The conundrum that cases such as Nigeria reveal as 
inherent in a legal positivist understanding of Law is that in making adherence by 
officials to the internal rules of a legal system195, and general obedience by ordinary 
citizens, form the most fundamental criteria of a positivist understanding of Law’s 
existence, it soon becomes evident that legal positivism’s explanation for what gives rise 
to adherence by officials, and obedience by citizens, is tautological.   
When the legal positivist says that “whether a given norm is legally valid … depends on 
its sources”196, she does not only mean that we must look to the formal sources that 
legally document the establishment of a law to know that a law validly exists. She further 
means that we must also look to how officials of the legal system treat those sources and 
the rules they specify, and also the extent of obedience towards the law from the general 
population. As such, Shapiro says: “if we want to discover the existence or content of the 
fundamental rules of a legal system, we must look … only to what officials think, intend, 
claim, and do around here.”197 In other words, the positivist’s understanding makes the 
normative behaviour of officials towards the legal system’s rules a part of its formula for 
law’s existence. So that the law exists, in part, when, and because, officials adhere to it 
                                               
195 Hart, and legal positivism in general, are adamant in distinguishing between ‘obedience’ on the 
part of ordinary citizens and conformity or adherence to the rules of a legal system by its officials, and 
ensuring that it is understood that the latter is the more critical in understanding the basis of law’s 
existence. 
196 John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths’ in American Journal of Jurisprudence, (Vol. 
46/2001), p. 199. 
197 Op. Cit., Shapiro, p. 177. 
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and the people generally obey it.198  
I aim to suggest throughout this chapter that one of the consequences of the positivist 
description of Law is that we are left with no other explanation, by way of a positivist 
definition alone, for why officials may adhere to a legal system’s specified rules or 
ordinary persons may generally obey the law, other than because it exists. The Nigerian 
case suggests that even where the law exists on the basis of its legal establishment and on 
the plain, and formally documented, evidence of the internal rules that sustain the 
system’s procedural function, officials may regularly defy its internal rules and the 
general population may perpetually disregard the law. As such, where they do obey the 
law, another cause apart from the mere evidence of the system’s legally valid existence, 
must be sought and found.  
One obvious objection may be made against this thesis’ use of the Nigerian case, which is 
that the latter is somehow not reflective of the ‘normal’ or median legal experience in a 
complex society and that the real flaw is, therefore, in ‘outlier’ cases such as Nigeria, 
which broad or universal legal philosophy should not have to explain. I suggest, however, 
that not only is the Nigerian case not an anomalous extreme bearing no resemblance to 
many other legal systems, but it further serves as an illuminating case that legal 
positivism should be able to, but cannot, explain. It is my contention that the flaw that the 
Nigerian case observably reveals in legal positivism is a flaw in positivism’s own logic.  
I suggest that the flaw in legal positivism is the inevitable consequence of the fact that the 
                                               
198 See Op. Cit., Hart, Concept of Law.  
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legal positivist is primarily, if not wholly, concerned with the observable ‘facts’ of social 
behaviour as regards the law.199 So long as officials adhere to the legal system’s rules, 
and the people generally obey their laws, the legal positivist is assured that the law, there, 
exists.200 Why, however, the people come to obey any specific set of laws, is deemed by 
legal positivism not to be its especial concern. And yet, without it, legal positivism not 
only provides a very incomplete picture of Law in the cases where the latter may deemed, 
by legal positivism’s very own criteria, to exist; but further provides little explanation of 
value for cases, such as Nigeria, which it ought.  
Even when a modern version of legal positivism is put forward, as those such as Scott 
Shapiro do, and that are sufficiently varied to answer other criticisms levelled at older 
versions of the tradition, the very fact of its making observable and normative behaviour 
an inherent criterion of the existence of legal system201, along with the logical supposition 
that what is is what ought to be, ensures that legal positivism continues to fail in 
answering what I believe to be one of the most critical bases on which any theory of Law 
must rest—when, and why, ought the people of a given territory, to obey the law of their 
land? 
                                               
199 See Op. Cit., Shapiro, p. 176-177 
200 See Op. Cit., Hart, pp. 100-117. 
201 “The crucial point here” Shapiro says, “is that the determination by social facts is not some 
necessary, but otherwise unimportant, property of shared plans [i.e.: Legal System]. Shared plans must 
be determined exclusively by social facts if they are to fulfill their function. As we have seen, shared 
plans are supposed to guide and coordinate behaviour by resolving doubts and disagreements about 
how to act.” Op. Cit., Shapiro, p. 177.  
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I do not aim to make my argument against legal positivism by engaging a Natural Law 
explanation202 except to say that where legal positivists, rightly or wrongly, condemn 
Natural Law theory for denying the claim to Law of morally iniquitous laws203; I assert 
that legal positivism, itself, fails in the opposing direction—in its inability to explain, 
within its own theory, uncoerced obedience to ‘good’ laws.     
                                               
202 While it may be that Natural Law provides crucial arguments against legal positivism, particularly 
with regards to the very question of the moral and correct reasoning that ought to propel good men to 
follow good laws, I do not believe there is anything this thesis has to add to the particular, and age-
old, dispute between Natural Law Theory and legal positivism. Neither do I believe that a Natural 
Law explanation gives especial aid to the particular question that this thesis is attempting to resolve of 
why ordinary men within political society, who may or may not have any inclinations or 
understandings as to a morality made metaphysically correct, may come to obey a set of laws that 
they, by participation, come to understand as having a purpose in the interests of their whole 
community. 
203 The “scholastic theories of natural law [and] some contemporary legal theory which is critical of 
the legal ‘positivism’ inherited from Austin” Hart critiques, “… make this close assimilation of law to 
morality [and] seem, in the end, … to confuse one kind of obligatory conduct with another, and to 
leave insufficient room for difference in kind between legal and moral rules and for divergences in 
their requirements. … So the assertion that ‘an unjust law is not a law’ has the same ring of 
exaggeration and paradox, if not falsity, as ‘statutes are not laws’ or ‘constitutional law is not law’.” 
Op. Cit., Hart pp. 7-8, p. 156, also Chapter IX. 
 
Despite Hart’s critique and use of the oft-quoted view that according to Aquinas “if in any point 
[human law] deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.” Aquinas’ 
distinction between human law and natural law suggests that he does not, in fact, deny the claim to 
human law of morally unjust laws. He asserts simply that bad human laws are not derived from the 
divine law of nature; they may be human laws, nonetheless. ‘Every human law”, Aquinas says “has 
just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature”, as such where it does not it 
is, consequentially, at odds with the law of nature. And its force, therefore, is in no way derived from 
the moral right or from what is just according to nature, but from men alone. Such laws may, 
therefore, “not bind in [moral] conscience”, although we may have other non-moral and prudential 
reasons for obeying them, such as “to avoid scandal.” It is such that in being framed for human beings 
“the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue”, that human laws “do not forbid all vices” as do the 
laws of nature. And, as Aquinas goes on, ‘neither does [human law] prescribe all acts of virtue.” The 
positivist claim against, at least, the Thomist view that the latter removes unjust human law from an 
understanding of what ultimately counts as human law seems quite mistaken. See Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 95, a. 2, Q. 96, a. 2, a.3 and a.4. See also John Finnis, who notes that the 
Natural Law “tradition accepts that iniquitous rules may satisfy the legal system’s criteria of legal 
validity, and where they do, it does not seek to deny that fact unless the system itself provides a 
juridical basis for treating these otherwise valid rules as legally invalid by reason (directly or 
indirectly) of their iniquity.” Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 476; see also pp. 363-366. 
90 
 
 
Finally, in this chapter, I will outline what I believe to be a logical framework that 
answers the criticisms I lay against a positivist conception of Law. The crux of which is 
the fact that wherever we find laws, in a particular sense, by necessity, so there we find 
men, and each under the yoke of the State. The ramifications of these specificities are that 
when we speak of Law, it would be absurd to be speaking of it in a purely positivist 
sense—that is, as merely a particular system of rules without regard to the especial 
political circumstance of their institution.  
Rather, they must be understood, additionally, as receiving the command they are held to 
have over the citizens of a state by the very purpose which that state has in existing at all; 
the effecting for which the laws are, there, established. That the law must be legally 
legitimate, as positivists hold, will not, to some extent, be denied; but the law must, 
further, be legitimate in an additional, and particular sense, that allies it with the purpose 
of political society and the community that resides therein. This is, in an especial, 
political, sense, the moral legitimacy of Law.   
4.2. The Legal Legitimacy of Law 
When legal positivism speaks of Law’s legal legitimacy, it is speaking of its ‘existence’; 
and not so much in the sense of how we, thereby, judge a set of laws or a legal system to 
be either vibrant or well-functioning. The understanding that legal positivism aims to 
assert is one of what makes the law legally valid; that is, in a technical sense and based 
on observable criteria. Legal positivism simply seeks to ascertain the distinctive, 
descriptive, necessary, and sufficient features that are, and must be, found anywhere 
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where it can be said that there is Law—regardless of the particular type of system of 
laws, nor indeed with any reference to the substantive nature that the particular laws in 
any particular place may take.  These are the criteria that legal positivism asserts mark 
Law off from any other kind of rule-bearing programme that may also exist within any 
given society.204  
These ‘existence conditions’ cannot be separated from a definition of legal system 
understood simply as all the organizational elaboration to which Law itself gives 
structure and which themselves have Law as their focus – the courts, legislation, statute, 
precedent, legal officials, judges, lawyers, and so on. The terms Law and legal system 
will, therefore, be used interchangeably throughout this chapter.205  
Somewhere just before the middle of H.L.A Hart’s The Concept of Law, we arrive at one 
of the most famous and ground-breaking parts of his explanation. “The union of primary 
and secondary rules” Hart expounds, “is at the centre of a legal system.”206 
“Supplementing the primary rules of obligation with secondary rules which are rules of a 
different kind … might, in itself, be considered a step from the pre-legal into the legal 
world.”207  
                                               
204 See Op. Cit., Shapiro; Op. Cit., Hart. 
205 The ambiguity of the notion of legal system, which is not coincidental to that contained in ‘Law’ is, 
as Shapiro explains, to do with the fact that a legal system may rightly be understood to define the 
particular rules of a system or as an institution of specific types of people. However, the term ‘legal 
system’ –  as it is used throughout much of legal philosophy and in this chapter –  is best understood 
to connote the fact that any legal system is made up of both rules and people and in each case we are 
dealing with ‘norms’. Either in the sense of the normative rules of the system itself or in the normative 
behaviour of the systems officials, the two of which are mutually dependent. See, Op. Cit., Shapiro, 
pp. 5-7.  
206 Op. Cit., Hart, p. 99. 
207 Ibid, p. 94. 
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Hart’s formulation of law as the amalgam of primary and secondary rules was in response 
to what he correctly perceived to be Austin’s wrong-headed view of Law as “orders 
backed by threats” issued by one who is sovereign and in the position of being habitually 
obeyed while she or he habitually obeys no one208; and which had for nearly a century 
underpinned English jurisprudence.209 
At least the first part of Austin’s understanding of law as ‘orders backed by threats’ sits 
well with a common-sense view; particularly if it is agreed that when most people think 
of ‘the law’, in a particular sense, they tend to think of criminal law. Stealing is a criminal 
offence and the legal code that stipulates its criminality can readily be conceived of as ‘an 
order’ backed by ‘the threat’ that whosoever does steal, and is caught, will be dealt a 
punishment of x, y, and/or z.210 
Hart’s ingenuity, however, was to conceive that Austin’s view of Law was plagued by 
problems that an even rudimentary examination of actual types of law could expose. 
While the simple notion of Law as orders backed by threats might, all too easily, adhere 
with a common-sense view of the criminal law, the laws of most actually functioning 
legal systems could not be held to be composed only, or even chiefly, of laws dealing 
                                               
208 The original version of Hart’s Concept of Law (see 1st and 2nd eds.) was framed almost entirely 
with Austin’s classic formulation of law in its sights. Whilst the third edition takes in other legal 
philosophical views, its most significant points and developments (at least to this thesis) lie still in 
response to Austin’s classic postulation.  
209 Op. Cit., Shapiro, p.52. Further, these alternative interpretations are not lexicographic definitions of 
the word ‘Law’. As Shapiro points out, legal philosophy is generally not “an elaborate attempt to 
contribute to the Oxford English Dictionary” (See Legality p. 7, see also, Concept of Law pp. 13-17). 
The view of Law as “orders backed by threats” – likewise that of it as the “union of primary and 
secondary rules” – are formulations of what the respective thinkers regard as the inherent nature of 
Law.  
210 Op Cit., Hart, pp. 6-7, pp. 18-21. 
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with criminality.211 From a theoretical viewpoint, this made Austin’s view even more 
interestingly troublesome; since from it, we could not distinguish the myriad determining 
features commonly held to account for Law’s authority; and which, on Hart’s 
explanation, could only be exposed by looking at the different types of rules that 
compose a legal system.212  
For example, the notion of Law as ‘orders backed by threats’, and issued by a habitually 
obeyed sovereign’, or by her subordinates213, cannot explain how laws tend to be 
standing laws even when no one has expressly brought them to the attention of the public 
for whom they are intended. As follows from Hart’s explanation, though no ‘legal 
sovereign’ has directly informed me of my duty not to grievously injure the persons or 
properties of others without due cause, the laws in the United Kingdom against grievous 
bodily harm and destruction of private property stand in place as laws to which 
compliance is, nevertheless, demanded. And most importantly to Hart’s elucidation of 
Austin’s mistake, is the fact that the law, in this case, would be viewed, and views itself, 
as having the right to compel compliance—regardless of the expected punishment; a 
right that we do not often attach to the notion of forced orders in an Austinian 
conception.214 
Further, Austin’s view cannot explain the appearance of those laws, which Hart calls 
                                               
211 Ibid, pp. 26-49. 
212 Ibid, pp.18-20. 
213 Hart’s elucidation of Austin’s account has suffered from being broken up and spread out through 
the 3rd edition of Concept of Law, but see chapters 2-3 for the main points. 
214 Ibid, pp. 19-24. 
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‘power-conferring’. These are laws that do nothing that can – without a great deal of 
sophistication – be interpreted as imposing ‘sanctions’. The regulations regarding the 
making of contracts, marriages or wills, for instance, do not obviously impose a duty. 
Instead, they confer a power on the individual to enjoy the legal benefits that would 
accrue as a result of engaging in these practices in the correct way specified by the law. 
These kinds of laws, unlike the criminal code, do not care if we are inclined to use them 
or not; simply that when we do choose to use them, we do so in the specified way. And 
when we do not, our actions will merely lack a legal force. Our failure, as Hart says, to 
comply with these “statutory provision[s] is not a ‘breach’ or violation of any obligation 
or duty, nor an ‘offence’ and it would be confusing to think of it in such terms.” 215  
Nor, as Hart further elucidates, can Austin’s understanding explain many of the rules that 
make up a legal system that are directed at public officials of the law, and not at private 
individuals—the rules of court, and of correct judicial behaviour, are cases in point.216 
In any case, it turns out that even the criminal law of a complex society is not, when 
properly scrutinised, accurately reflected by an Austinian view. For in the latter’s 
                                               
215 Ibid, pp. 27-33. Hans Kelsen, for instance, attempted to meet this criticism of a sanctions theory by 
positing a conception of Law as “the primary norm which stipulates the sanction” meaning that if all 
laws are directions that impose a sanction, then power-conferring laws are merely fragments of laws 
and once the part of the law where some official is directed to impose a sanction (or a nullity) is 
brought into view then their full status as law becomes apparent and a sanctions theory can be thought 
to apply to them no less. Indeed, for Kelsen, even the criminal law can only be seen to be composed of 
genuine laws when the imposing sanction takes primary position in the law’s formulation. “There is 
no law prohibiting murder, there is only a law directing officials to apply certain sanctions in certain 
circumstances to those who do murder.” Despite Kelsen’s ingenuity, Hart is correct when he says that 
such a view grossly distorts the law for the sake of definitional uniformity. Not only does it prevent us 
from seeing how certain power conferring laws are used by the public but it further blurs the line 
between different kinds of power conferring rules and their purpose such as those conferring 
jurisdiction on a law court. Ibid, Hart, pp. 32-42. 
216 Ibid, pp. 29-49. 
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inherent idea of orders issued to ‘others’, it cannot explain how the law comes to apply to 
the law-maker also. Nor can it explain the position of customary laws as laws that have 
rarely been deliberately made by one who is ‘sovereign’, and yet, are in many legal 
systems still considered valid legal rules.  
Austin’s definition cannot explain how new legislators come to have the right to make 
future legislation in the absence of an already existing “habit of obedience” to them. It 
cannot explain how laws come to live beyond their particular makers and to continuously 
apply despite what may be an often regular change in the identity of the law-maker or 
‘sovereign’. And it cannot explain any kind of situation, such as that which is maintained 
in the United States, where ‘the sovereign’ has legal limitations imposed on its legislative 
capacity and is, in that sense, in ‘the habit of obedience’ to others.217 
In short, the coercive theory of Law as inherently defined by sovereign orders directed on 
pain of punishment does not permit us to theoretically conceive of an understanding of 
Law’s nature that is separate from the tools that the law, in any given society, wields for 
its own enforcement. To put it other ways, an Austinian legal conception does not give us 
any insight into how a law may still be a law even if no punishment were exacted for its 
abrogation because the idea of punishment or sanction cannot be removed from its very 
definition of Law without its entire framework crumbling to pieces.218 Not only this but, 
more importantly, so far as Hart is concerned, the coercive view of Law detrimentally 
fails to cast any light on the characteristic aim the law is said to have as a guide to social 
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behaviour.219  
Most legal systems then, for Hart, are patently characterised by their persistence, their 
continuity, and their compatibility with a broad variety in the types and content of what 
makes up the law; the particulars of which often apply as equally to legislators as they do 
to ordinary citizens. Importantly, legal systems have a tendency to create ‘an obligation’ 
on the part of those whom it directs to follow its regulations.220 It is clear to Hart – and 
has come to be clear to legal philosophy in general – that what accounts for these 
generalizable characteristics is the existence of rules; and it is these rules that critically 
account, in a Hartian framework, for the authority or right that the law has over us— in 
other words, the law’s legal validity. As Hart says,  
“the root cause of failure [of Austin’s view] is that the elements out of which the 
theory was constructed, viz. the idea of orders, obedience, habits, and threats, do 
not include, and cannot by their combination yield, the idea of a rule, without 
which we cannot hope to elucidate even the most elementary forms of law.’221  
4.3. Rules and the Existence of Legal System 
‘Rules’, as Hart conceives them, provide an authoritative grounding of such seriousness 
that it is only by them that the hold that Law may be viewed to have over us can be 
thoroughly comprehended. Just as a social rule imposes an obligation on its bearers by 
the extent of pressure levied by society to adhere to it, so the law “appears as a chain 
binding those who have obligations so that they are not free to do what they want.” But, 
as Hart goes on, despite sharing with merely social rules the characteristic of an 
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imposing, “insistent” and “general demand for conformity”222, laws have yet another 
feature that distinguishes them as particular kinds of rules. For Law is made up both of 
what Hart calls ‘primary rules of obligation’ and ‘secondary rules’.223 
Hart explains that all societies – including those to which we would hesitate to ascribe the 
existence of a legal system – have rules of the first kind. Only a legal system is composed 
of rules of the second type. While most societies have primary rules against murder and 
stealing, as well as those relating to the community’s welfare in general, only legal 
structures have secondary rules in addition. Secondary rules determine that the primary 
rules are actually validly existing legal rules, and by which it is known how these first set 
of rules are to be validly amended or overturned. Further, secondary rules instruct and 
enable officials of the system to determine how to deal with those who offend against the 
primary rules. 
Such secondary rules will often contain what Hart calls a ‘rule of recognition’, which 
ultimately fulfils the function of giving the primary rules a “common mark” by which it 
may be authoritatively known that they validly belong to that particular system.224 In 
other words, the system’s ultimate rule of recognition is that by which the validity of all 
other rules is known; and it is, in that sense, an ‘ultimate’ rule. It is such a characteristic 
that, for instance, defines the Constitution of the United States, or the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom, as the ultimate end-point to which the validity of the individual laws 
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within these respective systems is traced. So that, for instance,  
“when the validity of [any particular statute] has been queried and assessed by 
reference to the rule that what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law, we are 
brought to a stop in inquiries concerning validity: for we have reached a rule 
which, like the intermediate statutory order and statute, provides criteria for the 
assessment of the validity of other rules; but it is also unlike them in that there is 
no rule providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity.”225  
That such primary and secondary rules exist, Hart maintains, is determined by the 
observation of their “acceptance” and “use”. On the one hand, by the obedience paid to 
the primary rules by ordinary civilians and, on the other, of the adherence to the 
secondary rules by officials of the legal system. 226 At a minimum, the bulk of society is 
required to obey the laws for whatever reason they may so choose – including, but by no 
means necessarily – a heartfelt conviction that the law ought to be followed.227  
However, the adherence of officials to the secondary rules of recognition, and in 
particular, to the ultimate rule of recognition, from an “internal point of view [italics 
added] as a public, common standard of correct judicial decision” is, according to Hart, a 
“necessary condition” of our ability to speak of the existence of a single legal system.228 
This ‘behaviour’, so far as Hart is concerned, characterises the “situation which deserves, 
if anything does, to be called the foundations of a legal system.” 229 And they together 
constitute the “two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a 
                                               
225 Ibid, pp. 105-107. 
226 This, as Shapiro describes, is the positivist method of determining the fact of the existence of a 
thing purely by the observation of the social fact of the thing. What is, is what people do in fact do. 
Op. Cit., Shapiro, pp. 27-28. 
227 Op. Cit., Hart, pp. 113-115. 
228 Ibid, pp.115-116. See also chapter VI. 
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legal system.”230 
For Hart, Law and legal system exist purely on the basis of the law’s legal legitimacy 
which is necessarily and sufficiently proved on the observation of obedience to the 
primary rules by ordinary citizens and adherence to the secondary rules by the legal 
system’s officials. In other words, a legal system exists when the primary and secondary 
rules also exist; and these exist when the first are obeyed by the general population and 
the latter are closely adhered to by the system’s officials. This is what Hart means when 
he says “law may most illuminatingly be characterised as a union of primary rules of 
obligation with…secondary rules.”231 
None of this means that this intertwined relationship will explain every single aspect of 
any particular legal system or that if one examines the laws of a particular land, the only 
thing that may be worthy of comment and observation is the existence of primary and 
secondary rules.232 The point, however, is that their existence forms – on Hart’s view – 
the necessary and sufficient conditions to prove the presence of any given legal 
system.233 They thus compose the fundamental element of Law. 
On this Hartian examination of Law, the Nigerian legal system cannot be observed to be 
present. To begin with the lesser point of obedience to the primary rules of Nigeria’s 
                                               
230 Ibid, p. 116. 
231 Ibid, p. 94. 
232 Indeed, Hart is at pains to explain how it is that the rules in any legal system will be subject to 
judicial interpretation where the law, in its combination of primary and secondary rules, still gives 
much space for ambiguity. And in these areas of undefined meaning, judges and legal officials will 
inevitably fulfil the function of supplementing the law. And in this area there will be much that is 
interesting to scholars on what the law actually is. See Ibid, chapter VII. 
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legal system by ordinary persons, it is neither empirically, nor theoretically, useful to 
know whether Nigerians are committing petty theft, or some other primary crime at a 
higher or lesser rate than their counterparts in Australia or anywhere else. Because what 
the ‘acceptable’ rate of disobedience to what particular primary rules has nowhere been 
established234; nor should it to be, since it is the desire of every legal system that not a 
single one of its laws be abrogated by a single individual. As has been laid out in chapter 
three of this thesis, what can however be said of the attitude that many civilians display 
towards the legal system itself by the malign use they make of it, and their constant 
disregard of its judgements, is that they do not appear to view its rules and procedures as 
having sufficient authority to abide by them—and this includes the attitude of members 
of the country’s executive branch. 
More importantly to a positivist assessment of the existence of Nigeria’s legal system, as 
I have also set out in the third chapter of this thesis, is the fact many legal officials do not, 
despite positivism’s necessary criterion, appear to view the system’s secondary rules of 
recognition from an ‘internal point of view’. Indeed, if the cases detailed in chapter three 
are anything to go by, the incidence of judicial malfeasance against their own internal 
rules of correct judicial behaviour is at such a rate that – judicial rebuke and disciplinary 
action aside – one wonders if the standard of judicial behaviour is not now the 
misapplication of the system’s secondary rules.  
                                               
234 See also what Joseph Raz says of the relation between the obedience of the citizenry and the 
question of the legal system’s existence, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the 
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If, as Hart has it, the existence of the legal system lies in the verifiable observation, that is 
the counterpart existence proved by the necessary use of its secondary rules by officials 
and the sufficient obedience to its primary rules by ordinary citizens, then the existence, 
and union, of primary and secondary rules in the Nigerian legal system do not appear to 
form the basis of the existence of the Nigerian legal system itself. And yet, legal 
positivism says it must be so if the system should be taken to exist at all. 
The Nigerian legal system is evidently alive, although it is clearly unwell. The very fact 
of the constant recourse to the courts not only by ordinary citizens, but also by members 
of the State and Federal Governments,235 suggests that the legal machinery in Nigeria is 
somewhere to be found. Further, despite the rate at which judges appear not to abide by 
the system’s secondary rules, it is clear that these rules still do exist given the reference 
that is made to them as caution by those more upstanding among the judiciary.  
These secondary rules, which lay out the criteria by which various sources of law are 
characterised as being legally validly in force and, further, point to the ways in which the 
various laws are to be applied and upon whose authority such application may be based, 
are evident, first and foremost, in the Nigerian Constitution. Although, for historical 
purposes, one may say that the ultimate rule of recognition in the Nigerian system could 
be traced back to the 1906 Letters Patent that gave Nigeria formal legal definition236 in 
the first place, practically, the currently operating 1999 Constitution fulfils this function 
                                               
235 Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Supreme Court and Federalism in Nigeria’ in Journal of Modern African 
Studies (Vol. 46, No.3/2008), p.451. 
236 See Chapter 2 of this thesis, ‘On the Establishment the Nigerian Legal System’. 
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in the modern-day.  
The Constitution declares its own supremacy in Chapter I, Part I (1.1) : “[t]his 
Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on the authorities and 
persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”237 Meaning that the “Constitution is 
the groundnorm, that is, the fundamental law. Thus, any law which is inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Constitution is to the extent of that inconsistency null and void.”238 
Chapter I, Part II, Section 4 of the Constitution further sets out the basis of legislation as 
a source of law in the Nigerian system. Section 4 (8) further states: 
“Save as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the exercise of legislative 
powers by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly shall be subject to 
the jurisdiction of courts of law and of judicial tribunals established by law, and 
accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall not enact any 
law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or of a judicial 
tribunal established by law.” 
Chapter VII of the Constitution establishes the Nigerian courts of law; it determines the 
basis upon which their membership must be constituted, and it lays out the terms of their 
jurisdiction and hierarchy.239 So it is that “the Supreme Court is the final Court of Appeal 
and… the Chief Justice of Nigeria is empowered to make rules for the internal 
organization of the machinery of justice.”240 And that “each High Court has both original 
and appellate jurisdiction in respect of any civil or criminal proceedings in which the 
                                               
237 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at http://www.nigeria-
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238 Jadesola O. Akande, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Lagos: MIJ 
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239 Op. Cit., 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
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existence or extent of a legal right… is in issue.”241 Further, that “each State [may have] 
… its own High Court Law which regulates the [court’s] practice and procedure.”242 
In being the country’s ultimate rule of recognition, the Constitution not only determines 
in which bodies the authority to make Nigeria’s laws are vested, it further outlines their 
procedural and substantive criteria. It provides for the establishment of the courts and sets 
out the areas in which these may act. As a result, what the courts do, and the attending 
rules which they themselves provide for their own action, so long as it is within the 
jurisdiction accorded them by the Constitution, is deemed legally valid according to the 
Constitution.  
So when it is asked why the High Court’s decision in so and so case is valid and legally 
binding, the response – when the decision is so – may be because it follows the rules 
specifying the procedure of court. It may then be asked again: why are these rules valid? 
The question, as Hart says, may go on and on but it must reach an end point. In Nigeria’s 
case, the final answer would be that the very existence of the court and the actions that it 
may undertake are so laid out in the Constitution of the Federation, and for which “there 
is no rule providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity.”243  
Apart from the Constitution, intermediate secondary rules are also established in Nigeria, 
for instance, by the Evidence Act, section 14 of which “provides that an indigenous 
custom of any ethnic group in Nigeria could be adopted as part of the law governing a 
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particular set of circumstances.”244 If a custom has only been acted upon once by a 
previous, though not higher, court, however, evidence must be provided that the custom 
exists. Thus “in Asuquo Oko and Ors. V. James Ntukidem and Ors, the Supreme Court 
per Wali, J.S.C., reiterated: 
“The Court may take judicial notice of custom of the people when such has been 
established on other occasions before the courts. A solitary instance of the 
application of the custom to the facts of a particular case is not sufficient to make 
such a custom notorious.”245 
It is in such a manner that judicial precedent also forms part of the secondary rules of the 
legal system. Precedent must be followed in similar cases by courts lower in the 
hierarchical chain and may be followed by those above.246 Judicial precedent forms a part 
of adjective common law and, as a result, the doctrine of precedent only applies to those 
courts that have been legislatively empowered to administer adjective common law.247  
Despite the existence of primary and secondary rules provided in the Nigerian legal 
system, by Supreme Court rulings, High Court enactments, judicial precedent, and 
ultimately, the Nigerian Constitution, adherence by officials to the system’s rules is 
lacking. I suggest that this is because the cause of the existence of the primary and 
secondary rules, in any given legal system, is separate from the cause of obedience to 
them.  
                                               
244 Charles Mwalimu, The Nigerian Legal System: Volume 1: Public Law (New York: Peter Lang, 
2005) p. 21. See also, C. Eche Adah, The Nigerian Law of Evidence (Lagos: Malthouse Press Lts, 
2000), p.35; and Akintunde Olusegun Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1979), p.85. 
245 Op. Cit., Adah, pp. 35-36. 
246 Op Cit., Obilade, pp. 111-112. 
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In other words, contrary to Hart’s notion, while the legal validity of a system is 
established by the simple and plain existence of its rules, which may be set down in a 
constitution, by legislation, and so forth, the existence of these rules themselves, and 
therefore of the legal system, is not, foundationally, determined by obedience, or 
adherence, to them.   
One of the fundamental problems that the Nigerian case reveals about Hart’s positivist 
equation is that in deriving the existence of Law and legal system, that is, legal validity, 
from what he asserts to be the necessary and sufficient conditions of obedience by 
ordinary citizens to primary rules and adherence by officials to secondary rules, 
obedience and adherence are, then, given no other defining account except through the 
law’s legal validity. Indeed, as Hart himself notes, the “assertion that a legal system 
[validly] exists is … a Janus-faced statement looking both towards obedience by… 
citizens and to the acceptance by officials of secondary rules as critical common 
standards of official behaviour”248 In the extreme, “the society … might be deplorably 
sheeplike … and end in the slaughter house”, but the law there, given the criteria, would 
be legitimate.”249 
It further turns out that the “internal point of view” that is meant to be held by officials 
concerning the system’s secondary rules is nothing more than a deeply held belief that the 
secondary rules that purport to guide their behaviour are, indeed, held by them to be 
legally valid; no more and, certainly, no less. When Hart says that the existence of a legal 
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system is necessarily found in the observable existence of a particular kind of normative 
behaviour of officials towards the secondary rules, he is not making a moral judgement 
that this behaviour is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Neither is he to be misinterpreted as 
suggesting that this kind of behaviour ought to be in practice. He is simply describing the 
observations of an ‘external’ onlooker towards those who regard the law from a 
normative and evaluative internal perspective.250 
Likewise, where Hart ‘describes’ as primitive the kind of society which would operate by 
primary rules alone and no attendant rules of recognition, he is not apparently employing 
a derogatory usage of the term as something necessarily to be compared to any normative 
notion of ‘advancement’. Simply, that where only primary rules are used, that society is 
of a kind that we describe with the word ‘primitive’.251  And where we observe both 
primary and secondary rules in use, we say a legal system, there, exists. 
The root problem is that Hart believes himself to be engaged in a purely descriptive 
endeavour. A problem Scott Shapiro gracefully describes when he notes that despite his 
protestations, Hart violates Hume’s Law that you cannot, by logic, derive a normative 
proposition from a descriptive statement of fact. Or to put it otherwise: “no normative 
conclusion can follow from statements that report them.”252 Take, for example: in 
Singapore, it is illegal to import chewing gum into the country except for therapeutic 
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purposes, which must be evidenced by a doctor’s prescription.253 There is, further, a 
heavy fine levied against anyone who drops food or litter, including chewing gum, in 
public spaces.254  
Person A, a citizen of Singapore, obeys this law and does not publicly chew gum or spit it 
out. All she cares about is that it is the law and the fine is an expensive one, so she heeds 
it. This is, indeed, what all laws command—that we obey them purely on the evidence 
that they, validly, exist. So far as the law in Singapore regarding publicly chewing gum is 
concerned, all persons to whom it applies should obey it because it is a legally legitimate 
law. What other, normative, or even possibly moral, reasons any persons on Singaporean 
soil have for adhering to the primary rule is irrelevant to the purely legal obligations the 
primary rule imposes on such persons.255 
Even in Person A’s very simple case where obedience appears to be traceable to the law’s 
legal validity, the Hartian legal positivist cannot explain the cause of obedience here. It 
                                               
253 Regulation of Imports and Exports Act, (Chapter 272A, Section 3), Regulation of Imports and 
Exports (Chewing Gum) Regulations, at ‘Singapore Statutes Online’, at 
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254 Offences in respect of Uncleanliness in Public Places, at ‘Singapore Statutes Online’, at 
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law, however, only (and can only) seek to make judgement on our external actions. It cannot obligate 
us towards or against anything beyond “outward performance”. It is thus that the tools the law has at 
its disposition to compel obedience are those relevant only to external action e.g. threat of force, 
promise of reward etc. Though these do often stir up an internal motivation in the citizen, the law is 
only concerned with the outward action that is produced. T.H. Green, Paul Harris and John Morrow, 
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), pp. 18-20. 
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can only say that Person A obeyed the law on one hand, and the law was legally valid, on 
the other. In order to say that Person A took the normative action of obedience because 
the law was legally valid, we would have to understand the normative underpinnings 
Person A had given the notion of legal validity. We would say, upon such understanding, 
that Person A obeyed the law because it was legally valid, a characteristic of law that she 
believed meant, therefore, that she ought to obey laws with such characteristic. But since 
legal positivism claims that the legal validity of law is not an inherently normative 
characteristic of law– neither good nor bad – but simply an observable description, then it 
cannot give us even this. And because it cannot explain the simple case of Person A, legal 
positivism certainly cannot, neither does it wish to, explain more complex cases of 
obedience where the latter is traceable to moral, and not simply normative, 
understanding.  
Person B, on the other hand – an avid gum-chewing foreign visitor to Singapore – upon 
realising what the Singaporean law is on gum decides to refrain from the activity he finds 
thoroughly enjoyable. He does so because he thinks he ought to. He does so because he 
thinks it is morally right for him to obey the laws that operate in the lands of other men, 
and to which he is merely a visitor. He believes, in high moral standard, that the laws of a 
land have a purpose that aim, in general, to benefit the domestic population; and he thinks 
that visitors have no right to abrogate such laws, regardless of what they are, and 
irrespective of whether they agree with the moral worth of the specific laws, there, 
operating. Person B’s obedience here, has very little to do with the legal validity of the 
law; and, indeed, the simple observation of his obedience alone would give us no insight 
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whatsoever as to why he, actually, obeyed the law. If we went on observably descriptive 
evidence alone, we would see no difference between him and Person A; and yet, a great 
deal of normative space exists between the two. Person B’s normatively-laden action is 
not one that we could derive simply from observing his plain obedience.  
In fact, Person B thinks the law on chewing gum is a stupid one that deprives him of 
great oral enjoyment. His obedience to the law is independently traceable to his moral 
understanding about the relationship visitors ought to have towards the laws of foreign 
countries.256 As such, he obeys the law because of a characteristic to which the legal 
validity of the law itself has, and seeks, no claim.  
Person C is also a foreigner, but one who hates chewing gum and believes it to be the 
cause of much evil in the world. Person C obeys the Singaporean law because she 
believes it is a law of intrinsically moral worth that ought to be instituted in all places and 
at all times. She does not care about the technicalities of its legal validity, neither does 
she have any compunction as to the moral responsibility of visitors in obeying the laws of 
foreign territories. But yet she obeys the law because, independent of the law’s legal 
legitimacy, she thinks she ought to. Again, simply observing her obedience gives us no 
insight into the ample normativity behind her decision to obey. 
To be clear, legal positivism does not explain the actions of any one of these hypothetical 
characters. It can only descriptively tell us that a person obeys the law on one side and 
                                               
256 It is partially in answer to this question of the relationship foreigners ought to have to the 
institutions of other countries that Jeremy Waldron develops his theory of natural duties. See ‘Special 
Ties and Natural Duties’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, (Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan., 1993). 
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when, in parallel, the law is the law. Legal positivism cannot tell us, as in case A, the 
normative ascriptions behind why people may choose to obey legally valid laws. And the 
reason I believe it cannot give us this, even in simple cases, is because it wraps up 
normative obedience in its very definition of legal validity itself.  
More challengingly, as in the cases of Persons B and C, legal positivism cannot explain 
cases where obedience is independently traceable to a reasoning that is not outwardly 
observable or mirrored by the simple evidence of the existence of a valid law. The 
obedience of Persons B and C have another cause besides the legal validity of the law 
and, which while it may have no impact on the legal validity of the law itself (the law 
validly exists and imposes itself in equal measure on all three characters), matters 
separately, and a great deal, to our understanding and explanation of obedience.  
On the basis of his own formulation, Hart cannot, therefore, say that someone operating 
within the confines of a legal system may make the normative judgement that the law 
ought to be obeyed because it is legally valid simply on the basis of the descriptive 
information alone that the law is legally valid. To be sure, any given person, such as 
Person A, may obey the law because it is legally valid. But the descriptive fact of the law 
being legally valid gives us no insight as to why, in general, the law ought to be obeyed. 
A Hartian analysis is unable to give us an assessment of the ought reasons behind what 
may explain the outward observation of obedience.   
Shapiro suggests that while Hart is correct that a ‘good man’ may come to his own 
normative, but amoral, conclusions about how to react to the law simply from the law’s 
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merely descriptive definition given by the neutral legal philosopher, where Hart fails is in 
not being able to account for how a ‘bad man’ would come to a similarly normative 
conclusion without, like the good man, needing to comprehend the normative obligations 
the law imposes on him. Shapiro’s point is that where a ‘good man’ may very well get his 
normative input from elsewhere than a simply descriptive definition of Law, thus 
explaining his normative action, the ‘bad man’ is he that has no other input but the 
amoral, supposedly non-normative, description of law and its demands. So when the 
latter carries out normative action on the basis of what is held to be purely descriptive 
information about the law, we must ask whether that information is actually as 
descriptive as we believe it to be; and if not, where else the normative input can be 
coming from. Seeing as many a ‘bad man’ does often come to what is indeed a normative 
decision to obey and ascertain the content of the law, without – like the good man – 
necessarily accepting it or viewing it as morally legitimate, that he nevertheless has a 
(moral) obligation to obey the law despite only having the descriptive information that 
the law legally ‘obligates’, Shapiro concludes that Hart is fated to fail ‘Hume’s 
challenge.’257   
Shapiro attempts to correct Hart’s sin against Hume by proposing the notion of Law and 
legal system as a kind of “social planning.”258 By doing so, Shapiro believes he conforms 
to Hume’s Law by ascertaining the existence of law through purely descriptive, amoral, 
and non-normative, criteria, whilst acknowledging that the law itself has a normative 
                                               
257 Op. Cit., Shapiro, pp. 98-115. 
258 Ibid, p. 120. 
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point of view. He also views himself as solving the proverbial ‘chicken and egg’ puzzle, 
at which many before him had so far failed. In other words, how it can be possible for the 
law to exist in the first place if legal authority or law is required to make law.  
“The proper way to establish the existence of plans”, Shapiro says, “is simply to 
point to the fact of their adoption and acceptance. Whether I have a plan to go to 
the store today, or we have a plan to cook dinner tonight, depends not on the 
desirability of these plans but simply on whether we have in fact adopted (and not 
yet rejected) them. … [T]he picture that emerges is one in which the creation and 
persistence of the fundamental rules of law is grounded in the capacity that all 
individuals possess to adopt plans… [T]his power is not conferred on us by 
morality. On the contrary, it is a manifestation of the fact that we are planning 
creatures.”259 
In conceiving the law as what he calls “planlike norms” 260, Shapiro comes to the 
conclusion that there is a kind of internal logic to the law – as with plans – whereby we 
may say that on the basis of the purely legal claim given by the law, a person that is given 
legal authority by the law has “morally legitimate power”. Or that if the law commits a 
person to some action, we may say from the point of view of the law’s internal planlike 
structure, that person “has a moral obligation to perform that action. This statement may 
be understood to mean only that from the legal point of view one is (morally) obligated to 
perform that action.”261 
Shapiro’s conception is not especially different from Hart’s though it uses different 
explanatory language; and so the fundamental problems remain the same. It is no surprise 
that Shapiro provides us with no more explanation than Hart does and the major problem 
                                               
259 Ibid, p. 119. 
260 Ibid, p. 120. 
261 Ibid, pp. 184-185. 
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of what explains obedience apart from the law’s legally valid existence not only remains 
intact but is made more troublesome. For in Shapiro’s framework, ‘legality’ and ‘legal 
morality’ meaning nothing but each other and the latter being explained solely by the 
former, ‘legal morality’ or the authority of law has no distinctive explanatory 
characteristic beyond mere legality, which at least Hart was attempting to give it.  
4.4. Human Behaviour and a Normative Description of Law 
I believe Shapiro is primarily mistaken on the grounds against which he criticises Hart’s 
framework. As a result, the end to which he is able to bring his own conceptualization 
does not escape the very same pitfalls to which Hart’s, and positivism in general, is 
subject. Shapiro misidentifies Hart as asking a descriptive question and producing a 
normative answer. However, the real problem is that Hart (and Shapiro himself) is asking 
a distinctly moral question and searching for a merely normative answer; or the 
description, thereof.   
The fact is that Hart wants to be able to explain what he thinks are the merely normative 
reasons why either the citizen views herself to be compelled to obey the law or why the 
official takes it to be his duty to adhere to the guidelines of the secondary rules beyond 
the law’s capacity merely to impose sanctions.262 In other words, he wants to be able to 
explain the law’s command263 and why it is accepted as authoritative by officials and 
                                               
262 Ibid, p. 92; also Op. Cit., Hart, p. 23, p. 35, p. 198.  
263 When I say that the law commands I am not making the same error as Austin in supposing that all 
laws impose duties (see Shapiro, Legality, p. 68), I am using the term less specifically to mean that it 
is authoritative. As such, I am not only referring to penal laws but also to such laws that cannot be 
seen to impose any kind of restrictive duty to refrain from particular actions. Contract laws 
‘command’ in this sense because those who wish to enter into contracts take the legal stipulations 
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citizens simply on the evidence of its legal existence or validity. What Shapiro seems to 
fail to understand about Hart’s conception is that the major problem is not actually that he 
seeks to assert a normative state of affairs out of a purely descriptive one but, rather, that 
he aims – though he denies he does – at a moral explanation of a (possible) normative 
state.  
Shapiro rightly interprets that under a Hartian conception, “to divine the set of legally 
valid rules… one must know what officials think, intend, claim, and do.”264 The problem 
with this is not Hart’s attempt to ascribe a normative judgement to people with only 
descriptive input but his desire is to explain moral motivations on the basis of merely 
normative criteria. It is not only that Hart cannot explain how the ‘bad man’ comes to 
normatively conclude that he ought to obey the law, given that such a person neither 
cares about the law’s legal validity, nor would the latter – if it were a merely descriptive 
and not a normative fact – have any command, no matter how minimal, over someone to 
whom the law’s authority is irrelevant. More importantly to this thesis, however, is the 
problem that Hart, and positivism, cannot explain why the good man would obey the law 
simply because it is merely legally valid.  
Hart wants to be able to explain why it is that a ‘good’ citizen or a ‘good’ official might 
obey or adhere to the law beyond the reason of its mere legal validity265, but given that 
                                               
about how they are to do so as the legitimate and definitive way to form contracts. Likewise officials 
take the secondary rules as the inviolable rules by which they are to perform their own duties as 
officials of the system.  
264 Ibid, Shapiro, p. 118.  
265 Op. Cit. Hart, pp. 82-90. 
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his entire explanatory power is contained in the law’s legal validity, he cannot. He is 
forced to conclude that the (possible) observation of the norm of the citizen simply 
obeying266 – for whatever reason – and the norm of the officials valuing the rules from an 
‘internal perspective’ of the law’s legal validity, constitute the whole criteria for the 
existence of the rules of the legal system. And by which it is also to be imputed that all 
we need to account for the observation of the above normative behaviour is the legal 
validity of the rules themselves.  
There is no explanatory power for Law’s existence on one hand, and obedience to 
existing law, on the other hand,267 outside of Law’s legal validity. The law is legally valid 
because it exists by the observable evidence of our obedient/adherent behaviour towards 
it and our obedient/adherent behaviour towards the law is evident when or because the 
latter is legally valid. And yet, Hart knows very well that the technical explanation of the 
                                               
At least some part of the reasoning behind Hart’s disinclination to confuse ‘morality’ with ‘legality’ is 
made somewhat clear in a series of three lectures given at Stanford University and documented in 
Law, Liberty, and Morality’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). In them, Hart’s argument 
against the public sentiment at the time that the ‘immorality’ of homosexual practice between 
consenting adults, and in private, should be enforced by society on pain of legal sanction. Hart holds, 
against those such as Lord Devlin – an advocate that society’s ‘morality’ ought to be legally 
enforceable – that it is “quite unclear why forcing a person under threat of legal penalties to conform 
to moral requirements – say as to his sexual conduct – should be regarded as securing for him welfare 
or good of any kind.” p. ix. Hart’s particular concern, as shown by his concern with the matters of his 
day, with not confusing ‘morality’ with legality and his belief that while the law may be subject to 
moral criticism, its use in the enforcement of society’s ‘morality’ would be unduly harmful both to 
society, the individuals being morally persecuted by use of the law, and to the sanctity of the law 
itself.” See pp. 1-24. Despite Hart’s correct and admirable assertions against those who would wield 
Law in aim of their own petty beliefs, it is illuminating that Hart goes along with the Lord Devlins of 
this world in accepting the use of the word ‘morality’ to describe mere social value norms that may be 
apparent in particular places and particular points in time. On this reckoning, however, Hart’s desire 
not to confuse ‘morality’ with legality is understandable.  
266 Op. Cit., Hart, Concept of Law, p. 114-115. 
267 Even Shapiro acknowledges that it is not theoretically possible to equate the behavior that rules 
dictate with the rules themselves. The two, in lying on different metaphysical planes, are not of a kind. 
As Shapiro says, “rules are standards that guide conduct, not the conduct itself.” Legality, p. 103.  
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law’s legal validity, and its peculiar authority to compel obedience beyond merely brute 
force are two different things. I suggest that the problem is in eliding the distinction 
between an ‘at base’, or foundational definition of law and any description that aims to 
define any higher-level attributes Law may have beyond its most basic appearance.    
Joseph Raz recognises the problem that the concept of authority presents when he asserts 
that “there is little surprise that the notion of authority is one of most controversial 
concepts found in the armoury of legal and political philosophy.”268 Raz’s solution to the 
problem of what counts for, or is justifiable as, legitimate authority is to adhere to a 
“reason-based explanation” of practical authority.269 In doing so, Raz corrects the 
confusion that I believe Hart does not fully identify between something being an 
authority and its actually having authority over people—that is, in actually being 
accepted by people making the decision to do what it tells them to do. Raz separates the 
notion of de facto authority—the notion that a thing can have binding authority simply 
because it says it does from a de jure authority—one based on justifiable reasons.270 And 
as he explains of the law, it  
“is the popular view that the law enjoys de facto or effective authority. Its analysis 
involves these concepts but not necessarily that of a legitimate authority. This is a 
mistake. To hold that a government is de facto government is to concede that its 
claim to be government de jure is acknowledged by a sufficient number of 
sufficiently powerful people to assure it of control over a certain area. A person 
has effective or de facto authority only if the people over who he has that 
authority regard him as a legitimate authority.”271 
                                               
268 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 1. 
269 Ibid, pp. 7-13. 
270 Ibid, pp. 4-22. 
271 Ibid, p. 28.  
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Raz determines that law has legitimate authority because its valid existence acts as an 
“exclusionary” or “protected” reason for “conforming action and for excluding 
conflicting considerations.”272 He further explains: 
“The claim that legal sources are reasons for action raises as many questions as it 
solves. Are legal sources moral reasons or prudential reasons, or is there a special 
and distinct kind of reason which legal reasons exemplify? Do ordinary legal 
statements import moral approval of the law? These questions cannot be explored 
here … But suppose one asks why is a certain legislative act a reason for action? 
Is it not because of moral grounds that a policeman’s order, for example, is a 
reason for action? Be that as it may, some of these grounds are legal while others 
may not be. The policeman’s order is a valid reason because, generally, 
policemen act to preserve the peace and are reliable. This is not a legal ground. 
Another ground for accepting that the policeman’s order is a reason for action is 
that parliament conferred on him the power to give such orders. There may or 
may not be non-legal grounds for accepting legal sources as reasons, but there are 
always such legal grounds.”273 
Raz’s attempt to separate the layers of ‘reason’ that justify legitimate authority appears 
too simplistic. It is yet still possible to ask for what reason an official views the legal 
grounds or reason – that is, evidence of valid legal rules – as ‘exclusionary’ to other 
supposedly non-legal considerations when these are indeed in conflict; and when they are 
not, why, we assume, she views the legal reason as superior to the non-legal one. Further, 
the suggestion that there are instances in which there will not be relevant higher order 
non-legal reasons for accepting legal sources or, put more simply, for adhering to validly 
existing law requires more proof than Raz gives. That non-legal reasons are not easily 
and outwardly observable is not proof of their absence.  
Remaining in Raz’s useful analytical framework, I assert that in being complexly 
                                               
272 Ibid, p. 29, pp. 22-33. 
273 Ibid, p. 68. 
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composed of layers of reasoning, legitimate authority does not rely on one set of reasons 
in exclusion of all others (even if this is how the law itself views the basis of its own 
legitimate authority), but rather on layers of compatible sets of reasoning that are of 
greater and lesser logically substantive and positional importance. In application to law, it 
is not that officials, or those who choose to obey the orders of officials, choose the legal 
reason to the exclusion of all others, but rather that these latter reasons act as prior 
reasons that justify acceptance of the legal reason. We may ignore them if all we are 
looking for in the end is the legal reason, and further if we see non-legal reasons as 
differing incoherently from person to person, but where the case can be made that these 
reasons fall generally under a definitive philosophical understanding that explains their 
necessary presence, then ignoring them would seem not only to be detrimental to our 
understanding of authority but of law’s particular and peculiar authority, more 
specifically.   
So, we may grant, as Raz says, for example, that part of a policeman’s reasoning in 
choosing to accept to do as the law directs is the plain existence of a legal rule; in other 
words, he is given a legal reason by a valid legal source.274 We can further still ask, 
however, what justifies or provides the reason for the policeman’s choice in accepting the 
legal reason as itself a justifiable enough or sufficient explanation to himself for why he 
is adhering to the legal rule. The answer to this must come from outside the explanation 
of legally valid law.  
                                               
274 See Ibid, Raz, pp. 68-69. 
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Yes, at the observable root of every law or rule that is obeyed by the citizen or adhered to 
by the official is a law that exists on the basis of its legal validity; an existence for which 
the citizen or official at some point reaches in deciding to obey or adhere. But there is 
something further behind this that causes either individual to view that the technical 
existence of the law is an even immediate reason for which he should reach in the first 
place. This further reasoning or justification is positionally and substantively prior to the 
legal reason because in explaining why a person takes the legal reason itself to be of such 
significance, it also provides the justification behind that person’s acceptance of the legal 
reason as itself sufficient justification of authority.  
It is difficult to logically deny the correctness of the most fundamental features of the 
positivist framework. That Law is made up of rules and that at the very heart of all legal 
systems lies an interlocked relationship between primary and secondary rules is the basic 
groundwork of legal system, to which Hart has so seminally contributed and which no 
enquiry into the concrete nature of modern law can exclude. But that is where the 
positivist contribution to our understanding of the necessary conditions of Law ends.  
Since Hart’s – and the general positivist – conception of Law and Legal System are 
universalist in their remit, it may be possible to suggest, using such cases as Nigeria 
where the legal system exists in absentia of legal positivism’s existence criteria, that the 
existence of legal system is simply to be found in the documented appearance of ‘official’ 
rules, both primary and secondary, that aim to govern a given socio-political entity. 
Whether these rules do actually govern said community and/or are taken as authoritative 
– as witnessed in the behaviour both of citizens and – and to an even higher extent – of 
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system officials, is not a necessary criterion for the basic existence of Law and legal 
system and for their ‘at base’ definition. This behaviour may, however, constitute a 
necessary observation in answer to an all-together different moral question.  
To explain, we may, quite neutrally say of the State, that it is composed of layers of 
governing structure by which one segment of society organises both itself and the 
community at large. Within this structure we may often find a legal or judicial arm, a 
civil or bureaucratic arm, a military arm, and a political arm; all of which may inter-relate 
with each other in myriad ways. We may further say that each arm of the State and all of 
them together may be so structured as to enable the government as a whole, or the 
remaining society, or both together, to achieve their self-defined aims. With this further 
assertion, we have an amoral but normative description of the State. For while, with the 
latter description, we are making no assertions as to the moral condition that any given 
state ought to have – since the description may apply as equally to Luxembourg as it 
could to North Korea – we are, however, going beyond merely defining the difference, at 
base, between a state simply being apparent and not. We are further adding that it is the 
normative good for the State to aim at and attain some end, which not merely any kind of 
social organisation often does.   
Hart is therefore correct when he says it is possible to – from an external position – 
describe the normative internal workings of a system and yet be forming no distinctly 
moral judgements.275 For in being concerned only with the normatively effective and or 
                                               
275 See Op. Cit., Hart, Concept of Law, Postscript. 
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efficient outcomes of the function of a state or a legal system, and based only on what 
any given example of these structures determine for themselves, it is perfectly possible to 
be totally unconcerned with whether these ‘outcomes’ are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, in a moral 
sense.  
The issue at hand, however, is a little more serious and I think more interesting than this. 
Neither positivists nor proponents of Natural Law have found it useful to anybody to set 
out to positively advocate for the fundamental nature of ‘bad’ law whether in a moral, 
normative, amoral, or non-normative sense. Further, though they would be loath to admit 
it, even positivists have found it uninteresting to be concerned solely with an at base, 
non-normative, amoral, description of Law. And while they would like to find a way of 
ascertaining a description of normative but amoral Law, they cannot because they are – 
as am I – asking an inherently moral question.  
Now, in addition to descriptively saying that the state aims at some normative good or 
end, we may, further, ask for the reasoning behind why people within that state accept 
that that normative good or end is, indeed, a good end to which they ought to ascribe and 
aid in achieving. When we ask this, we are asking a moral question.  
Whereas when we stop at a merely normative definition of either the state or of Law, it 
still remains possible for an understanding of the motivations behind human behaviour to 
be unnecessary; and it is, certainly, utterly irrelevant for the ‘at base’ definitions of either 
of these things. But why and how people behave does, by logical necessity, come to 
matter to a more than ‘at base’ or normative definition of Law, or of the state. Yet, this 
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behaviour, or the reasoning behind it, cannot inherently be explained by non-moral 
definitions in either case.  
What makes people do what the law tells them to do is the question that legal philosophy, 
once it moves beyond an at base definition, must acknowledge it is asking and it is a 
question about the compulsion of people to a specific kind of behaviour— obedience. 
Once we begin to question human behaviour, we are no longer speaking only normatively 
because we are not simply describing the ‘normal’, or everyday, condition of people 
obeying the law. We are asking why, even where it is the normal condition, is it so; and 
where it isn’t, why not? And we are, in short, questioning the ought possibility of a 
normative condition, and in acknowledgment of the fact that what is could, always, be 
otherwise. That is to occupy a moral stance.  
4.5 Participation and the Moral Legitimacy of Law 
The fault in positivism as found in Hart and his followers, is to conceive of the existence 
of law and legal system prior to the presence of human life. Throughout his major legal 
treatise, Hart appears to speak as if without the law, and without the specific legal 
requirements that permeate so much of social life in most political communities, 
humanity would literally cease to exist. It is not that human beings would function in a 
different way, and for which we would no doubt find some other definition. Rather, on a 
Hartian interpretation, it is that laws have, non-metaphorically, produced the major part 
of what we can commonly observe to be characteristic of human behaviour.276  
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An alien using The Concept of Law as its guide to human existence would be quite right 
to judge that human beings would cease to be born, or to die, save for the legal 
certification of births and deaths. And it would be understandable if it were to believe that 
in order to abolish the human race, it would need simply to eradicate our formal laws.  
To be sure, there are many aspects of our behaviour that laws do actually modify. Hart is 
astute in explaining how the legal requirements that specify the making of wills, for 
instance, specifically alter the ways in which many in certain societies bequeath their 
worldly goods onto their descendants after death. It is a testament to the power of formal 
laws over us that many of us do, or will, organise the possessions we leave behind in 
conformity with the legal regulations of our various countries so as to circumvent the 
messiness that can often accompany such occasions.277 It would, however, be a mistake 
to believe that such regulations themselves produce the common tendency that people 
appear to have to leave their possessions to friends and family, as opposed to merely 
organising how they do so within societies that are structured under formal legal systems.  
It is also possible that there are behaviours that certain laws do actually introduce. One 
that comes easily to mind is the law on the payment of taxes. So fundamental is paying 
tax to one’s government a part of the behaviour within most modernised societies, despite 
the fact that no proof exists that we are, by nature, predisposed to handing over half of 
our earnings to a faceless bureaucracy.  
                                               
277 Hart gives the example of the specifications of the English Wills Act 1837 as giving the provision 
by which valid wills are made. When s. 9 of the Wills Act is not complied with, the will is simply 
made a nullity, “without legal ‘force’ or ‘effect’. Concept of Law, p. 28. 
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Nevertheless, while the tax code does appear to establish ‘new’ behaviour, this is only so 
on a superficial reading. Laws of taxation do not create the base motivation or desire to 
pay taxes; rather, they merely force legal compliance. The law instructs me to pay my 
taxes and so I pay my taxes and any other reasons I have for paying my taxes that may, 
and often do, exist quite irrespective of the law’s stipulations and may be, very 
importantly prior to it, have nothing to do with the legal code, and therefore cannot be 
explained by it.278  
My desire to accrue at least some of the benefits that governments the world over profess 
will be actualised as a result of public taxation – such as a state-funded education, or a 
national health service, or public transportation, or a national defence – is nowhere 
stipulated in the directions of the tax code. Not only is it highly probable that these 
motivations are not determined by the law itself, it is equally probable that the source of 
their determination is prior to the existence of formal taxation – and thereby cannot be 
explained by taxation’s legal codification. These prior motives may be part of the 
explanation for the existence of tax law itself.   
That legal positivists have tended to put the proverbial cart before the horse to which it 
belongs is of no small matter to their conception of Law. This thesis, however, aims to 
suggest that Law is given moral meaning by the aim a given population instils in it, 
through participation. This aim, towards which that state and its citizenry direct their 
                                               
278 As Hart states, a legal legitimacy interpretation of Law cares very little, and it by necessity cannot, 
about any non-legal motives for compliant behaviour. See Concept of Law, pp. 114-117 and pp. 167-
180. 
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laws, and for which the law is instituted in the first place, is the just moral end of the 
communal living of the population in respect of the relative freedom of one another. It is 
the distinguishing feature of a specifically political society, and in aim of which the laws 
of the land are developed. I suggest that wherever we find a people freely obeying their 
laws, or the majority thereof, we find laws made legally valid by the plain and 
documented existence of primary and secondary rules and made morally legitimate by 
that same population who has participated in shaping the manner of the laws and imbuing 
in them a purpose for the just benefit of both their individual and communal living. This 
is the moral legitimacy of Law.  
Shapiro’s reformulation of positivism also conceives of the law as purposive. But though 
he countenances the “beliefs” and motives of the people who might wield ‘plans’, he still 
makes the ‘plans’ of his framework logically prior, or as at least amorally distinct from 
any fundamental characteristic that we may find it necessary to ascribe to its employers. 
As such, Shapiro rejects the understanding that the coming together of a set of people to 
make a ‘plan’ is an inherently moral activity that gives the content of that plan moral 
purpose. If plans are purposive in Shapiro’s framework, they are not morally so; but 
simply as a result of their basis in social facts. Law, as a set of plan-like norms in 
Shapiro’s analysis, are not there to tell you what the law ought to be or how they ought to 
be interpreted. Instead, as plans, they are determined by the social, not moral, facts that 
determine the nature of the law.279 
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In conceiving of Law through the framework of ‘plans’, Shapiro is at least right to view 
the law as ‘purposive.’280 He errs, however, in removing his ‘plans’ from the distinctive 
nature of political society. To Shapiro, it would seem, the ‘plan’, for instance, that a set of 
people may have to play a game of cards, purely on the momentary fact that they are 
bored (consider that this ‘plan’ may take an even larger scale of a daily National Card 
Playing Championship and for which dense and horizontally organized sets of rules 
would be needed), should be no different from a distinctly political community coming 
together not only to frame the fundamental rules of living a full life together but also, of 
understanding the parameters of their political relations with one another in the 
fundamental benefit of their individual goals and ambitions and those of the community 
as a whole.281 That each of these ‘plans’ do not lie together on the same plane of 
amorality is the fundamental distinction between this thesis’ understanding of the law as 
purposive, and that of Shapiro’s. 
Regarding the purpose of law, Hart is, further, incorrect in asserting that it is “quite vain 
to seek any more specific purpose which law… serves beyond providing guides to human 
conduct and standards of criticism of such conduct.” 282 In having the specifically moral, 
and crucially political, purpose of enabling a society to attain the end of a good 
                                               
280 Ibid, p.128. 
281 As Shapiro explains of his own thesis, “the fundamental rules of a legal system constitute a shared 
plan and, as we have seen, the proper way to ascertain the existence or content of a shared plan is 
through examination of the relevant social facts. A shared plan exists just in case the plan was 
designed with a group in mind so that they may engage in a join activity, it is publicly accessible, and 
it is accepted by most members of the group in question. As a result, if we want to discover the 
existence or content of the fundamental rules of a legal system, we must look only to these social 
facts. We must look, in other words, only to what officials think, intend, claim, and do around here.” 
Legality, p. 177.  
282 Op. Cit., Hart, Concept of Law, p. 249. 
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communal life, and which binds the whole community into a specifically political 
society, the law is even greater distinguished from simply any kind of rule that may be 
present in society. And it is, indeed, by reference to this ultimate end that the law is, and 
ought to be, used as a standard of public criticism.  
My thesis is, also, not to be confused with the natural law theory of Lon L. Fuller, who, 
as Shapiro notes, unleashed “the most famous assault on legal positivism” in his book, 
The Morality of Law.283 For Fuller, the law and morality were inherently connected 
because the law is given what he calls an “inner morality of the law” by being composed 
of rules made general, public, understandable, and stable. There must, further, be 
congruence between announced rules and their administration; they must not contradict 
themselves, and they must be prospective.284 For Fuller, the very existence of a legal 
system was to be judged by its adherence to this internal morality because it is what 
grounds the citizen’s ability to conceive that he has a moral obligation to obey the law.285 
The theoretical understanding of the law’s moral legitimacy that this thesis aims to 
advance firstly does not make the moral validity, internal or otherwise, of the law a 
determining criterion for its basic existence. Secondly, it holds that the morality of the 
law, which is to be a general characteristic ascribable to the legal system as a whole, is 
something that is revealed in the nature of Law and legal system by the participation of 
those who use the law in the moral purpose of their relative freedoms. 
                                               
283 Op Cit., Shapiro, pp. 392-3. 
284 Lon L. Fuller The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) pp. 33-94. 
285 Ibid, pp. 39-94, also p. 155. 
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For Fuller, these larger societal aims are categorised under an “external morality” to 
which the “internal morality of the law” is neutrally indifferent286, but to which the latter 
may very well lend its support. This thesis, however, contends that it is these larger 
societal aims – and which are the good end of all correct political societies – that in 
defining the very nature of political community, gives to the law its moral legitimacy. A 
moral legitimacy that comes to be made apparent to a people by their participation in the 
framing and maintenance of their legal systems; and one that is entirely separate from 
law’s legal existence, and that provides the distinctive answer to the question of free 
obedience.287 
If the legal system in Nigeria exists, and certainly it does, then it is, perhaps, that we are 
in need of an exclusive theory of legal system that uniquely applies to, and explains, 
cases like Nigeria where the legal system exists but is sub-optimally functioning. I 
suggest not. More likely it is that such cases as Nigeria point to the fact that established 
positivist theories of legal system, that aim to describe the universe of legal system, are 
lacking in critical respects.  
The Nigerian case suggests that in being unable to fully account for the latter’s existing 
nature, positivist legal theory also only provides a partial explanation of the nature of 
those other legal systems, such as the United Kingdom’s or North America’s, which it 
                                               
286 Ibid, chapter 4. 
287 Under this framework, it will still be possible for there to be individually bad laws in such a society 
where law is yet understood to have a morally legitimate purpose. The infallibility of human nature 
and human conduct means that even among groups or whole societies of upstanding citizens, what 
each, and even all of them may feel together to, in their time and space, be just or good laws may bear 
no resemblance to the good absolutely.  
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only appears to better explain. The Nigerian case suggests that in those political societies 
where a legal system seems to be verified by positivist criteria, some other source, or 
cause not given by positivism, for obedience and an ‘internal view’ of the law has also 
been achieved. A cause, which positivism unknowingly utilises by the verification of its 
observational criteria.  
What I mean here, is that whereas positivism believes itself to be giving an account of 
what makes law, in general, authoritative based on observable criteria, it is really only 
giving a partial accounting. By saying that the law is the law when, and because, officials 
behave towards it in like and like manner, positivism is, in fact only giving us an account 
of the end-product of the law’s authority in the one sense that happens to be easily 
observable by the behaviour and acceptance of officials. When, in fact, this acceptance 
and behaviour is actually the result of the law, and the manner of its correct sourcing, 
already being authoritative in a more important, and prior sense. The explanation for this 
prior authority, and which explains the population’s acceptance of law’s legal authority 
cannot be found simply in a definition of legal validity. In short, the reason that 
positivism does not fully explain Nigeria is because it does not, and cannot, fully explain 
any other case of adherence/obedience within a legal system.    
What it is that may explain obedience, quite apart from the legal validity of the law which 
merely establishes it valid existence, and with which legal positivism is adamantly 
unconcerned, is the certain focus of the remainder of this thesis. The philosophical 
foundations that situate the participation of a people in the establishment of their laws as 
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a primary moral requirement for the attainment of a just political society is an 
understanding given most comprehensively by political philosophy.  
Using Aristotle and Rousseau, this thesis aims to put forward the understanding that the 
law of a state does not sit by itself, but fulfils specific purposes that are given to it by the 
very nature of political society, and to which it is in service. If the Nigerian case suggests 
anything, it suggests that the establishment of the law does not, and ought not to, come 
about for simply any sake at all. And when it comes about without adherence to a 
reasoning that is justified by the aim of a people, and without their participation in 
formulating a particular understanding of law’s nature and their relation to it and to each 
other, we may have a legal system that is legally valid, but it will elicit little compliance 
neither by citizens, nor by officials, who will be yet to view that the law, together with its 
sources has, or should have, any authority over them. 
The questions of what purpose exactly is contained in the law that participation brings 
closer to the citizenry’s view and understanding, and to what feature of human nature 
participation attaches in enabling this view, are questions fruitfully answered by the 
exploration, and combination, of Aristotle’s understanding of justice together with a 
reformulation of Rousseau’s construction of freedom.   
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Chapter 5: The Essence of Justice 
It is possible that the problems that this thesis sees as arising from a positivist conception 
of law are the insurmountable consequence posed by the interdependent positional 
relationship between law and political society in the first place. As Joseph Raz explains 
of the perspective of legal theorists such as Hans Kelsen, for instance, “the concept of the 
state [could] be explained only in legal terms. That is, the concept of a legal system must 
be explained first; from it naturally flows the explanation of the concept of a state, for a 
state is but a (municipal) legal system.”288 Law, in this sense being prior to the state, 
could be conceived of entirely without it.  
For a political philosophical understanding that views law as being in the service of 
societies that make the law’s very existence possible, it cannot but be the other way 
around. Yet, both are correct—the state is a construction made possible by a system of 
laws; and laws, of the kind we have been discussing, do not exist in absentia of states, the 
construction of which, they enable. Raz acknowledges that because “Kelsen lacks the 
concept of the state as a political system, he fails to account for the identity of a legal 
system.” “A theory of law”, he goes on, “must be based, at least partly, on a theory of 
state … A theory of state, however, is partly based on a theory of law—the two are 
intimately interrelated.”289 Yet for his own purposes, Raz concludes that “there is no need 
to discuss the concept of state beyond mentioning some truisms. A state is the political 
organisation of a society, it is a political system that is a subsystem of a more 
                                               
288 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 99. 
289 Ibid, p. 99.  
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comprehensive social system.”290  
I hope to make it clear over the course of this chapter and the next that there is every 
need, for our purposes at least, to pay a far greater deal of attention not only to the 
concept of the state, but to the very meaning of the notion of the ‘political’, without 
which terms such as ‘political organisation’ and ‘political system’ are liable to connote 
simply any understanding. We can agree with the perspective of the pure legal theorist 
that laws do, in a fundamental sense, ‘make’ the state and yet still posit that the particular 
meaning behind this leads to a critical understanding that not only does law give the state 
particular meaning, but that in doing so, law also takes on a specific character that must 
be taken into the consideration of its relation to political society.  
My exploration into the character given law by society and vice versa begins with 
Aristotle who most clearly viewed the city-state as an entity given to us by nature291; and 
from which its inherently political and legal character, and that of its inhabitants, also 
flowed. I aim to further suggest – though Aristotle himself makes no such claim – that 
what Aristotle rightly understands as being the end of law as the logical result of the 
nature of political society, is an end that is fruitfully illuminated to the ordinary members 
of society by way of a participation that is derived from the nature of men in a freedom 
relatively conceived, and which participation itself further enables them to understand.  
In the first half of this chapter, I use Aristotle to show that the authority of law within 
                                               
290 Ibid, p. 100. 
291 “Every city... exists by nature” says Aristotle. Politics, (Trans. Carnes Lord) (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013). Politics, Book I, Chapter 2, p. 3. 
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political society derives from the nature and communal purpose of the state, which gives 
law its own authoritative purpose in associating the citizenry with a material form of 
justice, and which forms part of the inherent end of political society itself. I then explore 
why participation does not form a core part of Aristotle’s own exposition as it does for 
mine. I suggest that it may, in the end, be possible, based on a reformulated 
understanding of freedom – which I more fully explore in Chapter 6 – to attach 
participation to an Aristotelian understanding of the nature and end of political society as 
giving law an authority that is prior to the authority that it gives itself, and which this 
thesis views as critically important without, in fact, undermining the former 
understanding.  
5.1. Without the City, Without Law, Man is Worst of all… 
“The complete community, arising from several villages, is the city”, states Aristotle at 
the start of the Politics.  
“It reaches a level of full self-sufficiency, so to speak; and while coming into 
being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well. Every city, 
therefore exists by nature, if such also are the first communities. For the city is 
their end, and nature is an end: what each thing is – for example, a human being, a 
horse, or a household – when its coming into being is complete is, we assert, the 
nature of that thing. Again, that for the sake of which a thing exists, or the end, is 
what is best; and self-sufficiency is an end and what is best. From these things it 
is evident, then, that the city belongs among the things that exist by nature, and 
that man is by nature a political animal.”292 
The connection between the nature and naturalness of the city and the nature and 
naturalness of the law that holds the city together cannot be overestimated. For Aristotle, 
                                               
292 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 2, pp. 3-4. 
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man is, by nature, a political animal; not because he has a natural affinity for ‘politics’, 
but because he needs the city—for it is in the city than man is connected with law. “He 
who is without a city through nature rather than chance”, Aristotle says “is either a mean 
sort or superior to man; he is without clan, without law, without hearth.”293 If the city is 
the most complete and self-sufficient end of communal organization, then “just as man is 
the best of animals when completed, when separated from law and adjudication [,from 
being outside or without a city,] he is the worst of all”294 the beasts.295 “For injustice is 
harshest”, Aristotle continues,  
“when it is furnished with arms; and man is born naturally possessing arms for the 
use of prudence and virtue which are nevertheless very susceptible to being used 
for their opposites. This is why, without virtue, he is the most unholy and the most 
savage of the animals… Justice is a thing belonging to the city. For adjudication 
is an arrangement of the political community, and justice is judgment as to what is 
just.”296 
This is a fundamental understanding of the nature of the state and its relation to the nature 
and purpose of law of which legal positivism, in general, appears to be bereft. This is a 
conception of the city that understands the latter as a unique type of legal arrangement. 
An arrangement in which the nature of the law is fundamentally tied to a specifically 
political purpose. A purpose that is, further, defined by the very nature of what is meant 
by the most self-sufficient of human communities; that is, the political community, the 
city-state.   
                                               
293 Ibid, p. 4. 
294 Ibid, p. 5. 
295 This allusion is to Aristotle’s comparison between some (if not most) multitudes to beasts: see Ibid, 
Politics, Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 79. 
296 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 2, p. 5. 
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This understanding becomes clearer the further we delve into what exactly Aristotle 
conceives of as the city’s own nature. Aristotle says that the city-state is a specific kind of 
aggregate community, the smallest part of which is the household.297 At base, the city is a 
“community” “of persons who cannot exist without one another: on the one hand, male 
and female… on the other, the naturally ruling and ruled.”298 But the city-state is, in a 
very crucial sense, much more than this. For this description does little to distinguish the 
city-state from the individual households of which it is composed and in which, 
traditionally, one finds a female and a male and ruling and ruled elements in the relation 
of parents to their children. The state, or the city, is  
“prior by nature to the household and to each of us. The whole must of necessity 
be prior to the part; for if the whole body is destroyed there will not be a foot or a 
hand, … but the thing itself will be defective. Everything is defined by its 
function and its capacity … That the city is both by nature and prior to each 
individual, then, is clear. For if the individual when separated from it is not self-
sufficient, he will be in a condition similar to that of the other parts in relation to 
the whole. One who is incapable of sharing or who is in need of nothing through 
being self-sufficient is no part of a city and so is either a beast or a god.”299  
In Aristotle’s conception, what unifies the state into a practical whole300 that is prior to its 
parts is the regime that organises or gives it a specific, and specified, legal arrangement. 
But in being the whole, that is, the good end of the community, the city, and the regime 
by which it is legally arranged, does not however tend to simply any purpose whatever.  
And it is precisely because the city is to be understood as an end given to us by nature, 
                                               
297 Ibid, Book 1, Chapters 1-2, pp. 1-3. 
298 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 2, p. 2. 
299 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 2, pp. 4-5. 
300 Ibid, pp. 2-5. The link this thesis later draws between its understanding of Politics through its 
interpretation of Metaphysics is justified by some of the ideas that run through both texts. One, is 
Aristotle’s conceptual use of ‘the whole’ and its ‘parts’. The other, which is more thoroughly 
examined later on in this chapter is his use of ‘essence’ and ‘substance’ in both texts.   
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and thus prior to each of us, that the laws that arrange it, and to which we are given 
access by our attachment to the city must be understood in a specific sense. The laws that 
organise the city must, by logic, be tied to the communal end and function for which the 
city is naturally in place.  
5.2. That the State is a Legal Arrangement 
It is with this essential understanding in mind that we may go on to elucidate Aristotle’s 
equally important establishment of the ‘legality’ of the city-state or the legal structure by 
which city-states may exist. Aristotle arrives at the fundamental comprehension of law’s 
importance to the political nature of the city and to that of its practical existence by 
asking whether it is by the city’s location or by the citizens living in it; or better still, is it 
by the two being conjoined that we know that a city persists? Aristotle answers that since, 
in theory, and in actuality, the “location and the human beings can be disjoined with 
some inhabiting one location and others another, and it will still be a city”, there is a 
greater sense in which the city is not where it is or who lives in it; “for it is surely not by 
the fact of its walls.”  
“It is evident”, Aristotle says, “that it is by looking to the regime above all that the city 
must be said to be the same; the name one calls it can be different or the same no matter 
whether the same human beings inhabit it or altogether different ones.”301 What, in turn, 
defines the existence of any given regime is whether, or not, in it the laws prevail. 
                                               
301 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 3, pp. 65-66.  
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“Where the laws do not rule there is no regime”,302 Aristotle says. We are made to 
understand that in a certain crucial sense the regime, properly speaking, is its laws; and 
that is by these latter that a city-state is said to exist.303  
But further, the correctness of the laws will depend on the correctness of the regime, and 
vice versa. “Laws”, says Aristotle, “are necessarily poor or excellent and just or unjust in 
a manner similar to the regimes to which they belong: if nothing else, it is evident that 
laws should be enacted with a view to the regime. But if this is the case, it is clear that 
those enacted in accordance with correct regimes are necessarily just, and those in 
accordance with the deviant ones, not just.”304  
Aristotle divides the different types of regimes under which a city may exist into two 
main categories: “correct” and “deviant”. He distinguishes the fundamental character 
belonging to all correct regimes from that of the deviant regimes by saying:  
“since ‘regime’ and ‘governing body’ signify the same thing, since the governing 
body is the authoritative element in cities, and since it is necessary that the 
authoritative element be either one or few or the many, when the one or the few or 
the many rule with a view to the common advantage, these regimes are 
necessarily correct, while those with a view to the private advantage of the one or 
the few or the multitude are deviations.”305 
                                               
302 Ibid, Book 4, Chapter 4, p.106. 
303 Although it is clear throughout the Politics that Aristotle’s logic sees the laws and the regime to, in 
a certain respect, be almost interchangeable terms, it is also evident that there is a distinction between 
particular laws and a regime (as constituted by a more holistic and organizationally complete legal 
arrangement) when he speaks of those legislators such as Lycurgus and Solon who instituted both 
laws and regimes. Politics, Book 2, Chapter 12, pp. 58-61. It is this understanding that I think resolves 
Lord’s query in 4.2.1289b when Aristotle says: “so tyranny is the worst and furthest removed from a 
regime.” Lord wishes for the last word here to be replaced with ‘polity’ or ‘kingship’. But what 
Aristotle, in fact, means is that in being rule according to the personal dictates of the ruler and not in 
any way according to law, tyranny is hardly to be classified as a regime-type at all.  
304 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 81. 
305 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 7, p. 73. 
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Under correct regimes, Aristotle places three regimes: kingship, aristocracy, and polity 
(as respectively rule by one, by a few, and by the many, all with a view to the common 
good). Under deviant regimes, he places “tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from 
aristocracy, democracy from polity. Tyranny is monarchy with a view to the advantage of 
the monarch, oligarchy rule with a view to the advantage of the well off, democracy rule 
with a view to the advantage of those who are poor; none of them is with a view to the 
common good.”306 
When, then, arguments arise as to whether the multitude, or the wealthy, or the 
respectable, and such other parts of a city, should rightly be the authoritative element in a 
regime, Aristotle retorts that the details of such squabbles make little difference. For 
more than who rules, it is the correctness of the type of law instituted within city-states to 
which those who argue over such things must look. For what matters is whether or not 
the laws are just in tending to the common good, since it is the same if those who are rich 
and in the minority rule unfairly as it is if those who are poor and in the majority rule in 
this manner as well. 307 Indeed the name we give to any particular kind of regime or city-
state is, and ought to be, based on the kind of laws by which it is governed. “For a regime 
is an arrangement in cities connected with the offices, establishing the manner in which 
they have been distributed, what the authoritative element of the regime is, and what the 
end of the community is [italic added].”308 
                                               
306 Ibid, pp. 73-74. 
307 “But if law may be oligarchic or democratic, what difference will it make with regard to the 
questions that have been raised?” Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 10, p.78. 
308 Ibid, Book 4, Chapter 1, 98.  
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The meaning of Aristotle’s much misinterpreted phrase that “man is by nature a political 
animal”309, and that “justice is a thing belonging to the city”, becomes ever clearer. If, as 
Aristotle repeatedly notes, “the regime is [a legal] arrangement of a city”310, whether this 
arrangement be democratic, aristocratic, or monarchic, it is by the law– and by which we 
define the regime (and therefore the city-state) – through which those living inside gain 
access to the law and to justice. But this has yet further meaning, for the city-state is an 
end by nature.311 And its attachment to law and to justice must, therefore, be of a specific 
kind and for a specific purpose. 
For the city-state is not merely some kind of trade or security alliance,  
“it is evident, therefore, that the city is not [simply] a community sharing a 
location and for the sake of not committing injustice against each other… These 
things must necessarily be present if there is to be a city, but not even when all of 
them are present is it yet a city… [T]he city is the community in living well both 
of households and families for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life… 
This sort of thing is the work of affection; for affection is the intentional choice of 
living together. Living well, then, is the end of the city, and these things are for 
the sake of this end [italics added]. …The political community must be regarded, 
therefore as being for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of [merely] living 
together”312 
                                               
309 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 2, p.4.  
310 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 6, p. 71; see also, Book 2, Chapter 8, p. 44, where Aristotle implies the 
interchangeability of the terms “the laws” and “the regime.” Although it is clear that Aristotle means 
that in a deeper sense the law or the legal framework is the regime, which is the formal arrangement of 
the city, it is also clear that in another sense there is evidently a definitional distinction between “a 
regime” and the particular set of laws that compose the legal framework which distinguishes the 
former notion. See Aristotle’s description Ancient Greek legislators some of who crafted laws, and 
others whole regimes. Book 2, Chapter 12, pp. 58-59. Further, Aristotle belabours the point 
throughout the Politics, that a city ruled personalistically rather than by an institution of laws, is not 
rightly called a regime; for such cities as the former can never be maintained for long. 
311 Ibid, Politics, Book 1, Chapter 2, p. 3. 
312 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 9, p. 77. 
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Aristotle’s understanding of the city-state, as being in a critical sense, the legal regime 
that defines it, cannot be divorced from the end of the city as a communal endeavour in 
living well. And the laws that arrange that community for it, by logic, to be said that the 
city is type of legal arrangement, must have that same specified political purpose. It is the 
common good, and the self-sufficient end. 313  
This forms the core understanding this thesis accepts in responding to legal positivism 
that even if it should be possible to conceive of law in absentia of political society, or 
even as existing before it, once we begin to speak of the legal system, or body of laws of 
a particular state, we are speaking of law as having a specific character given to it by the 
very nature, and what it means to speak fundamentally, of a political community. 
Still, in Aristotle’s conceptualisation, and in the argument of this thesis, there is no 
necessary contradiction between the one kind of authority that comes from the law’s 
simply being the law and the further authority that is given law by the greater purpose 
and nature of the city, and to which the law is in service. Aristotle makes clear that legal 
justice is part of political justice, which is further composed of a natural justice yet larger 
than itself. “What is just in the political sense can be subdivided into what is just by 
nature and what is just by convention”, Aristotle says.  
“What is by nature just has the same force everywhere and does not depend on 
what we regard or do not regard as just. In what is just by convention, on the other 
                                               
313 “It is thus evident that virtue must be a care for every city, or at least every one to which the term 
applies truly [italics added], and not merely in a manner of speaking. For otherwise the community 
become [merely] an alliance which differs from others … only by location, and law becomes a 
compact and, as the sophist Lycophron said, a guarantor among one another of the just things, but not 
the sort of thing to make the citizens good and just.” Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 9. For law to really be law 
then, it must be connected with the true and self-sufficient end of the city-state. 
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hand, it makes originally no difference whether it is fixed one way or another, but 
it does make a difference once it is fixed, for example, that a prisoner’ ransom 
shall be one mina, or that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat but not of two sheep, 
and all the other measures enacted for particular occasions.”314 
We might, therefore, say that legal positivism is justified in its attempts to detach law’s 
legal validity from other non-legal considerations. And in fact, as this thesis does, we 
may accept this narrow explication as the basis of law’s existence in a plain way. But, as 
with Aristotle, we further assert that there is more to what gives law its wider authority 
than this.  
5.3. The Essence of Justice 
What is it that makes us singularly human? To put it other ways, what is the ‘essence’ or 
‘substance’ of man—that she is what she is beyond her ‘accidental’ attributes. That she is 
brown or pink is merely the accidental form the matter takes. That she is well-read or 
poorly educated may be particular to her, but these are not the characteristics that mark 
out her very existence, in singular fashion, as a human being. For this we must look, 
Aristotle says, “to something else” – that “substrate” which does not depend on anything 
else and is its own substance; indivisible.315 “It would seem”, Aristotle reasons, “that this 
‘something else’ is something that is not an element, but is the cause that this matter is 
flesh and that matter a syllable, and similarly in other cases. And this is the substance of 
each thing, for it is the primary cause of its existence.”316 
                                               
314 Aristotle, (Trans. David Ross), Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
Book 5, Chapter 7, p. 131. 
315 Aristotle (Trans. Hugh Tredennick), Metaphysics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1935), Book 7, Part 1-6, pp. 311-337 
316 Ibid, Book 7, Part 17, p. 399  
142 
 
 
So it is, also, with justice. In an explanation of ‘being’—that is, what it is to say that 
something exists, what it is to point to the thing and give it a definition beyond its 
accidental matter requires that we understand the ‘substrate’, or ‘essence’, or ‘substance’ 
of the thing. Substance, Aristotle says, is the “only or chief subject of [the] definition” of 
a thing and its cause.317 By which he means that to ask what a thing is, in the most 
important sense, is not merely to ask of its quality or of its quantity, that it looks such and 
such or that it weighs this or that. Although such things may form a part of a definition in 
some sense, to ask what a thing is, is to question the nature of its fundamental essence.318  
“A particular thing”, Aristotle says, “is considered to be nothing other than its own 
substance, and [so] the essence is called the substance of the thing.” The ‘essence’ is to 
be understood as that thing, or innate substance, upon which whatever is in question is 
dependent for its very being, and without which it could not be what it is. For its own 
existence, however, the essence is, itself, self-subsistent.319   
So far as it pertains to the inquiry of this thesis on what the law’s nature depends, there is 
another aspect of Aristotle’s understanding that must be highlighted before proceeding 
into Aristotle’s understanding of justice. What exactly the ‘essence’ is or, in other words, 
what can be the fundamental definition of any individual thing is, in a sense, 
unattainable.320  This is because it is impossible to define that which is predicated of 
                                               
317 “The essence, whose formula is the definition, is also called the substance of each particular thing.” 
Ibid, Book 5, Part 9, p. 241; also Book 7, Part 13, pp. 381-3; also Book 7, Part 17, p. 399. 
318 Ibid, Book 7, Parts 1- 5, pp. 311-331. 
319 Ibid, Book 7, Part 6, pp. 333-335. 
320 For though the essence or substance of a thing is the definition or chief definition of that thing, 
“there is no definition even of substance.” Ibid, Book 7, Part 13, pp. 382-3. 
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nothing but itself. Those things, then, which are ‘eternal’, or ‘pure form’ or ‘pure 
essence’, so to speak, are those that have no predicate and no matter; they are – in their 
entirety – what Aristotle calls “actuality”.321 And what causes the essence in things that 
have no matter, and that are eternal is the essence itself. In having no predicate, it can 
have no cause outside of itself. It simply is, “ipso facto”.322  
But while we may not be able to give such things a unique definition consisting of a 
description that belongs exclusively to them, we can at least understand what the essence 
of such things are like.323 So that in those things – what Aristotle calls “sensible things” –  
which are not ‘pure form’ or ‘pure essence’ but which are composed also of matter, that 
is things made both of matter and of form or essence, we may gain a definition of the 
matter but also an inkling of the form. But even of those things composed also of matter, 
their truest substance will still be in their essence and not in their matter.  
So that those who describe man merely as a two-footed animal describe only the matter; 
when in fact, man’s most true substance, so Aristotle says, is his soul. And while man is 
not pure form but a combination of matter and of form, there is a sense in which – given 
that the essence of a thing is its truest substance – ‘man’ and ‘soul’, will then be 
coterminous. 324  
This is not to say that the matter of which sensible things are composed is unimportant. 
The problem with defining sensible things by their matter alone, however is twofold. The 
                                               
321 “By substance without matter, I mean the essence” Ibid, book, 7, Part 7, p. 341. 
322 Ibid, Book 7, chapter 6, pp. 423-425. 
323 “We cannot say what silver is, but we can say that it is like tin”, Ibid, Book 7, Part 3, p. 413.  
324 Ibid, Book 8, Part 2, p. 411. 
144 
 
 
first is that stripped of the parts that are their matter, we can still comprehend the 
existence of such things as are composed of matter and of form. Without all of her limbs, 
a man will still be comprehended as a man, while on the other hand, her limbs will not. 
The matter then, as Aristotle persists, is in a sense besides the matter.325  
The other problem, as Aristotle puts it, is that all matter, separated from ‘form’, is 
indeterminate.”326 As such, the precise shape in which sensible things may come cannot 
be understood to be fixed. Sensible things are not in the precise material form that they 
happen to take as a matter of necessity. They could have been otherwise. While essence, 
then is an ‘actuality’ because it is what it is and must be; matter is a “potentiality”. In the 
opposing sense of can.327  
The importance of considering matter a part of substance will be especially relevant in 
the case of those parts of sensible or “concrete” things that, though posterior to their 
wholes (and therefore to their essence), are themselves integral to a conception of the 
wholes of which they are a part. For example, while we may consider that a man’s finger 
does not compose part of the formula for what is man, of such importance are other parts 
of the human material such as the brain or the heart that though they be matter, they must 
be included; for they may be understood to be those material parts through which the 
                                               
325 With man as the example, Aristotle explains: “Man lives in virtue of himself, because the soul is a 
part of man, and life is directly contained in it … Man has many causes: “animal”, “two-footed,” etc.; 
but nevertheless man in virtue of himself man.” Ibid, Book 5, Part 23, pp. 269-271; see also Book 7, 
Part 10. p. 361. 
326 Ibid, Book 7, Part 11, p. 371, also Book 7, Part 10, p. 363. 
327 Ibid, Book 8, Part 6 -Book 9, Part 1, pp. 423-429. 
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essence of man (the soul) is induced into the material body of man.328 
Although the essence of things, which is their most fundamental substance, is what truly 
defines them, it must, therefore, be admitted that of those things that have matter in them, 
that matter – despite its superficiality329 – will also be understood to compose part of the 
substance of that thing.330 So that, for example, the substance of ‘calm’ is levelness. But 
when in reference to something that is made of matter, the substance of that thing with be 
present both materially and in essence. So that the substance of a calm sea will be both, 
the essence of levelness and the material substance of the sea itself.331  
So it is with all things that are made both of ‘form’ and of ‘matter’; that is, all things 
which are not pure form i.e.: pure essence; in other words, sensible things. 332 In sensible 
things, it is through the matter that we induce the pre-existing form, in as much as, for 
example, “the craftsman does not produce the substrate … so neither does he produce the 
sphere; except accidentally, inasmuch as the bronze sphere is a sphere.”333 
Those things which are predicated both of matter and of form are not, for Aristotle, 
                                               
328 Ibid, Book 7, Part 9-11 pp. 353-365. The explanation is perhaps better emphasised by Aristotle’s 
use of the syllable. “It then matter, form, and the combination of the two are distinct, and if both 
matter and form and their combination are substance, there is one sense in which even matter may be 
called “part” of a thing; and another in which it is not, but the on parts are those elements of which the 
formula of the form consists. E.g., … bronze is part of the statue as a concrete whole, but not of the 
statue in the sense of form. We may speak of the form (or the thing as having form) as an individual 
thing, but we may never so speak of that which is material by itself. This is why the formula of the 
circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas the formula of the syllable does contain that of 
the letters; for the letters are parts of the formula of the form; they are not [simply] matter; but the 
segments are parts in the sense of matter in which the form is induced.” pp. 355-357. 
329 Ibid, Book 3, Part 1- Book 4, Part 4, pp. 101-173. 
330 Ibid, Book 8, Parts 1-3, pp. 403-411. 
331 Ibid, Book 8, Part 2, pp. 409-411. 
332 See Ibid, Book 7.  
333 Ibid, Book 7, Part 8-9 pp. 345-351. 
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relegated only to things we can physically sense. Sensible things also include those things 
that are intelligible, which we can mentally comprehend – such as the objects of 
mathematics.334 If the Pythagorean theorem is a sensible substance, so then must justice 
be. And just as with man, justice is possessed of an essence—which is its core substance; 
but also, further, of a material substance or substances.  
We may say that, for Aristotle, there is a material justice composed of material parts or a 
‘potential matter’ in contradistinction to its ‘actuality’ or essence, and which depends on 
indefinite circumstances. There is also an essence of justice, which is its eternal substrate 
predicated of nothing. What then, is justice, of what parts is it composed, and how is it to 
be related to law and the city?  
In a material sense – that is, the material form into which one may say the essence of 
justice comes to be induced – Aristotle elucidates that justice is the median. “Now, if the 
unjust is unequal, the just must be equal.” Aristotle explains that “accordingly, the just is 
necessarily both median and equal, and it is relative and it is just for certain 
individuals.”335 He restates the point when he says in the Politics that “justice is held to 
be equality, and it is but for equals and not for all.”336 What Aristotle means is that justice 
requires giving to each what he merits in the knowledge that all do not merit equally. It 
explains his disdain for the understanding of justice that underpins democracies, and 
which though not quite opposite is entirely incompatible with his own; for there, in 
                                               
334 Ibid, Book 7, Part 17, pp. 395-297; see also Book 7, Part 10-11, p. 363-367; and Book 8, Part 3, p. 
413. 
335 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5.3, p. 118. 
336 Op. Cit. Aristotle, Politics, Book 3, Chapter 9, p. 75. 
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democracies, “justice is held to be something equal [unqualifiedly].”337  
Rather, the real equality contained in justice, Aristotle suggests, involves a more 
thoughtful division so that “there will be the same equality between the persons and the 
shares: the ratio between the shares will be the same as that between the persons. If the 
persons are not equal, their just shares will not be equal. … The just, then, in this sense is 
the proportional, and the unjust is what violates the proportion.”338  
To the practical lives of ordinary citizens, this must mean that for such things as the 
distribution of honours and wealth, the division must be in proportional equality to those 
to whom they are given.339 That justice is a certain manner of equality will have a 
practical impact in a “corrective” sense so that where inequality has been brought about 
by an injustice, for example, in the case of theft or murder, the object of justice will be to 
restore the balance to equality; and “by inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to 
take away his gain and restore the equilibrium.”340  
Further, in economic life, justice will also be a kind of reciprocal equality; so that in 
mutual exchange where what is being exchanged is not readily proportional – Aristotle 
uses the example of an economic association between a housebuilder and a shoemaker – 
justice and fairness will involve “equalising” the products in the transaction so that it may 
be determined how many shoes is worth a house and so on. It is for the purpose of 
relating physically incommensurable products to a single standard for the sake of 
                                               
337 Ibid, Book 5, Chapter 9, p.153. 
338 Op. Cit. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5.3, p. 118-120. 
339 Ibid, Book 5.3, p. 119. 
340 Ibid, Book 5.4, p. 121. 
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economic exchange between citizens – a means by which they satisfy their communal 
needs – that money has been introduced and “becomes, as it were, a middle term.”341 
Justice, however, exists prior to its material or practical manifestations; and it is because 
it does that even in the material of justice, we are able to sense something greater, but 
which we cannot quite define. And so, as Aristotle says,  
“in one sense we call those things ‘just’ which produce and preserve happiness for 
the social and political community. … Thus, this kind of justice is complete virtue 
or excellence not in an unqualified sense, but in relation to our fellow men. And 
for this reason justice is regarded as the highest of all virtues, more admirable 
than morning star and evening star … In justice every virtue is summed up. It is 
complete virtue and excellence in the fullest sense because it is the practice of 
complete virtue.”342 
If virtue unqualified is the complete practice of moral and intellectual excellence within 
each man343 both for its own sake and for the sake of his own happiness, then justice is 
the complete practice of the moral virtues in the aim of the happiness of others. As such, 
“justice alone of all the virtues is thought to be the good of another, because it is a 
relation to our fellow men in that it does what is of advantage to others.”344 
Justice, Aristotle says, “is that quality [italics added] in terms of which we can say of a 
just man that he practices by choice what is just, and that in making distribution between 
himself and another, or between two others, he will not give himself the larger and his 
neighbour the smaller share of what is desirable (and vice versa in distributing what is 
                                               
341 Ibid, Book 5.5, pp. 123-128. 
342 Ibid, Book 5.1, pp. 113-114. 
343 Ibid, Book 5.1, pp. 114-115. 
344 Ibid, Book 5.1, p. 114.  
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harmful).”345 Further, “the just in political matters is found among men who share a 
common life in order that their association bring them self-sufficiency, and who are free 
and equal, either proportionately or arithmetically.”346 
And so, “the just exists only among men whose mutual relationship is regulated by law, 
and law exists where injustice may occur.”347 For it is the material form of the just that 
law produces that we are able to experience, or sense, as the essence of justice. And so 
Aristotle says, “lawful is what the art of legislation has defined as such, and we call each 
particular enactment ‘just’. The laws make pronouncements on every sphere of life, and 
their aim is to secure either the common good of all or of the best, or the good of those 
who hold power either because of their excellence or on some basis of this sort.”348 
This should not confuse the fact that, as Aristotle indicates, justice does not always come 
to inhabit the law on the plain example of unjust laws349; and further, that justice and the 
law do not identically overlap. As he says, “But ‘unfair’ and ‘unlawful’ are not identical 
but distinct and related to one another as the part is related to the whole. For everything 
unfair is unlawful, but not everything unlawful is unfair.”350 In other words, justice does 
not fill the entire concern of the law; there are things with which the law is concerned that 
have nothing to do with moral fairness. And in turn however, since not everything 
                                               
345 Ibid, Book 5.5, p. 128. 
346 Ibid, Book 5.6, p. 129. 
347 Ibid, Book 5.6, p. 129. 
348 Ibid, Book 5.1, p. 113. 
349 Aristotle notes that “people think it does not take much wisdom to know what is just and what is 
unjust, because it is not hard to understand the matters with which the laws deal. But these things are 
not just except incidentally.” Ibid, Book 5.9, p. 139. In other words, it is easy for there to be unjust 
laws since without much wisdom the law comes to represent what is just merely by accident.  
350 Ibid, Book 5.2, 116. 
 
150 
 
 
unlawful is unjust so also is it that not everything lawful is fair.351 Nevertheless, of the 
aspect of justice that we are able to materially access within political society, it is only by 
the law that we do so.  
In the next chapter, I argue that participation shows the citizenry that law, in laying down 
a material justice that applies to one of them, intends to apply, and relate to them all. It is 
in this way that I further suggest that participation reveals to the citizenry what it means 
to do justice to one another; for by the obedience that is gained from their better 
understanding of law’s purpose, they carry out justice as moral virtue.  
5.4. Virtue and the (In)Significance of Participation in Aristotle 
Given the importance that Aristotle gives to justice as the practice of complete moral 
virtue between fellow citizens, the undefinable essence of which is contained in the 
material of correctly-framed laws, combined with the crucial understanding he gives of 
the city-state as a work of “affection”, it is perhaps a little surprising that the participation 
of the citizenry, particularly with regards to law, is hardly of any significance to 
Aristotle’s fundamental theoretic.  
This seeming peculiarity is emphasised by what Aristotle says of speech as the 
distinguishing feature of human beings among the other animals:  
“for, as we assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone among the animals 
has speech. The voice indeed indicates the pleasant or the painful, and hence is 
                                               
351 “All law is universal”, Aristotle says, “but there are some things about which it is not possible to 
speak correctly in universal terms… And this is the very nature of the equitable, a rectification of law 
where law falls short… This is also the reason why not all things are determined by law.” Ibid, Book 
5.10, pp.141-142. 
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present in other animals as well; for their nature has come this far, that they have 
a perception of the painful and pleasant and signal these things to each other. But 
speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just 
and the unjust.”352 
To be sure, in his definition of the citizen Aristotle notes that who gets to participate or 
deliberate will depend on the kind of regime, and therefore on who each specific type of 
regime denotes as being a true citizen. “We see that regimes differ from one another in 
kind,” Aristotle explains,  
“and that some are prior and some posterior; for those that are errant and deviant 
must necessarily be posterior to those that are without error… Hence the citizen 
must necessarily differ in the case of each sort of regime. Accordingly, the citizen 
that was spoken of is a citizen above all in a democracy; he may, but will not 
necessarily be a citizen in the others. … Who the citizen is, then, is evident from 
these things. Whoever is entitled to share in an office involving deliberation or 
decision is, we can now say, a citizen in this city; and the city is the multitude of 
such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-sufficient life, to speak 
simply.”353 
Nevertheless, and despite the reference that some deliberative theorists make to 
Aristotle354, participation and deliberation are not so fundamental to Aristotle’s most 
important understanding of the basic nature of the ideal city-state and to the significance 
of law to its inhabitants. As Richard Mulgan suggests, “Aristotle does not reject the 
whole of ethical and political life in favour of philosophy; but neither is he a 
wholehearted advocate of political participation as essential for happiness.”355 
                                               
352 Op Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Chapter 2, p. 2. 
353 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 1, pp. 63-64. 
354 See Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (California: 
University of California Press, 2003); Jane Mansbridge Beyond Adversary Democracy, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative 
Democracy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
355 Richard Mulgan, ‘Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation’ in Political Theory, (Vol. 18, 
No. 2/ May 1990), p 195. 
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For reasons that further serve to clarify the nature of the political community and the type 
of political virtue that enables its end as cause, which Aristotle elucidates, and to which 
this thesis ascribes, I aim to suggest that the relative insignificance of participation to 
Aristotle arises precisely as a result of the ends of political society and the nature of 
virtue that is a further part of its end in educating the citizenry through correct laws. It is, 
further, my aim to examine whether or not it is possible to solve the apparent 
contradictions that seem to arise from an Aristotelian view, between participation in law-
making and the self-sufficient end of the city-state without, in fact, diminishing a correct 
conception of either law’s most authoritative purpose or that of the city-state.   
To be clear, Aristotle says that it is not the sign of a fine arrangement or regime where 
“the people keep quiet, though not taking part.”356 And as a remedy for the ill of having 
the majority in any regime be opposed to it, Aristotle advances that there must be a 
minimum of participation—including in correct regimes. He resolves the question 
“over what matters free persons or the multitude of the citizens (these being 
whoever is neither wealthy nor has any claim at all deriving from virtue) should 
have authority. For having them take part in the greatest offices is not safe: 
through injustice and imprudence they would act unjustly in some respects and err 
in others. On the other hand, to give them no part and for them to have no part in 
the offices is a matter of alarm, for when there exists many who are deprived of 
prerogatives and poor, that city is necessarily filled with enemies. What is left, 
then is for them to take part in deliberating and judging. Hence Solon and certain 
other legislators arrange to have them both choose officials and audit them, but do 
not allow them to rule alone.”357  
When Aristotle debates the correctness, or lack thereof, in the arrangement by Solon he 
notes approvingly that “Solon seems, at any rate, to have granted only the most necessary 
                                               
356 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 2, Chapter 10, p. 55. 
357 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 79.  
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power to the people, that of electing to office and auditing; for if the people did not even 
have authority over this, they would be enslaved and an enemy to the regime [italics 
added].”358  
I find some confusion as to whether Aristotle believes the participation of the citizenry in 
the function of the regime should be relegated to electing and auditing officers and 
serving on juries alone, or more widely to be involved in deliberating and judging with 
regards to the nature of the laws. Given his later explication of the level of virtue required 
for the latter, however, it is likely that he simply means that the citizenry should be 
involved, as he states, in deliberating on “judicial cases carrying penalties of death or 
exile or confiscation, and the choosing and auditing of officials” and not over the laws 
themselves.359  
Of the laws, which in being the most important aspect in defining the practical nature of 
the city-state, Aristotle examines that it ought to be removed from the influence of men, 
and precisely because it is so important to the well-being of the city. Indeed, since the 
manner of the laws define the regime, a regime that does not rule by law is a tyranny 
because it is not a regime at all.360 And so, Aristotle says, “one might assert ... that it is 
bad for the authoritative element generally to be man instead of law”361 … for “the law 
should rule in all matters.”362 
                                               
358 Ibid, Book 2, Chapter 12, p. 59. 
359 Politics, Book 4, Chapter 14, 120-121. 
360 Ibid, Book 4, Chapter 2, p. 99. See also footnote 303 of this chapter.  
361 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 10, p. 78 
362 Ibid, Book 4, Chapter 4, p. 106. 
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As such, the participatory function of the majority of inhabitants in at least two of 
Aristotle’s correct regimes —that is, kingship and aristocracy is entirely circumscribed to 
either the one who is truly a citizen in a kingship, or the few, on the basis of their virtue, 
in an aristocracy.363 In the case of a polity, however – which composes the third of 
Aristotle’s correct regimes – although the many, there, take part in the regime for the 
very fact that in such a regime it is the multitude that governs,364 their participation 
cannot be thought to extend to having authority over the law.365 Such a formulation 
Aristotle condemns as belonging to a form of democracy so extreme that it cannot be 
thought to apply even to a basic democracy, which is itself listed among the deviant 
types.366  
In any case, Aristotle gives the citizenry a minimum of participation within any regime as 
a fundamental necessity of the city being a community in the purpose of living-well. As 
such, the citizens, who are defined by regime-type, must share not merely in the physical 
location of the city, but in the city itself and in its end.367 I want to suggest, however, that 
                                               
363 See Book 3, Chapters 7-8; Book 4, Chapter 8. 
364 In polities, which Aristotle says are the most attainable in leaning more towards democracy than 
they do towards virtue, the bulk of the citizenry is allowed to take part in deliberating. Ibid, Book 4, 
Chapter 8-9. 
365 Aristotle, at several points, makes it clear that the extreme of making the people have authority 
over the laws that is found in some democracies is an error of such gravity that it is liable to end in a 
revolution into tyranny. See Politics, Book 5, Chapter 5. pp.140-141, and Book 5, Chapter 9, pp.152-
153. “In the sort of democracy which is now most particularly held to be a democracy (I mean, the 
sort in which the people has authority even over the laws)…” Book 4, Chapter 14, p. 122. 
366 Aristotle’s distinction between an ordinarily ‘deviant’ democracy and democracy’s extreme form 
where the multitude have authority even over the laws is made clear when he states: “ For it is indeed 
possible for an oligarchy to be in an adequate condition in spite of departing from the best 
arrangement. But if someone tightens either of them further, he will make the regime worse first of all, 
and eventually not even a regime.” Ibid, Book 5, Chapter 9, p. 152. 
367 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 2, p. 5. 
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Aristotle’s exclusion of the multitude from participating in or influencing the laws in 
particular, is not only a result of the absolute importance of law’s attachment to the 
complete ends of the city-state but, also, a result of Aristotle’s concerns about the nature 
of men.  
Julia Annas has noted that the most striking injustice in Aristotle’s ideal state is that even 
aside from the slaves368 “a majority of the free residents of the ideal polis are not to be 
citizens.”369 However, I suggest that where Annas ascribes this injustice to a kind of 
oversight or lack of clarity in Aristotle’s own thinking and further suggests that 
“Aristotle’s exclusion of the [majority] from political rights finds no justification in his 
ideas about human nature”370, not only do I think Aristotle relatively clear in a logic that 
necessarily leads to excluding the majority from sharing in the ideal regime, but this is, 
further, an especial result of his understanding of human nature and not divorced from it.   
“Good birth and virtue exist among few persons,”371 Aristotle says. And if one were 
looking for almost all the causes of factional conflict that are apt to destroy a city, one 
need look no further than the base passions of men.  
“For men are stirred up against one another by profit and by honour. … They are 
stirred up further by arrogance, by fear, by preeminence, by contempt, by 
                                               
368 Beyond the discussion here, there is, of course, no part of what Aristotle expresses even about 
slavery that could ever be correctly interpreted or used to justify or defend racialized forms of forced 
slavery. Quite apart from what Aristotle says about the immorality of forcing people into slavery, he 
states quite clearly that his understanding of slavery is not the result of physical attributes but rather 
those of the soul that would cause a person to be capable of voluntarily submitting themselves to the 
rule of another. See Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 3-6, pp. 6-10.  
369 Julia Annas, ‘Politics: A symposium: Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue’ in The 
Review of Metaphysics (Vol. 49, No. 4,/ Jun 1996), p. 740. 
370 Ibid, p. 753. 
371 Op Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 5, Chapter 1, p. 131 
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disproportionate growth, and further, though in another manner, by 
electioneering, by underestimation, by neglect of small things, and by 
dissimilarity. … Men engage in factional conflict through fear, both when they 
have committed injustice and are frightened of paying the penalty, and when they 
are about to suffer injustice and wish to forestall it.”372  
Aristotle confirms that “the wickedness of human beings is insatiable.”373 In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, he notes also that the “common run of people, as we say, betray 
their utter slavishness in their preference for a life suitable to cattle.”374 And when it 
comes to the souls of the many and the ruled, “the irrational element” is not sufficiently 
brought to order by “the element having reason.”375 “What difference [,then,] is there 
between some multitudes and beasts, so to speak?”376 Aristotle questions.  
This understanding of some men, though not all, as a certain danger to the sanctity of the 
laws is perhaps what explains Aristotle’s assertion that “one who asks law to rule, 
therefore, seems to be asking god and intellect alone to rule, while one who asks man 
adds the beast. Desire is a thing of this sort; and spiritedness perverts rulers and the best 
men. Hence law is intellect without appetite.”377  
But it is not so that Aristotle believes the many, or all of the multitudes, to be entirely 
without virtue. Not only is there a certain, though, different type of virtue that must be 
granted to the free and the many378, there is further a kind of virtue that resides in their 
                                               
372 Ibid, Book 5, Chapters 2-3, pp. 132-133 
373 Ibid, Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 41. 
374 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1.5, p.8. For more references to the baseness of 
some ordinary men, see Book 3.4, p. 64, and Book 10.9, p. 295. 
375 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Chapter 13, p.22. 
376 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 79. 
377 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 16, p. 93. 
378 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 13, pp. 21-22. 
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sheer number.  
“The many, of whom none is individually an excellent man, nevertheless can 
when joined together be better – not as individuals but all together than those who 
are best… For because they are many, each can have a part of virtue and 
prudence, and on their joining together, the multitude, with its many feet and 
hands and having many senses, becomes like a single human being, and so also 
with respect to character and mind.”379 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that this certain virtue that the multitude 
possesses comes merely from an aggregation in the number of their senses, rather than a 
substantive improvement in their individual quality—in the sense of minute amounts of 
reason when tallied together amounting to something of note. The multitude’s virtue, 
such as Aristotle conceives it, is in no way derived from the multitude forming together 
in deliberative action and the latter process being conceived to have the effect of 
enhancing each individual’s capacity for reasoned judgement. “For all of them”, Aristotle 
explains, “when joined together have an adequate perception and, once mixed with those 
who are better, bring benefit to cities, just as impure substance mixed with the pure make 
the whole more useful than the small amount of the latter, but each separately is 
incomplete with respect to judging.”380  
Aristotle acknowledges that “what is many is more incorruptible: like a greater amount of 
water, the multitude is more incorruptible than the few. The judgement of a single person 
is necessarily corrupted when he is dominated by anger or some other passion of this sort, 
whereas it is hard for all to become angry and err at the same time.” But he maintains, 
                                               
379 Politics, Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 79. 
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nevertheless, that:  
“the multitude must be free persons acting in no way against the law… This is 
certainly not easy for many, but if there were a number381 who were both good 
men and good citizens, is the one ruler more incorruptible, or rather the larger 
number who are all good? Is it not clear that it is the larger number? … If then, 
the rule of a number of persons who are all good men is to be regarded as 
aristocracy, … aristocracy would be more choiceworthy for cities.” 
In the ideal, it is the few men “excellent of soul” who Aristotle preferences over any 
arguments in favour either of the multitude or of any individual person.382 
Understandably, then, the role of the multitude within the city must be confined to 
electing and auditing officials and jury service; and not over the laws. For once the 
multitude is dispersed, each man comes back again, with regards to virtue, to where she 
started; and in this virtue, “the excellent men [continue to] differ from each of the many 
individually, just as some assert beautiful persons differ from those who are not 
beautiful”383—that is, innately.  
This is because, for Aristotle, the nature of political virtue, as a part of moral virtue, that 
is required to keep the city-state functioning in accordance with its self-sufficient end is 
not one that can be thought to exist commonly among all types of men. He explains, “the 
political community must be regarded, therefore, as being for the sake of noble actions… 
hence those who contribute most to a community of this sort have a greater part in the 
                                               
381 I believe this is more usefully read as “a few”. 
382 Ibid, Politics, Book 3, Chapter 15, pp. 90-91. 
383 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 11, p. 79. 
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city than those who are equal or greater in freedom and descent but unequal in political 
virtue.”384  
Aristotle describes that only few men are capable of possessing the level of political 
virtue required to work for the noble ends of the city. In short, only few men are capable 
of being good citizens,385 for only few men can be seen to have acquired that extent of 
affection and prudence over and above what the remaining may minimally possess, and 
which is required to keep the city from perishing.386 
This political virtue is of such a fundamental character and importance that it is perhaps 
understandable why Aristotle portrays it as being outside the capacity of the multitude.  
“For the present purpose” Aristotle says, “let us presuppose this much, that the best way 
of life both separately for each individual and in common for cities is that accompanied 
by virtue.”387 Not only is virtue a characteristic belonging to individuals, it is most 
supremely the one by which we judge a good state or regime. And as such, “whoever 
takes thought for good governance… gives careful attention to political virtue and vice. It 
is thus evident that virtue must be a care for every city.”388 
It is even more than this; political virtue in being a characteristic belonging, above all, to 
the most excellent citizens and the most excellent state, is responsible in equal measure 
for the extent of happiness attainable by either. Aristotle clarifies: 
                                               
384 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 9, p. 77. 
385 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 4, pp. 67-69. Also, Book 3, Chapter 6, p.71. 
386 Ibid, Book 5, Chapter 9, pp. 151-153. 
387 Ibid, Book 7 Chapters 1-2, p.189. 
388 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 9, p. 76.  
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“Whether happiness must be asserted to be the same both for a single individual 
human being and for a city or not the same, however, remains to be spoken of. 
But this too is evident: all would agree it is the same. … [A]nd if anyone accepts 
that the individual is happy on account of virtue, he will also assert that the more 
excellent city is the one that is happier.”389 
It is as such that those who are most especially spoken of as ‘citizens’ in sharing in the 
ideal regime, must be excellent or the most virtuous. For the city’s virtue, and the extent 
to which the city can be happy and excellent, depends on a similar virtue being found in 
those rightly called ‘citizens’. Since, “there is no fine deed either of a man or of a city 
that is separate from virtue and prudence.” And furthermore, the “courage, justice, and 
prudence of a city have the same power and form as those things human beings share in 
individually who are called just, prudent, and sound.”390 
In Aristotle’s ideal city-state, as is the case in all other regimes where some level or form 
of virtue is required, it is, then, the work of law, in the hands of the legislator, to instil 
virtue into the citizenry. “Now men become good and excellent through three things”, 
Aristotle says, “[t]hese three are nature, habit, and reason. … Now as to what sort of 
nature those should have who are going to be readily taken in hand by the legislator, we 
discussed earlier. What remains… is the work of education. For men learn some things 
by being habituated, others by listening.”391   
                                               
389 Ibid, p. 189. See also Book 7, Chapter 9, p. 202, where Aristotle states: “since we happen to be 
investigating concerning the best regime, and this is the one in accordance with which the city would 
be happy above all, and since it was said earlier that happiness cannot be present apart from virtue, it 
is evident from these things that in the city that is most finely governed … the citizens should not live 
a worker’s or a merchant’s way of life, for this sort of way of life is ignoble and contrary to virtue.” 
390 Ibid, p. 189, See also Book 7, Chapter 13, p. 210, where Aristotle notes: “a city is excellent, at any 
rate, through its citizens’ – those taking part in the regime – being excellent.” 
391 Ibid, Book 7, Chapter 13, pp. 210-211. 
161 
 
 
Aristotle’s understanding of who is given the capacity to what kind of virtue, and is 
therefore rightly included in more substantive participation in the ideal city-state, is made 
clearer if we look to what he says in the Ethics. In distinguishing between the moral from 
the intellectual virtues, Aristotle also distinguishes how we come to find them in 
ourselves and in others. The moral virtues, which include such human characteristics as 
courage, self-control, and generosity392, are virtues instilled or “formed by habit.”393 Of 
what it means to be morally virtuous, Aristotle says,  
“it is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is in 
emotions and actions that excess, deficiency, and the median are found. Thus we 
can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally any kind of 
pleasure and pain with too much or too little, and in either case not properly. But 
to experience all this at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right 
people, for the right reason, and in the right manner—that is the median and the 
best course, the course that is the mark of virtue.”394  
The moral virtues are to be distinguished from the intellectual virtues – which include 
theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom – by the fact that no one comes 
to the latter in any meaningful way either by nature or by habit. These are characteristics, 
or rather forms of human knowledge, that are learnt—and Aristotle does not put them 
within the reach of most people.395  
“Intellectual virtue or excellence owes its origin and development chiefly to teaching, and 
for that reason requires experience and time.”396 Where the intellectual virtues require 
true knowledge, the moral virtues require that we choose to do what we have been 
                                               
392 Op. Cit. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books 3- 4. 
393 Ibid, Book 2.1, p. 33 
394 Ibid, Book 2.6, p. 43. 
395 See Ibid, Book 6. 
396 Ibid, Book 2.1, p. 33. 
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inculcated by habit to know as being right. Of morally virtuous action, Aristotle says:  
“in the case of the virtues an act is not performed justly or with self control if the 
act itself is of a certain kind, but only if in addition the agent has certain 
characteristics as he performs it: first of all, he must know what he is doing; 
secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and he must choose it for its 
own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm unshakeable 
character.”397  
This is what Aristotle wants the legislator to instil in the citizenry by habituating them to 
the law. And when Aristotle says that “lawgivers make the citizens good by inculcating 
good habits in them, and doing this is the aim of every lawgiver”398, he is speaking of the 
moral virtues, for it is no coincidence that he includes this paragraph in his explanation of 
the moral, and not of the intellectual, virtues. It is, then, for the sake of the importance 
and authority that law must have over men, as the very definition of a correct regime, and 
if the city is to fulfil its ultimate purpose, that Aristotle hands the task of arranging the 
laws over to the legislator. It is the legislator’s role in a “finely administered” city-state to 
induce into the citizenry – through an arrangement of correct laws – the “good character” 
that is required if the city is to truly be a community.399  
Through philosophy, and habit, and law,400 the legislator educates401 the citizenry on 
what it is to be excellent citizens with a view to political virtue.402 The legislator arranges 
                                               
397 Ibid, Book 2.3, p. 39. 
398 Ibid, Book 2.1, p. 34. 
399 This is elucidated in Aristotle’s examination of how in a rightly constructed city, property, though 
privately owned, ought to be used in common. Op. Cit., Politics, Book 2, Chapters 4-5, pp. 30-34. 
400 Ibid, pp. 32-33. 
401 In his discussion on factional conflicts that arise as a result of ill-thought through regulations on 
property, Aristotle says: “yet even if one were to arrange a moderate level of property for all, it would 
not help. For one ought to level desires sooner than property; but this is impossible for those not 
adequately educated by the laws.” Ibid, p. 39. For more on the legislator’s role as educator see p.32, p. 
41, p. 51. See also Books 7 – 8. 
402 Martin Ostwald’s distinction between nomos and thesmos sheds some light on Aristotle’s 
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the city-state and those who inhabit it403; and it is by the legislator’s wish404, through the 
institution of the laws, that the city will be finely managed. It is as such that Aristotle 
observes that “law has no strength with respect to obedience apart from habit, and this is 
not created except over a period of time.”405  
Annas is correct that Aristotle’s use of habituation to moral virtue is not only in a robotic 
sense (although he does give ample room for this kind of habituation).406 And as she 
points out, Aristotle’s emphasis on education407 suggests his belief that  
“the natural development for humans is one in which they achieve virtue, which is 
not a matter of mindless habituation but a developed reflective disposition to 
choose and act rightly—a decision which precisely frees the agent from 
dependence on the results of habituation if these have been too narrow and 
conventional to capture what matters for virtue. Thus the citizens in Aristotle’s 
ideal state will be individuals who choose and act as a result of autonomous 
reflection.”408 
                                               
understanding here. Thesmos, or what we would think of in the modern-day as formalized law was, in 
Ancient Greece, regarded as what Ostwald calls “the descending view [of law as] … only the rules 
imposed by a law-giver as imbued with public authority.” With Cleisthenes’ reforms of the Ancient 
Greek Constitution, nomos was made to replace thesmos in legal terminology and thought. The 
understanding of nomos within Ancient Greek society as immortal and deeply-ingrained societal 
customs and ways of practical living, made Cleisthenes’ reforms – which replaced thesmos with 
nomos “as the official term for ‘statute’” – deeply consequential both for the Ancient Greek 
understanding of formal law and for its wider understanding of nomos. As Ostwald notes, “once the 
[linguistic] extension had been made, it had far-reaching consequences not only for the Athenian 
concept of law but also for Greek thinking about other social norms.” It is perhaps in this way that we 
can make sense of Aristotle’s understanding that the lawgiver educates through law and through habit. 
See Martin Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics 
in Fifth Century Athens (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 85-108.   
403 Op. Cit., Politics, Book 3, Chapter 1, p. 62. 
404 Ibid, Book 2, Chapter 8, p. 43. 
405 Ibid, Book 2, Chapter 8, p. 45. 
406 See ibid, Book 7, Chapter 17. 
407 See ibid, Books 7 and 8. Also Book 5, Chapter 9, p. 153, Aristotle says: “for there is no benefit in 
the most beneficial laws, even when these have been approved by all those engaging in politics, if they 
are not going to be habituated and educated in the regime.” 
408 Op. Cit., Annas, p. 737. 
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I disagree with Annas, however, when she postulates that Aristotle divides those who 
take part in the state from those who do not, not on the basis of what he believes to be 
their inherent nature but rather as a result of a fortune or “chance” that fails to give the 
“external goods” required for attaining happiness through virtue to some, while giving it 
to others.409  
I believe Aristotle indicates that some will not be able to partake of happiness410 because 
happiness “is the best thing, and this is the actualization of virtue and a certain complete 
practice of it.”411 This view is emphasised by his discussion of the nature that can be 
discerned in those in whom the legislator must cultivate virtue – that it is by the very 
presence of a certain type of original nature, by which we know to whom virtue will 
eventually belong. When Aristotle says, “it is evident, therefore, that those who are to be 
readily guided to virtue by the legislator should be both endowed with thought and 
spirited in their nature”,412 I suggest that he is speaking of their innate nature rather than 
one that is to be acquired or learnt at a later date.  
Further, Aristotle says: “[n]ow that everyone strives for living well and for happiness is 
evident. It is open to some to achieve these things, but to others not, on account of some 
                                               
409 Ibid, p. 752. 
410 It is important to note that for Aristotle, happiness that arises as a result of partaking in the political 
regimes and being composed of the moral virtues that are, there, required, is distinguishable from 
happiness in a fuller sense. Although there is a happiness that arises from practical wisdom, which 
forms the basis of political wisdom, it is subordinate to the more complete happiness that comes from 
the other intellectual virtue of theoretical wisdom as the basis of the contemplative life. And so 
Aristotle observes that “a life guided by [practical]… virtue is [only] happy in a secondary sense.’ 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10.8, p 291. See also Ethics, Books 6 and 10.  
411 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 7, Chapter 8, p.200. 
412 Ibid, Book, 7, Chapter 7, p. 199. 
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sort of fortune or nature; for living nobly requires a certain equipment too—less of it for 
those in a better state, more for those in a worse one.”413 The role he ascribes here to 
fortune, and that relates to the acquisition of material equipment that may be useful for 
acting virtuously, are simply additional. It is an inherent nature that Aristotle sees as 
giving the core provision for each individual’s capacity to virtue. Aristotle confirms this 
when he says, “of the good things that are external to the soul the cause is chance and 
fortune; but no one is just or sound by fortune or through fortune.”414 Where fortune has a 
kind of surplus impact in providing what Aristotle determines to be useful “external 
things” in the aid of virtue,415 it is nature that determines any one individual’s primary 
capacity.  
5.5. The Authority of Law, the Utility of Deliberation, and Freedom  
A participation deriving from an understanding that, regardless of the exact type of 
correct regime and even in the most ideal of them, the freedom of each man is significant 
enough to afford him a say on the law, would seem to be at fundamental odds with an 
Aristotelian conception of correct and authoritative law in the service of ends determined 
by nature. But it does not have to be. In the remainder of this chapter, I suggest that it 
may be possible for participation, based on a correct conception of freedom, to align with 
an Aristotelian understanding of the authority of law given by the specific ends of the 
                                               
413 Ibid, Book 7, Chapter 13, p. 209. 
414 Ibid, Book 7, Chapter 1, p. 188. 
415 Ibid, p.188, Also in Ethics, Book 1.8, p. 21, Aristotle notes that “happiness … needs external 
goods”, but it is evident that they constitute an ‘aid’, without which “supreme happiness” may be 
spoiled. Further in Book 1.9, p. 25, he makes himself clear: “Or is it quite wrong to make our 
judgement depend on fortune? Yes, it is wrong, for fortune does not determine whether we fare well 
or ill, but is, as we said, merely an accessory to human life.” 
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political community in living-well and self-sufficiently. It may further be possible for 
participation to be seen as aiding in the aim of habituating the citizenry to the political 
virtue on which the maintenance of the city-state fundamentally depends.  
It is perhaps necessary to briefly explain why freedom should matter here. It matters 
because what Aristotle explains about freedom may be seen as further underlying the 
reason why participation in the laws in not significant to the fundamental theoretic of 
authoritative law by the nature of the city-state that he establishes. If it is possible to 
reframe freedom from the definition that Aristotle has of it, then it may, in this way, be 
possible to see that participation can yet be conjoined with the Aristotelian understanding 
of law and political community that this thesis holds.  
As I have previously outlined, Aristotle marks democratic regimes as among the deviant 
kind. This is because, he says, “there are two things by which democracy is held to be 
defined: the majority having authority, and freedom.” In democracies, “justice is held to 
be something equal [and this] equality requires that whatever the multitude resolves is 
authoritative, and freedom and equality involve doing whatever one wants.”416 Aristotle 
precedes this statement by noting that this understanding of freedom is mainly adhered to 
by those who “define freedom badly” and, as a result, establish democracies in opposition 
to “what is advantageous.”417  
Aristotle admonishes those, in democracies, who in believing that they are equal with 
                                               
416 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 5, Chapter 9, p. 153. 
417 Ibid, p. 153. 
 
167 
 
 
regards to freedom, err in believing that they are, thereby, “equal generally”, when in the 
most authoritative things they are not.418 The effect in democracies is that justice is 
contrived as being an equality of number “and not on the basis of merit” or virtue.419  
As such, there is a sense that freedom, at least understood this way, is necessarily 
juxtaposed to the nature of political virtue that must characterise the citizens of correct 
regimes, and certainly in the ideal city-state; and against the justice that is a fundamental 
part of the communal end and good. And aristocracy and democracy come to be in 
opposition not so much in their original definition as rule by the virtuous few versus rule 
by the many but in what is held to be their most fundamental, and respective, guiding 
principles. “Aristocracy is held to be most particularly the distribution of prerogatives on 
the basis of virtue; for the defining principle of aristocracy is virtue, … and of rule of the 
people, freedom.”420 
But what if freedom is not this way—indeed, Aristotle says that this base understanding 
of freedom belongs only to those who wrongly define it. If we accept, however, that 
freedom when thought of rightly, can be conflated with no such thing as simply doing 
what one wants, when one wants it, then freedom need not be seen as opposed to an 
Aristotelian notion of political virtue, nor against justice. Freedom, correctly conceived 
within political society, is a sober understanding both of the difference between one’s 
needs and wants and that of others. 
                                               
418 Ibid, Book 3, Chapter 9, p.75. 
419 Ibid, Book 6, Chapter 2, p.173. 
420 Ibid, Book 4, Chapter 8, p. 111. 
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A better understanding of freedom is put forward by Locke, who in fact posits the notion 
that freedom in the political society must be understood in a restrictive sense as a basis 
for part of what makes law legitimate. For Locke, law’s ability to achieve political 
society’s purpose in “the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I 
call by the general name, property”421 is what forms part of the understanding of “human 
law’s” authority within political society. Although this is not related to the understanding 
of law’s authority that this thesis seeks to illuminate, Locke gives us a useful insight into 
freedom when he says that in the state of nature men are in “a state of perfect freedom to 
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit”422 But 
they are not lawless, for the law of nature and the laws of God act as their guide. Each 
dictates that man 
“has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession… 
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and 
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, 
or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent … there 
cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorise us to 
destroy one another, as if we were for one another’s uses.”423 
For Locke, the laws of nature and the respective rights it accords each man are not 
dismantled in the political society, but are rather given, through law, “a known and 
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established 
law, power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.”424 
                                               
421 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1980) S.123- S.124, p.66. 
422 Ibid, S.4. 
423 Ibid, S.6.  
424 Ibid, S. 124-126.  
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This is an understanding of freedom, which despite its name, is properly thought of in a 
restrictive sense. It is not the license to act on every of our desires; it is rather an 
allowance given to each of us within our respective political communities by the fact of 
the necessity nature gives to the existence of all others. As such, rightly understood, 
freedom in political society only exists in a relative sense. Each man is free only to the 
extent that each other is not; the sphere of the relative freedom of any other individual 
demarcates the sphere of ours.425  
If a more correct understanding of freedom is seen as the principal basis of participation 
by citizens who deliberate as a necessary expression of a right conception of their 
freedom, then perhaps participation not only need not be divorced from justice and virtue 
but, in fact, be closer to them in alignment. Indeed, in the proceeding chapter, I suggest 
that freedom is relative in further senses than simply as against the freedom of all others, 
and that it is by this relativity that it gains its moral quality. It is by a correct 
                                               
425 John Stuart Mill’s conception of ‘liberty’ also provides us with a similarly less bad understanding 
of freedom as one that must not conclude in harm to others. However, Mill departs a great deal from 
the most important aspects of the understanding that this thesis aims to put forward by his particular 
insistence on precluding any kind of interference on the individual for any reason whatever except 
only in the prevention of harm. So much also does Mill’s conceptualization really depend on doing 
what we like, in the absence of harm, that it is not, in complexity, far enough distanced from the 
conceptualization of freedom that, as Aristotle says, is given by those who “define freedom badly.”  
 
Mill states, “The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual… That principle is, that the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant … Secondly, the principle requires liberty of 
tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, 
subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long 
as we do not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.” John 
Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in John Gray (ed.) On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), pp. 13-17. 
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understanding of freedom that participation is made an essential means of instilling in the 
population that very understanding that justice is what law gives in the very purpose and 
as part of the ultimate end of the political society by which the legitimacy of law is 
further defined. 
With regards to the education that it is intended that the laws give426, in the case of 
correct laws, participation may encourage an understanding that is required, not to 
determine or define the correctness of the law itself, but to embedded the reason for its 
correctness in the mind of each individual. In the case of unjust laws, participation may 
also allow the reason of its unjustness to be practically revealed to the citizenry. It is in 
this way that the authority of the law may move from the abstract, through participation, 
to gain the understanding of the citizenry as bearing a concrete relationship to each and 
every one of them, who expresses, in participating, the nature of their relative freedom.  
Most importantly, it may also be the case with regards to the practice of justice and to 
moral virtue, that it is by participating on the basis of a relative freedom, that the citizenry 
is further enabled to see, to feel, and to know of itself as a necessarily interdependent 
community, and to see the basis of doing justice to one another. For in participating, each 
individual may become practically aware that for her own correctly free existence, she is 
inextricably reliant on, and needing of, the “affection” and moral virtues of all others. 
And of her, the same is required in return. 
This is an understanding that enjoins, further, what Aristotle says on the matter of 
                                               
426 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 3, Chapter 16, p. 93. 
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friendship. For Aristotle rightly says  
“friends enhance our ability to think and to act. Also, it seems that nature implants 
friendship in a parent for its offspring and in offspring for its parent, not only 
among men, but also among birds and most animals. Not only members of the 
same family group but also members of the same race427 feel it for one another, 
especially human beings… Friendship also seems to hold states together… when 
people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need 
friendship in addition. In fact, the just in the fullest sense is regarded as 
constituting an element of friendship.”428 
For it is in a certain kind of friendship that we may be persuaded to see and to love the 
good, reciprocally.429 Again, as Aristotle says,  
“all communities are like parts of the political community (or state). Men 
combine with an eye to some advantage to provide some of the necessities of life, 
and we think of the political community as having initially come together and as 
enduring to secure the advantage of its members … and men call ‘just’ what is to 
the common advantage. Now, all other forms of community aim at some partial 
advantage.” where the political community aims at the advantage of the 
whole.”430  
My aim is to suggest, that even in the acknowledgment that all men in the community 
will not be equal to one another in virtue or in excellence, it is with a view to establishing 
among a given population that “eye” of the necessity of the “common advantage”, and 
for which the law is established in service, that participation rightly makes itself useful.   
To conclude, this is the understanding that Aristotle gives us: that, in the self-sufficient 
                                               
427 i.e.: species 
428 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Ethics, Book 8.1, p. 215. 
429 Ibid, Book 8.2-8, Although we are under no illusion that in the conception of this thesis, we are 
unlikely to establish participation as leading to the “perfect and complete” friendship of good men 
who are all excellent and virtuous, for such friendships Aristotle observes are rare. But the minimal 
view of friendship among citizens that is produced by the participatory interaction may be a necessary 
sort of communal friendship, or concord, nonetheless—for “friendship is present to the extent that 
men share something in common, for that is also the extent to which they share a view of what is 
just.” 
430 Ibid, Book 8.9, p. 232. 
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end to which it tends, and which each of us individually or as households are unable to 
attain without it, the state is a particular kind of community that is prior to each of us. For 
in connecting us to law, it connects us to justice and therefore to virtue, and as such, we 
are educated and habituated in the proper maintenance of the city-state; and upon which 
we depend by its laws. It is in being for this ultimate purpose that we say that the law is 
authoritative and it is best that it rule over men. Obedience to law thus correctly 
understood and defined, tends in aim of the city-state’s very existence, which is nothing 
more, and not less, than the common advantage of all.  
In Chapter 6, I put forward an understanding of participation, that in deriving from a 
particular understanding of relative freedom, not only need not be at odds with this 
understanding that Aristotle illuminates, but further serves, as a practical means through 
which the citizenry is able to concretely view that the ultimate purpose of law to the 
political community is in being for the sake of living, and of living well; a view that I 
suggest, when attained by the citizenry, gives law a practical relation to the citizenry that 
confirms to them the law’s moral authority. It is the fundamental argument that this thesis 
seeks to put forward that without participation, the communally advantageous end of 
society, in other words—the purpose of the law will merely be as an abstraction. It is in 
giving the citizenry a view of law as bearing a most necessary relationship to each one of 
them individually and all together, that what Aristotle theorises becomes a practical 
reality; and the citizenry’s understanding of which establishes the law’s moral legitimacy 
in their minds and from which obedience to the laws freely results. A habit in which the 
citizenry will, as the practical result of participation, remain.   
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Chapter 6: The Puzzle of Freedom 
Aristotle provides us with the understanding that the state is not just any congregation of 
men, but a legal one, and not just any legal arrangement, but one whose specific purpose 
is the attainment of the self-sufficient life and well-being of its citizens through being 
educated in an affection for good laws and the practice of justice from each man towards 
his fellows. Rousseau, on the other hand, brings us to understanding – though only 
partially – the necessity and utility of participation, and to what exactly is found within 
man’s nature to which participation attaches and that makes it necessary. It is in 
attempting to elucidate this understanding that I aim to provide the philosophical basis for 
this thesis’ argument that participation reveals in law, or legal system, a kind of moral 
legitimacy that explains obedience to laws that are legally valid by other criteria.  
6.1. Man was and is free … So says Rousseau 
“Man is born free, and [yet] everywhere he is in chains”431, so begins Rousseau’s most 
distinctly political work. Rousseau’s concern with freedom in On the Social Contract is 
certainly crucial to understanding the entire logic of his ideal political society and, 
therefore, to the role and importance of participation, both for his purpose and for that of 
this thesis. But it is not in that work that we discern what Rousseau truly means by 
freedom. Indeed, the reasoning behind the appearance he gives freedom in the Social 
Contract cannot be understood without the character of freedom elucidated in Emile.     
                                               
431 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Judith R. Masters Translation), On the Social Contract (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1978), p. 46. 
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Seemingly a book about the education of a young boy through to his manhood432, Emile 
is Rousseau’s lament for, and of, man. It is an expression of sorrow for that imagined 
time when man was most fully himself. That is to say, when his understanding of his 
being had no other influence apart from the inner workings of his own mind and body. 
That time when, in the aim of her own sustenance, she relied only on that with which she 
had been equipped by God and by nature. What other men came to tell her of herself 
meant nothing.433 For “everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; 
everything degenerates in the hands of man.”434 What is it that nature has not given us? 
Rousseau appears to ask; is it the senses with which to best preserve ourselves? It gave us 
five; each working to reinforce the others.435 And to affirm these, nature has given us 
conscience. “Conscience! Divine instinct, immortal and celestial voice, certain guide of a 
being that is ignorant and limited but intelligent and free.”436 When conscience eludes us, 
                                               
432 Jean Jacques Rousseau’s (Allan Bloom Translation) Emile (Basic Books, 1979) begins with an 
infant who is led by his governor in the form of Rousseau, from infanthood to childhood through to 
adolescence and then to manhood. Each stage of Emile’s life, and seemingly every activity that 
composes it, is carefully thought through by his governor so that at the end of each stage of 
development the boy is of a character his governor believes to accord with the way of nature but for a 
child who is bound to end up among his fellows in society. Emile is perfectly ‘subjected’ in his 
‘freedom’ in the sense that though he is being trained only to judge of what he understands on the 
basis the personal experiences his bodily senses have given him himself, and never to take the word 
and morals of others as anything but opinion, every event that has occurred in the boy’s life and every 
lesson that he has got from all his activities have been carefully manufactured by his governor. By the 
time of his adolescence and his entrance into society at large he is perfectly ‘free’ in this sense. He 
therefore knows of the falsehood of society’s invented moralities. He is a young man of good reason 
and judgement, whose ‘will’ is (so far as he knows) his own. He is a part of society to the extent that 
his love for his fellow men extends to being able to feel pity for them, but he is not of society since he 
finds no virtue in its ways and opinions.  
433 Ibid, Book 3, p.177. 
434 Ibid, Book 1, p. 37. 
435 Ibid, Book 1, p. 38; Book 2, pp. 156-7; Book 4, p. 281. The whole of the first part of Emile’s 
upbringing is dedicated to his feeling the need of his senses so that he feels the physical world. His 
experience is confined to the ‘laws of necessity’ brought by that world of which only his senses can 
enlighten him. See Book II.  
436 Ibid, Book 4, p. 290.  
 
175 
 
 
here are the faculties, from which we may procure reason sufficient enough for our 
natural needs.437  
So then, here is man, by nature “whole”, and with all that he requires to keep himself 
‘good’.438 “Any man who, [thus,] only wanted to live would live happily. Consequently, 
he would live as a good man, for what advantage would there be for him in being 
wicked.”439 Yet, we are wicked; every one of us. This could not have been nature’s 
intention. And so, says the Savoyard Vicar, “man, seek the author of evil no longer. It is 
yourself. No evil exists other than that which you do or suffer, and both come to you 
from yourself.”440   
Emile is a lament for the rotting effects of society on the individual, of the teachings of 
other men, of history, and of philosophy. All of this has been our creation – by the abuse 
we make of our natural faculties – and which have had the effect of making “us unhappy 
and wicked.”441 It is we – by a so-called civilization – that has made man a grotesque 
poseur divided between his own understanding and the opinions of others.442 It is we that 
have ended man in the most unnatural state in which he “regrets being only himself 
[italics added].”443 Man has become a being for whom society has turned a natural love of 
self into a hateful “amour-propre” that forces him to refer to others in defining himself 
                                               
437 Ibid, Book 4, p. 286, Book 2, p.80. 
438 Ibid, ‘Introduction’, p. 3. 
439 Ibid, Book 2, pp. 81-2. 
440 Ibid, Book 4, p. 282. 
441 Ibid, p. 281. 
442 Ibid, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-5, Book 1, pp. 39-41. 
443 Ibid, Book 4, pp. 238- 243. 
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and makes everything revolve around himself alone.444 
This deplorable state of affairs is the result of society’s ceaselessly taking man out of his 
proper sphere. It is in society than man overextends his imagination and his desires and 
makes them supersede his own individual powers. It is society, which in causing us 
“imaginary ills”, makes us believe we need things that we do not. As such, we feel our 
“weakness”; for what we come to think of as our needs, however illusory, now surpass 
the strength nature gave us to satisfy our real needs, which lie only in the preservation of 
our beings.445  
Not only has “society made man weaker … in making his strength insufficient for 
him”446, it makes “double men.”447 They are not “natural men”, entirely self-sufficient. 
Neither are they true citizens— he who “believes himself no longer one but part of the 
unity and no longer feels except within the whole.”448 The man of our day – “civil man” – 
he is that miserable unhappy soul; “always in contradiction with himself … he will never 
be either man or citizen.”449 “Civil man is born, lives, and dies in slavery. At his birth he 
is sewed in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed in a coffin. So long as he keeps his 
human shape, he is enchained by our institutions.”450 He is an “automaton”, unalive 
                                               
444 Ibid, Book 4, pp. 213-214. Also, pp. 228-229. This idea of amour-propre is made clearer in the 
comparison Rousseau makes between Emile and a boy raised by society. The latter wanting 
everything that is not his is miserable in everything he has. The former enjoys a quiet happiness which 
comes from being content with what he has and is. 
445 Ibid, Book 2, pp. 80-84. 
446 Ibid, p. 84. 
447 Ibid, Book 1, pp. 39-41. 
448 Ibid, Book 1, pp. 38-40. 
449 Ibid, Book 1, pp. 39-40. 
450 Ibid, Book 1, pp. 42-43. 
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though he breathes.451  
 “Is it nature”, Rousseau asks, “which thus carries men so far from themselves? Is it 
nature which wants each to learn of his destiny from others and sometimes to be the last 
to learn it?”452 This will not be the fate for our Emile. Emile does “nothing on anybody’s 
word. Nothing is good for him unless he feels it to be so.”453 Emile experiences, he feels 
what is good for him by his senses, he understands, and eventually he reasons.454 He is 
alive! He is an “active and thinking being”, and he will be completed by being made a 
“loving and feeling” one.455 He has been brought up to be master of himself always and 
in all things. “He considers himself without regard to others and finds it good that others 
do not think of him. He demands nothing of anyone and believes he owes nothing to 
anyone. He is alone in human society, for he alone has been taught to count only on 
himself.”456 “Forced to learn by himself, he uses his reason;”457 and thus, he alone 
amongst his fellows sees “that society depraves and perverts men.”458 This is as God 
wanted it.459  
Despite Rousseau’s proclamations460, however, the education of Emile does not consist in 
                                               
451 Ibid, Book 2, p. 118; also Book 1, p. 42. The error of society and of its laws, for Rousseau, is to 
make men, once again, ‘children’. That is to say to place them back into a stage of development where 
all they feel is need and where all they can do to satisfy their need is to obey orders and do as they are 
told. “The wise man does not need laws” since he has his “reason.” Book 2, pp. 85-91. 
452 Ibid, Book 2, p. 83. 
453 Ibid, Book 3, p. 178.  
454 Ibid, Books 2 - 4. 
455 Ibid, Book 3, p. 203. 
456 Ibid, Book 3, p. 208. 
457 Ibid, Book 3, p. 207. 
458 Ibid, Book 4, p. 237. 
459 Ibid, Book 5, p. 359. 
460 Rousseau continuously insists that Emile is not being brought up in the way of “social man” and 
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making a man who resembles the men of another time; the men truly of nature. As 
Rousseau admits “natural man is entirely for himself” and “what will a man raised 
uniquely for himself become for others?”461 As Emile’s governor, Rousseau must 
therefore contrive nature against itself in order to make the man who is at once a man 
made of himself alone, just as ‘nature’ intended, and a true citizen in being genuinely 
useful to his society.462 
Consequently, Emile has been trained to all at once feel his nature but, also, be immune 
to it. He must be delivered “at first without hindrance to the law of nature, but do not 
forget among us he must be above that law.”463 The man Rousseau wishes Emile to be 
has very little to do with nature; for the purpose of living in society, he is to subject 
nature. The promise of Emile is the promise of a man nature never made; and who, 
despite all the effort that has gone into making him what he could never have been 
without his master, is forever on the precipice of his own downfall. For he is of nature 
after all.464  
                                               
that while Emile is not being brought up to subsist in isolation but to be in society itself, he is 
nonetheless being raised on the tenets of natural man isolated to himself. Ibid, Book 3, pp. 184-6, p. 
205; Book 4, p. 255. 
461 Ibid, Book 1, pp. 39-41. 
462 Ibid, Book 3, p. 195. 
463 Ibid, Book 2, p. 129. Emile is raised to be immune to the seasons, to exercise outside in the height 
of winter. To sleep late and wake early. Sometimes to not sleep at all. He is taught to ignore his fears 
despite all the common sense nature prescribes; and to shun medicine in favour of learning to be sick 
and to die. All purportedly because “civil life is not simple enough, natural enough, exempt enough 
from extreme changes and accidents.” See also, Book 1 pp. 54-56, p. 60; Book 2, pp. 129-140. 
464 Even at the very end of Emile, when the young man is all but grown, his governor advises “watch 
the young man carefully. He can protect himself from everything else, but it is up to you to protect 
him from himself. Do not leave him alone, day or night. At the very least, sleep in his room.” p. 333. 
Ten years later, when Emile is nearly married, his governor has not moved from the same advice 
“Dear Emile, it is in vain that I have dipped your soul in the Styx; I was not able to make it 
everywhere invulnerable. A new enemy is arising which you have not learned to conquer and from 
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When we search deeper, we find that Emile is therefore not a figure of a forgotten time 
but of an imagined one that never was. Emile serves as a cry for, and an elucidation of, 
that wretched animal whose internal contradictions have, and will always, put him at war 
with himself.465 Fitted with senses that both educate and abuse him; with a similar 
capacity for virtue as for vice; with desires and passions at the same time as he has 
conscience and reason, man for Rousseau is that pitiable soul who by his very nature is 
armed against himself. His own worst enemy466, that wretched animal is you.  
Those who point to the contradictory nature of Rousseau’s works467, as if this were all an 
oversight on Rousseau’s part, miss the basic premise of his philosophic structure. To 
delve into the nature of a being whose fate Rousseau believes turns on the essential 
feature of its internal contradictions by way of some logically clear and linear exposition 
would have been to further pander to nature’s callous composition. The contrariness of 
Rousseau’s writings can be seen as a kind of visceral reminder, or mirroring, of what 
Rousseau believed to be the most significant aspect of the animal he dissects. He is of 
nature but can rise above it. He is free by his reason but subject to his senses. He can 
have no choice but to be in constant opposition to himself. 468   
Nevertheless, and whatever man may be, however paradoxical his nature, the logic of 
                                               
which I can no longer save you.” p. 443. This same Emile raised in the model way according to 
‘nature’ and still he is not safe! It seems the boy’s real nature can never fully be exterminated despite 
all efforts.  
465 Ibid, Books IV- V. 
466 Ibid, Book 5, p. 443. 
467 Jean Jacques Rousseau (Translated by Roger D. and Judith R. Masters), The First and Second 
Discourses, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1964), ‘Introduction’, p.1.   
468 See footnote 464 of this chapter. 
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creation, so far as Rousseau is concerned, makes him a being capable of choice, of 
reason, and of judgement; and therefore, of will. And since there is no such thing as an 
unfree will, man must be capable of being free.469 Patrick Riley is, therefore, correct 
when he asserts that “had Rousseau not been centrally concerned with freedom – above 
all with the voluntariness of morally legitimate human actions – some of the structural 
features of his political thought would be (literally) unaccountable.”470  However, the 
freedom and “voluntariness” Rousseau invents for Emile – for man – is an image. 
Seemingly ironically, the voluntariness is itself an image that testifies to man’s innate 
unfreedom and inherent contradiction. He must fight himself and choose the good that he 
is free to choose but unfree enough to be divided against.471 Rousseau envisages that it is 
by this ability to choose alone, however, that we may salvage some dignity from the 
heavy muck of our nature. In his regard for choice, Rousseau is in rare agreement with an 
Aristotelian conception. But where for Aristotle, man’s ability to choose virtuous action 
in the aim of becoming and being virtuous is a real, albeit an inherently difficult ability 
that must be diligently learned and inculcated, and which may eventually only be an 
                                               
469 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, Book 4, pp. 270-281. 
470 Patrick Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will: Freedom of a Particular Kind’ in Political Studies (1991), 
p. 55. 
471 “In meditating on the nature of man”, mourns the Savoyard Vicar, “I believed [italics added] I 
discovered in it two distinct principles; one of which raised him to the study of eternal truths, to the 
love of justice and moral beauty, and to the regions of the intellectual world whose contemplation is 
the wise man’s delight; while the other took him basely into himself, subjected him to the empire of 
the senses and to the passions which are their ministers, and by means of these hindered all that the 
sentiment of the former inspired in him. In sensing myself carried away and caught up in the combat 
of these two contrary motion, I said to myself, ‘No, man is not one. I want and I do not want; I sense 
myself enslaved and free at the same time. I see the good, I love it, and I do the bad. I am active when 
I listen to reason, passive when my passions carry me away; and my worst torment, when I succumb, 
is to sense that I could have resisted.’” Emile, Book 4, pp. 278-279. 
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ability truly open to the best of men472, for Rousseau, man’s ability of choice is a great 
trick of nature that man must use against nature itself.  
Rousseau is well aware that in every aspect of man’s life, and at every turn, man has 
never been free; not even when only a single one of him occupied the earth and no such 
thing as ‘society’ existed. At that point of pre-civilization, he might not have been 
enslaved to other men but he was no less wretched for being enslaved to nature and the 
needs that it gave him.473 But since all of nature is not so bad – so Rousseau appears to 
reason – whatever part of this nature of ours that is good must be elevated out of all 
proportion to the rest; for who shall miss the remainder? 
In making Emile rise above his true nature; in making Emile a man who always judges 
what his will is before acting and acts only on the basis of his own experiences, his own 
comparisons and ideas, his own judgement and reason, which is to say his own will; in 
making Emile a man who lives in society but disdains its ways though he knows very 
well that it is by nature that society was conceived474, and in making Emile a man whose 
                                               
472 For Aristotle, choice is at the root of the end and the good. It is not just that, as he states at the 
beginning of the Ethics that “every action and choice … aim at some good; the good, therefore, has 
been well defined as that at which all things aim”. It is that all virtue, and therefore, the ultimate end 
of happiness at which all virtue aims, is only made so by the voluntary choice we make to be so 
virtuous and to do things of virtue. In being an indication of our agency in consciously employing any 
particular means that we believe will tend towards a virtuous end, it is by choice that Aristotle 
believes we make ourselves known to be beings capable of reason and worthy of happiness at all. “For 
choice”, he says, “is not shared by irrational creatures.” See Nicomachean Ethics, Book 3.2 pp. 58-60, 
also Book 6.2, pp. 148-149. 
473 Op Cit., Rousseau, Emile, Book 2, p.154, also Book 3, p.193. 
474 Ibid, Book 4, p. 221. It is man’s weakness that makes him sociable Rousseau says and this 
weakness which society may multiply begins with life itself since “man is weak by nature”, Book 5, p. 
444. And “with life there begin needs” Book 1, p. 56. There is no real question of where Rousseau 
believes the whole process of man’s so called descent began. It is nature that at once “hides” and yet 
gives us the example of how to begin our depravity (See Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p. 152). It is 
nature which though making us isolated from one another to begin with, yet gives us an appetite to 
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temperate self-love keeps him always constrained within himself and exempt from the 
pain borne of attachments even to his own wife475, Rousseau has made an image of 
freedom for Emile like no other. And though the latter, still being merely a man, threatens 
always to disturb it, it is an image of absolute freedom.     
In Rousseau’s logic, what can such a man who, in his individual life, has “no need to 
prove to himself that he is free”, do in society where all purport to give him his freedom 
by laws?476 Where institutions, governments, and laws believe themselves to be his 
masters, his sovereigns by force?477  What he need not prove to himself he has no choice 
but to prove to others. To maintain the one state in individual life which requires only 
internal action, political society requires external deed. That deed is participation. And it 
is the only action that makes tenable the existence of “free” men in political society, 
which though necessary478, remains against nature; for it forces men to obey simply by 
                                               
perpetuate ourselves that would soon require the inevitability of society (see Second Discourse, p.119, 
p.142, p. 226). It is nature, after all, that is to blame for the whole charade.  
475 Op. Cit., Emile, Book V. 
476 Ibid, Book 2, p.161; See also Book 2, p.85. 
477 Op Cit., Rousseau, Social Contract, Book 1, Chapters 1-5, pp. 46 -52. 
478 Rousseau appreciates that the practical brutality of the state of nature necessitated the construction 
of political society “I assume that men have reached the point where obstacles to their self-
preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces each individual can use to 
maintain himself in that state. [italics added]” That man cannot maintain himself in his natural 
circumstance without external forces to himself at his aide is why we need the political society but the 
necessity of political society does not remove us from our supposed nature; it is there to aid us in 
maintaining at least a part, the most significant part of that state; our freedom. Ibid, Social Contract, 
Book 1, Chapter 6, p.52.  
Rousseau further intones the necessity of the social order when he says: man must be trained like a 
school horse; man must be fashioned … like a tree … Were he not to do this, however, everything 
would go even worse … In the present state of things a man abandoned to himself in the midst of 
other men from birth would be the most disfigured of all.” Op. Cit., Emile, Book 1, p. 37. See also 
Emile, Book 2, p.154. 
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might.479  
It is by participation alone that the programme of political society can be structured to 
accommodate the image of absolute freedom of which Emile is the prototype. So that 
though he lives under government and under laws that claim to tell him what to do and 
who to be; he, there, remains a free man, a citizen, a whole.480 The image of Emile’s 
existence is the reason for the social contract; and it is the purpose of participation in 
Rousseau’s logic. “By new associations urges the first draft of the Social Contract, let us 
correct, if we can, the shortcomings of the general association.”481 Put another way, the 
Social Contract promises a schema, by way of which, the supposed original freedom of 
each man can be preserved within, and for the virtuous good of, all of society.482  
But the illusion of Emile and the society that is configured on his promise, permits only 
of trickery. The ‘re-education’ of man – that Emile has received – promises to make him 
free, but once in society he participates merely in proof of his freedom.  For what would a 
man absolutely free, needing of no others but herself, have anything genuine to do with 
                                               
479 “The family is … the prototype of political societies. The leader is like the father, the people are 
like the children; and since all are born equal and free, they only alienate their freedom for their 
utility. The entire difference is that in the family, the father’s love for his children rewards him 
[enough] for the care he provides; whereas in the State, the pleasure of commanding substitutes for 
this love … Force is a physical power … Yielding to force us an act of necessity, not of will. At most, 
it is an act of prudence. In what sense could it be a [natural] duty?” Op Cit., Social Contract, Book 1, 
Chapters 2-3, pp. 47-48. 
480 “Whether it is said by one man to another or by a man to a people, the following speech will 
always be equally senseless: I make a convention with you that is entirely at your expense and entirely 
for my benefit; that I shall observe for as long as I want, and that you shall observe for as long as I 
want.” Social Contract, Book 1, Chapter 4, p. 52. 
481 George Armstrong Kelly, ‘A General Overview’ in Patrick Riley, Cambridge Companion to 
Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 8. 
482 Ibid, p. 9. As Kelly notes: “Rousseau conceived models” and Rousseau himself is said to have 
noted that his were “loose ideas… guided by … fantasy.” 
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anyone else? And of what use can participation be to a being whose freedom in being 
‘absolute’ matters only to herself? The good political society, Rousseau indicates, must 
be a cooperation, a communication, a common partnership.483 But not really; it is an 
empty communication that gives no real utility to cooperation. “Find a form of 
association”, Rousseau says, “that defends and protects the person and goods of each 
associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, 
nevertheless [italics added] obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”484  
The purpose of the communal articulation in Rousseau’s framework is not so much for 
society’s sake as for the individual’s. For the free man in political society to show that he 
is indeed free he must put his word to the laws that govern him in order that his action in 
obedience to those laws will be shown to be in adherence to his own understanding, and 
his own understanding alone. His action being thus shown, the man of political society 
proves that he is free, and that he had always the capacity for, and memory of, his 
freedom. Participation is thus, for Rousseau, a simple but crucial trick of logic.485 
Aristotle provides another critical correction to Rousseau here. Where Rousseau mistakes 
                                               
483 Op. Cit., Social Contract, Book 1, Chapter 6, p. 53. 
484 Ibid, p. 53. 
485 That Rousseau intends to make a proof of participation is evidenced by what he describes of Emile 
upon reaching the age of adolescence. At this point Emile has yet to be tainted by society; and so 
carefully raised has he been that he would have no idea how to follow the will of another were it to be 
most forcefully imposed on him. Most importantly, Emile’s character at this stage is composed 
entirely – so he imagines at least (and this is all that is necessary so that he remain unspoiled) – of his 
own ideas formed entirely from his own experiences and senses. There is nothing that he thinks, does, 
or believes himself to know that comes from anything other men have impressed on him. Of this 
creature, Rousseau advances “He has nothing to show other than himself.” Emile pp.158-162. It is 
only by entering into contract to obey “only himself” Social Contract, Book 1, Chapter 6, p. 53, that 
he proves to others what he need not to himself: “that he is always master of himself”. Emile, p. 161. 
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the authority that the laws, particularly good laws, have and ought to have over men in 
political society as merely an exercise in might which must be subdued under the will of 
each individual in preservation of the latter’s freedom, Aristotle understands that the laws 
ought to be conceived in no such way. The laws, under an Aristotelian understanding, 
ought to adhere to right reason in providing the organising schema for how any particular 
society, depending on the nature of the regime, ought to live in the aim of attaining 
justice and happiness for the whole community.486  
The irony is that the superficiality of Rousseau’s supposedly ‘communitarian’ agenda 
masks the real desire Rousseau has for the community to be in service solely to the 
absolute freedom of the individual. The laws that make a political community an actual 
community, and which Aristotle knows to be part of the very definition of a city-state, are 
thus a superfluous hindrance in a Rousseauian logic. Yet, they cannot be made so. More 
ironically, Rousseau provides us with the foundation for at least two of the crucial 
mechanisms – participation and a relative freedom – through which an Aristotelian 
understanding of the importance of the laws comes to, in reality, enable the preservation 
and prosperity of the political community rightly conceived.  
I suggest that participation, when based on a reformulation of freedom, enables the 
citizenry to see that the law has to aim at, and is purposed to preserving the advantage of 
each citizen, and therefore, of all of them together. But this relies on a citizenry that is 
able to genuinely sense of itself as a community and not one that sees the community 
                                               
486 See Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 3, Chapter 16, p. 93; Also Book 5, Chapter 9, pp. 151-154. 
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merely as thing to be subdued to the interests of absolutely free individuals. 
Taking men really “as they are”487, I seek to argue that participation is no simple proof of 
already existing phenomena. In doing so, my thesis holds that man is only relatively free; 
that it is in the logic of participation that this relative freedom plays its most valuable part 
in executing the other virtues of communal human existence; of which, freedom forms 
merely a single portion. It is by way of his relative freedom that man seeks – through 
participation – to act as he believes and thinks. It is by way of her relative freedom that 
she seeks to participate in putting that in which she believes into any order that may 
govern her action. It is by putting his word to the laws that are to guide his actions that 
man uses his understanding of his limited freedom, in conjunction with the same 
understanding of that limited freedom which also belongs to each of his fellow citizens, 
to effect the kind of communal existence of which the law ought, and is intended, to aim.  
Most importantly, for this thesis, it is through participation that the citizenry comes 
practically, and publicly, to see, and to feel, by the presence of each other, the communal 
purpose that underpins the nature of law. Since there is no sane man who wishes, or 
desires, to do what he does not understand or to do as he does not believe, there is 
nothing dormant about participation. Participation is not simply an idle proof of free 
beings, it is a necessary expression we seek to employ in the fulfilment of our relative 
freedoms. And which itself does not constitute an ultimate end state, as Rousseau 
contrives, but is, rather, an avenue to the greater good of justice, which Aristotle correctly 
                                               
487 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Social Contract, Book 1, p. 46. 
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surmises as “complete [moral] virtue”488.  
So it is, in a sense, as Rousseau says—it is by participating that man puts forward her 
mind, her faculties, and her very being, for the purposes of action. But if participation is 
not simply a trickery of proof then it ought to be seen that the process itself does not 
simply serve to restate sentiments that already existed but itself create new 
understandings. By enabling each to propose his own understanding of himself, 
participation also – by the dynamics of the new and external action – alters the 
understanding of all who participate as to what correctly pertains to each person’s 
virtuous survival and that of the community. The participant is altered by her 
participation; as is society.  
The laws of the land actively uninfluenced by each man’s hand may very well, whether 
by chance or by the forethought of a uniquely intelligent and objective lawmaker, accord 
with the opinions of the ‘self-educated’ man; and yet, without his voice society’s 
understanding of why the laws are what they are, i.e.: its purpose, suffers from his 
absence. By participation, he that puts his hand to the laws – though he may have failed 
to re-educate his individual self as Rousseau would instruct – will be said to have given a 
great deal more to society and to himself; because by participating in the laws, man does 
not merely execute his freedom; although this too he does. More importantly, it is 
through participation that he gains concrete understanding of the true nature of his own 
freedom, and further, comes face-to-face in realising the existent freedom of others, and 
                                               
488 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5.1, p.114. 
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the relationship and reliance of both domains on one another. This is an engagement is no 
small kind. 
I suggest that it is by participating that man puts his particular understanding – which his 
freedom enables him – in expressing to others the law’s relationship to himself and to the 
very nature, and execution, of his freedom. It is by participating that he takes from the 
particular understanding of others as to why the law is also related to them. All together, 
it is by participating that all the citizens come to an understanding that the law means 
something to each and everyone of them in enabling them the execution of their relative 
freedoms. In enabling each other, by their expressions, to see that the laws, there, relate to 
them all, and thereby relate each one of them to every other, the citizenry may come to 
critically understand itself as an interdependent community. 
Bereft of participation, man neither stands to act for himself in courtesy of what he 
believes nor does he show himself to others as one who is alive and with a position to be 
regarded. That he stands for something and that it is a thing unhindered by the influence 
of others, as Rousseau would have it, is neither here nor there in a political society the 
true nature of which we do not intend to suppress, lest he opens his mouth and speaks it. 
But his speaking does not prove that he is or was free, but constitutes his action in putting 
his understanding of his freedom to use.  
It is by his voice that he defines for himself and for all others, the purposes that he has, on 
the one side, for his own being, and on the other in relation to the purposes of others; and 
which, by their own relative freedoms are also enabled expression. When each speaks, 
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their speech does not only proclaims that they are free, it further expresses what the 
intention each has in making use of that freedom. In doing so, they bring to light the 
dependency each one must have on the other both in the ability of each to attain her own 
individual ends, and in the maintenance of their society as a whole. 
This is true if it is the case that freedom is not absolute and is, therefore, not the singular 
end goal which Rousseau conjures it to be. It is not merely the ability to have one’s 
thoughts untrammelled by a conception of society that is always external to the 
individual, but freedom may also be a state of being necessary for the purpose of yet 
other things equally or more significant than itself. These things themselves are essential 
if it is intended to be said that a man is not free for nothing. The relativity of freedom is 
not simply a limitation placed on each man by the existence of all others, it further 
concerns the ends of freedom also. Ends that, I suggest, give freedom its moral 
composition. 
Where for Rousseau, participation appears merely a validation of one’s preconceived 
beliefs and actions, the conception that this thesis aims to set forward is that it is the 
participation itself that constitutes the first virtuous action. It is not always possible to act 
as one speaks since it is not the mere force of other human beings that may stand in our 
way, but forces seen and unseen and known and unknown, both material and not. That 
one may not be able to act does not impinge on his ability to conceive of his relative 
freedom; nor does it diminish the importance of the outcome of his relative freedom to 
the common understanding. What can be said on its behalf is, therefore, of the utmost 
significance. 
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As such, participation is itself a very real and practical activity in which man must engage 
if she is to act in pursuit of anything in which she believes to be of consequence to her 
communal physical, and moral, survival; and for which the understanding of her relative 
freedom is required. The laws of political society ranking in the highest order of those 
things that determine our individual and communal survival – both physical and other 
ways – that each man participate and lend voice to their understanding ought not to be a 
trick of any kind.  
Despite what I believe to be Rousseau’s misuse of participation and his misconception of 
its utility, the analytical framework from which he derives it in the first place is a crucial 
starting point for this thesis. In spite of himself, Rousseau enables an essential view into 
what it is in man’s real nature to which participation attaches.  
6.2.  the Relativity of Freedom 
For Rousseau, man is free by proof of participation in society because he was free by 
nature. It is by the former action that Rousseau believes man can return to, or maintain, 
his individual freedom as given by nature. Rousseau’s particular use of participation, 
therefore, depends on what he supposes man’s original freedom to be. And it is by way of 
his characterization of this freedom that Rousseau makes participation an empty ruse.  
Rousseau reasons that there are two kinds of motion: one that moves another and is 
therefore “communicated”; and one that is not produced from anything outside of the 
being that moves. The latter is “voluntary” and “spontaneous”. If the latter kind of motion 
did not exist then “one would only be more at a loss to imagine the first cause of all 
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motion,” since the investigation would involve a never-ending circularity. To those 
heathens who suggest that the universe is first borne of matter then, Rousseau is resolute 
in his disbelief—for that which cannot move itself and yet moves must be moved by 
another. That which moves others speaks of spontaneous and voluntary action, meaning 
“a will”, and an “intelligence”. That is, beings capable of thought and independent action; 
beings whose movement has no other explanation but themselves. Such beings cannot be 
imagined as anything but free beings, the will of which explains all action since there can 
be no “effects without cause.” Man being one of those beings who, though his body is 
acted upon by other forces, is active also of himself, is, therefore, active and free.489 
If “the principle of every action, is in the will of a free being”490, and man is an active 
being, then either he is moved by something else or he moves himself. For Rousseau, it is 
clear that regardless of whatever else may be true, man was also made to move himself. 
Which is to say, to act “on his own.”491 “I want to move my arm, and I move it without 
this movement’s having another immediate cause than my will. It would be vain to try to 
use reason to destroy this sentiment in me. It is stronger than any evidence. One might 
just as well try to prove to me that I do not exist.”492  
If, then, man has been made to move on his own, then he has also been made – like He 
who establishes the whole order of things, the “Being active in itself” – to be good. And 
                                               
489 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, Book 4, pp. 272- 281. 
490 Ibid, Book 4, p. 280. 
491 Ibid, p. 281. 
492 Ibid, p. 272. 
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to choose that good without the aid of any others.493  “Nature commands every animal”, 
says Rousseau, “and the beast obeys. Man feels the same impetus, but he realizes that he 
is free to acquiesce or resist; and it is above all in the consciousness of this freedom that 
the spirituality of his soul is shown.”494 
Freedom, for Rousseau, is not merely the most wholesome state in which man can be 
proved to have begun. Nor is freedom, for him, simply an ideal state to which man ought 
to return for the benefit and preservation of his soul. For Rousseau, freedom is the 
ultimate end of individual human existence, so far as it can be conceived. “A truly happy 
being is a solitary being. God alone enjoys absolute happiness”; for he is free absolutely. 
He is perfect in “[sufficing] unto himself”. And though such a state cannot be envisaged 
for a being so flawed as ourselves, it is only by our base judgement that we do not 
conceive happiness to lie in solitude.495 So, “you must be happy, dear Emile. That is the 
goal of every being which senses. That is the first desire which nature has impressed on 
us, and the only one which never leaves us.”496   
Quite in opposition to Aristotle497, there is no distinction, by Rousseau’s 
conceptualization, between freedom and happiness; to be free is to be happy and to be 
                                               
493 Ibid, pp. 277- 281. 
494 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Second Discourse, p. 114. 
495 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, Book 4, p. 221. 
496 Ibid, Book 5, p. 442. 
497 For Aristotle, happiness is a more complex activity. It is to be understood, in one sense, as being 
based on political virtue. And in another, in being based on yet higher, almost unattainable intellectual 
virtues. For happiness being a most divine end is outside the reach of most of us within the realm of 
political society. So Aristotle explains, “It follows that the activity of our intelligence constitutes the 
complete happiness of man, provided that it encompasses a complete span of life; for nothing 
connected with happiness must be incomplete. However, such a life would be more than human. A 
man who would live it would do so not insofar as he is human, but because of the divine element in 
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happy is to be free. Happiness being the necessary end of all good human existence, 
freedom is the necessary, a priori, truth by which man proves and justifies her existence 
in, and as, the species; and thus attains its end. “The only one who does his own will is he 
who, in order to do it, has no need to put another’s arms at the end of his own; from 
which it follows that the first of all goods is not authority but freedom.”498 To put it other 
ways, for Rousseau, there is no “good” prior to “freedom”, and thus all ends depend, for 
their goodness, on their being derived from it; and are, thus, indistinguishable from it. 
So it is that Emile must be forced to achieve this freedom499, which consists in “being 
able to will only what is suitable to me, or what I deem to be such, without anything 
external to me determining me. Does it follow that I am not my own master, because I am 
not the master of being somebody else than me?”500 To attain such a state, Emile must 
exercise his reason, he must cultivate the use of his senses so that he will have an 
individual understanding of his own existence alone; and upon which his judgements will 
be based and, in turn, upon which he will execute his own will to the purpose of his own 
good of which only his own experiences have educated him.501  
Emile’s coercion comes not only from the teachings of his governor but from inside 
himself also. Emile must learn to suppress his passions and his desires; “hold out against 
                                               
him. This divine element is as far above our composite nature as its activity is above the exercise of 
the other, practical, kind of virtue.” Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10. 7, pp. 290. 
498 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, Book 2, p. 84. 
499 Several times in Emile, Rousseau intones that Emile is being ‘subjugated’ precisely so that he may 
be free. “Let him always believe he is the master, and let it always be you who are. There is no 
subjection as perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom. Thus the will is itself made 
captive” and directed to what it ought to be. Emile, p. 120. See also p. 92, and p. 179.  
500 Ibid, Book 4, p. 280.  
501 Ibid, Books 2-4. 
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your heart in order to listen to your reason”, Rousseau instructs him; for though “it is not 
within our control to have or not to have passion… It is within our control to reign over 
them.”502  
On the surface, Rousseau’s reckoning is not entirely dissimilar to Aristotle’s; the latter, 
after all, acknowledges that in those who live rightly, and unencumbered by the emotions 
of youth, the “rational principle” ought to be trained to bring our passion and desires 
under its control. “Knowledge” brings no benefit to [the young], just as it brings none to 
the morally weak. But those who regulate their desire and actions by a rational principle 
will greatly benefit”503, Aristotle says.  
Yet, for Aristotle, the rational principle controlling reason is only to be understood as the 
superior part of the soul and not the soul’s entirety. That in men of virtue, reason ought to 
control passions, is not a recommendation to eliminate what nature gives us as part of our 
human nature. In being a natural part of the soul, what Aristotle calls the “irrational 
element of the soul” has its function as it does in the other animals. The only judgement 
as pertaining to human beings is that a natural balance be maintained so that the irrational 
part of man not be allowed to subjugate the rational.”504 
The case in which man is made to wholly embody only one aspect of his nature is one in 
which the purpose of a political society made up of such men could, and possibly ought, 
never to be realised. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s reasons for the apparent artifice of 
                                               
502 Ibid, Book 5, pp. 444-445.  
503 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1.3, p. 6.  
504 Ibid, Book 1.13, pp. 30-31. 
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subjecting one aspect of nature to the other are not so malign as they may appear. To be 
“free”, “independent”, “self-sufficient” and therefore to be truly “happy”, Rousseau 
reasons that a person must rid themselves of all those aspects that while appearing to 
come from nature are actually given by “society”. For Rousseau, man’s faculties have 
given rise to passions and desires that were nowhere to be found in original man, and 
have eroded all his natural talent to recognise what is correct by nature within his own 
heart. And so, here he is— an “imbecile”; needing of an elaborate training through reason 
that will give him the ability to live in society when he already had all that he needed by 
instinct to live in nature.505 
The freedom which Emile is made to attain by reason is the best approximation he can 
have (since he is now in society) of the freedom that his distant cousin once lived by 
before society made it necessary for him to begin fighting with himself.506  Of savage 
man, we are told: “his desires do not exceed his physical needs,” … “his imagination 
suggests nothing to him; his heart asks nothing of him. His modest needs are so easily 
found at hand, and he is so far from the degree of knowledge necessary for desiring to 
                                               
505 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Second Discourse, pp. 95-96, also pp.114-128. This seems also to align with 
what Rousseau says of “thinking” in Emile when he notes that “by nature man hardly thinks. To think 
is an art he learns like all the others and with even more difficulty.” Emile, p. 408. This, having spent 
much of the text enunciating the virtues of thought and reason suggests that the latter faculties are 
those he believes we have needed to cultivate to in order to choose to approximate the state we were 
once in when we had no need of them. See also the conflict he brings between conscience and reason 
suggesting that the former ought to win out, though we can no longer know it without the latter p. 67, 
and pp. 283-291. See also Emile, Books 4 –5.  
506 See Emile, Book 5, pp. 442-450. “Not yet practiced at struggling against himself and not yet 
accustomed to desire one thing and to will another” Rousseau says of Emile, he must become so on 
being told he must leave his love, Sophie, in order to learn how not to be enslaved to his attachments. 
See Book 5, p. 448. 
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acquire greater knowledge [italics added].”507 “His knowledge and his industry are 
limited to jumping, running, fighting, throwing a stone, scaling a tree.”508 So much does 
he carry all that he truly needs within himself that “it is impossible to imagine why, in 
that primitive state, a man would sooner have need of another man than a monkey or a 
wolf.”509  
He lacks the “amour-propre” which makes social man desire what he does not need by 
nature and only on the conceit of other men; as such, natural man sees his fellows as he 
would any of the other animals. He does not wish to see his fellows suffer and any harm 
he does to them will only be for the gain of some necessary need. There is no vice in it, 
for he does not choose to act with the intention to cause the kind of “offense” which is 
only the result of vain ego.510 As such, “savage man, when he has eaten, is at peace with 
all nature, and the friend of all his fellow men.”511 He is, at base, “without industry …. 
and self-sufficient.”512 
There is no clearer description of absolute freedom. A being that wants only what it can 
do, not because it restricts its wants but because it has no conception of anything beyond 
its immediate and most natural needs. A being who neither depends on, nor needs, others 
                                               
507 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Second Discourse, pp. 116-117. 
508 Ibid, note (f) p. 189. 
509 Ibid, pp. 107 -126. 
510 Ibid, pp. 128-131, also Rousseau’s note (o) p. 222. Throughout I have changed the Masters’ 
translation of “vanity and “love of oneself” back to the original “amour-propre” and “amour de soi”. 
Reason being that both the original French terms express a great deal more on interpretation than the 
narrow modern English understanding attributed to “vanity” or “self-love”. It is also unnecessary for 
either term to be translated directly into English even for the non-French speaker so long as the 
interpretive meaning of the concepts are carried along with them. 
511 Ibid note (i), p. 195. 
512 Ibid, p. 137. 
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within its species for its own self-preservation. Whose will is therefore its own only; and 
is a will that is – as if all this were not enough – never denied for it is exactly what his 
basic natural senses dictate that he, in fact, wants and that he can do.513 This is a 
description of a ‘nature’ that Aristotle recognises as belonging largely to simple 
creatures, including plants, and not to complex human beings.514  
Rousseau’s ability to maintain man’s freedom in absolute terms depends on his 
distinction between man’s “dependence on things” and his “dependence on [other] men”. 
Of the former, Rousseau says, it comes from nature. Dependence on things creates no 
vices since it is not in the sphere of conscious voluntary action. It covers the realm in 
which we do what we must by necessity and as such, it is a realm that bears “no 
morality.” On the other hand, Rousseau surmises that man’s dependence on other men, is 
nobody’s fault but ours for it comes to us from society515; and it is we, alone, that created 
society in the first place.516  
So dispersed had nature made man over the earth, that any ideas that could be held by any 
one individual would have died there with him.517 Nature itself gave us the very minimal 
                                               
513 Ibid, pp. 104 -141. 
514 “Is it then possible that while a carpenter and a shoemaker have their own proper functions and 
spheres of action, man as man has none… Should we not assume that just as the eye, the hand, the 
foot, and in general each part of the body clearly has its own proper function, so man too has some 
function over and above the function of his parts. What can this function possibly be? Simply living? 
He shares that even with the plants… Accordingly, the life of nutrition and growth must be excluded. 
Next in line there is the life of sense perception. But this, too, man has in common with the horse, the 
ox, and every animal.” Op. Cit., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1.7, p. 16. 
515 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, Book 2, p.85. 
516 Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p. 119. 
517 Ibid, pp. 119- 121. See also note (j) p. 204 where Rousseau speaks of a race which could possibly 
be true savage men still found in the “primitive state of nature” due to their natural dispersal having 
prevented them from developing their “potential faculties”. 
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basis for a kind of interaction that would have no other purpose but the fulfilment of our 
mutual needs.518 By our own conniving, our ceaseless imagination and ambition, we 
morally attached ourselves together in the name of a so called “progress”.  
A progress that took man so far beyond any aspect nature could have been imagined to 
give to him. This desire for “self-perfection”519, which for all our labours, “so many 
sciences fathomed, so many arts invented … mountains razed, rocks broken, rivers made 
navigable”, the resulting virtues are still in deficit to the vices produced.520 From all the 
arts and the sciences, all of this “sociability”, so many “errors” have we engendered, 
making each man follow the opinions of others—the truth of which he has no guarantee; 
and all in the aim of progress.521  
In the same aim, according to Rousseau, we are forced to upend the equality nature gave 
us in the beginning so that all now being only superficially equal, we pay deference to 
those who are beneath us by natural character but surpass us in the material aspirations of 
society, wealth, and property.522 From the inequality that society institutes, and which 
makes the rich idle and overburdens the poor 523, so ensues all the vices that make civil 
                                               
518 Ibid, p. 126. 
519 Ibid, p. 114. 
520 Ibid, note (i). See also pp. 114-115. 
521 See Op. Cit., Rousseau, First Discourse. 
522 “For one’s own advantage, it was necessary to appear to be other than what one in fact was. To be 
and to seem to be became two altogether different things.” Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p.155. See also 
First Discourse, p. 37, and Emile, p. 186. 
523 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Second Discourse, pp. 109-110. But Rousseau is again very much aware that 
“instituted inequality” found its way out of its “natural” counterpart. For it is those that were stronger 
by nature that did more work, it was those clever by nature that turned it to their advantage in society; 
thus does natural inequality imperceptibly manifest itself alone with contrived inequality” Though in 
actual fact it is no more than saying it is natural inequality that presented the basis for contrived 
inequality. Second Discourse, pp.154-155, also p. 138. 
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law necessary: pride, petty jealousies, hatred, and avarice.524 All this, and a world away 
from the peace of “a state where men lived isolated and where a given man had no 
motive for living near another given man, nor perhaps to live near one another, which is 
much worse[!]”525 How far we have travelled526.    
So here is Rousseau’s image of man as he has become: “sociable”, “weak”, and a “slave”. 
“His soft and effeminate way of life completes the enervation of both his strength and his 
courage.”527 Rendering “each other apparent services and … [doing] every imaginable 
harm to one another” by giving each other ‘needs’ that nature has not given us and which 
by needlessly chasing after, we duly make ourselves miserable.528 This is the moral 
realm, for none but we have chosen it. It is the moral realm in which the use of our reason 
is required, says Rousseau, since it is by that very faculty that it was created.  
Nature made man free – that is, capable of acting independently of the movement of any 
other being but by our will, our judgement, alone – so that “by choice [italics added] he 
do not evil but good.”529 All, therefore, that causes us misery – for it is the natural desire 
of every being to be happy – has been by our choice. Since, likewise, the things that 
appear to cause us misery are not the things we need by nature to preserve our simple 
lives but from the things we have made ourselves morally dependent on – that is, other 
men, then it is by our choice when we are unfree and unhappy. But who would choose to 
                                               
524 Ibid, pp. 156-172; also p. 129. 
525 Ibid, note (l) pp. 219-220. 
526 Ibid, p.115. It is by the faculties that nature gave us that we have raised our selves so far above it.  
527 Ibid, p.111. 
528 Ibid, note (i) pp. 192-192, see also Op. Cit., First Discourse, starred footnote, p. 36. 
529 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, p. 281. 
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be so?  
So Emile proves that although difficult and requiring the use of those very faculties that 
brought man out of his natural habit in the first place – and thus the lessons always 
threaten to be undone since they come to us no longer by instinct – the ‘choice’ can be 
made the other way.530 Which is to say, we can choose to come again to be only 
dependent on things and not on other men, thereby regaining the sense of our absolute 
freedom.531  
On the contrary, and as Aristotle rightly recognises, at least, so far as the political 
community is concerned, the need we have for one another provides the underlying basis 
for why as he says, “a household is more self-sufficient than one person, and a city than a 
household; and a city tends to come into being when the community formed by a 
multitude is self-sufficient. If, therefore, the more self-sufficient is more choiceworthy, 
what is less a unity is more choiceworthy than what is more a unity.”532 In other words, 
when it comes to the organization of the state, it is the amalgam of its different parts and 
the different people who compose it that enable the achievement of its most ideal 
purpose, which is the self-sufficient preservation of the state and its inhabitants.   
Further, and as Aristotle also corrects, among what is “necessary” or of what “cannot be 
otherwise”, are our abilities to “art” or thought, which enables an intellectual production 
                                               
530 Ibid, Books 2-5. Also, Op. Cit., Second Discourse, pp. 95-96. 
531 Rousseau dreams “who knows where one can live independent and free, without needing to harm 
anyone and without fear of being harmed. … I agree that if there is any legitimate and sure means of 
subsisting without intrigue, without involvement, and without dependence, it is to live by cultivating 
one’s own land with the labour of one’s own hands.” Op. Cit., Emile, Book 5, p.457. 
532 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Politics, Book 2, Chapter 3, p. 27. 
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beyond the need for breath and food.533 “Thus of necessary things, some have an external 
cause”534, Aristotle notes. And indeed, what Rousseau views as the correct, amoral, need 
that we have from nature, for the fulfilment of which no other human beings are required, 
Aristotle rightly theorises as belonging under compulsion as a kind of necessity that is 
based on impulse rather than calculation.535  
In fact, to some extent Rousseau would agree with an understanding in which a ‘natural 
dependence on things’ is better recognised as a sense of compulsion and an aspect of 
need over which we have no control; except for him, this is not a base thing. Rousseau 
can only maintain that man’s “dependence on things” does not sit in the realm of moral 
action because he believes that it does not stem from our wills and therefore our 
voluntary control over this dependence is minimal, if it exists at all. Man is/was free 
because although he has always depended on things by his nature, this dependence was 
born of natural need. “Natural need”, which is the cause of our dependence on things, is 
not under the will of man.536 Since it is only what we will – what we can determine for 
ourselves – that defines our freedom, and to which our freedom gives moral status, man’s 
dependence on things in no way restricts the domain of his freedom. To be sure, he needs 
                                               
533 “In the case of things produced the principle of motion (either mind or some kind of potency) is in 
the producer; and in the case of things done the will is the agent—for the thing done and the willed are 
the same”. Op. Cit., Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 6, p. 295. As parts of “the good”, and as “things 
which function by art”, these “intellectual activities” are part of what is necessary. See Metaphysics, 
pp. 223-225, also Book 7, p.351-353. 
534 Metaphysics, Book 5, pp. 223-227. 
535 Metaphysics, Book 5, pp. 223-225. 
536 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Emile, p. 91. “it is in the nature of man to endure patiently the necessity of 
things,” It is by need that man ought to live, Rousseau basically says, because need is given to us by 
nature and we have no choice in adhering to it since the end is not ours or that of other men. The rest 
is “superfluous”. pp. 81-91.  
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them, but his need is involuntary. As a result, they do not influence his actions in a moral 
sense. 
Rousseau appears to conceive that morality hinges on the question of whether a human 
action has been freely willed; that is, without external interference. However, it is really 
the use to which we put our action, “free” or not, which defines, for us, the moral sphere. 
We depend on things and we depend on men; the two occupy the exact same moral 
domain of human life. We give our dependence, both on things and on men, moral 
meaning by the use that we make of them.  
Rousseau is incorrect that our dependence on things has no moral significance. Even of 
those things on which our dependence is made necessary by nature, we are capable – in 
degrees –  of choosing how, and to what purpose, we use them. We, therefore, make 
moral use of “things” by our freedom and in the aim of our preservation—both of 
ourselves and of others. To conceive of a theoretical logic in which man’s dependence on 
things in the ‘natural state’ constitutes moral action and man’s dependence on other men 
has itself a similar “natural” status is to understand the basis of man’s relative freedom.  
Practically, Rousseau concedes that our dependence on things sufficiently enough 
impacts us within the realm of our voluntary action to surmise that we must consider 
them to impact the space of our freedom. Men “are shaped by education,” Rousseau tells 
us. “This education comes to us from nature or from men or from things … Now, of these 
three different educations, the one coming from nature is no way in our control; that 
coming from things is in our control only in certain respects, that coming from men is the 
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only one of which we are truly masters.”537 As such, it is our dependence on men and the 
teachings they give us, since it hails only from society and not from nature, which must 
be excised from the education that we give ourselves.538 He notes, nevertheless, the 
education from things – which he says is “what we acquire from our experience about the 
objects which affect us” 539  – is at least partly in our control. In other words, we have the 
capacity to use for our own purposes the things that surround us – based on what we 
discern of their character and utility –  in the aim of some end, which is also more in our 
own determination than it is in that of the “thing” that we use. 
If it is true then that “things” fall – even partially – into the realm of our voluntary moral 
determination, then it is also true that they do and have always impinged on the extent of 
our freedom. If it is true that we are in partial control of things because we can ‘judge’ or 
determine the use we want to make of some of them on the basis of the effects that they 
show themselves to have, so must it be, then, that the extent of our dependence on them 
constitutes a very moral state; a dependence that diminishes our freedom to that same 
extent. 
Rousseau does not deny the importance of the utility of action in aid of preservation. He 
says: “it is by their palpable relation to his utility, his security, his preservation, and his 
well-being that [man] ought to appraise all the bodies of nature and all the works of 
men.”540 As such, Rousseau does not fail to understand that it is man’s preservation 
                                               
537 Ibid, Book 1, p. 38. 
538 Ibid, Book 2, p. 85. 
539 Ibid, Book 1, p. 38. 
540 Ibid, Book 3, p. 187. 
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alone, individually and communally, which circumscribe the moral sphere and so places 
our actions in it by the end to which they are made to bear. He, however, refuses to 
accept as necessary to our survival anything beyond our basic survival and the needs 
demarcated by it.541 
Unlike the other beasts of the earth, man lives in a relative freedom, which makes him 
dependent on some things (including other men) some of the time in some part of the 
sphere of his life. It is a freedom relative to the state of being in which man aims to 
control nothing outside of himself and is absolutely free. It is relative to the state of being 
in which man aims to control everything in his surrounding in the full aim of other ends 
except his own and is totally unfree. It is, further, relative to the state in which man is in 
absolute control of everything even within himself for his own ends, and it is relative to 
the state in which he has no control over any part of his own self and all the ends to 
which he is purposed belong to no one in particular. The relativity of freedom is precisely 
what tells us what is important about freedom; that is, that it regards some other thing on 
all its sides. It is less than its perfect form. But it is preferable to yet another. It is not 
required for some more basic thing before it. But it is necessary for something ahead of 
itself.  
Absolute freedom requires no justification. It sits whole, never needing of reason; 
required for all things and regarding nothing in particular. Relative freedom, on the other 
hand, is not an inherently moral state. Any moral status that is given it is derivative. It is 
                                               
541 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Second Discourse, pp. 126-129, pp.109-110; note (i) pp. 193-197. See also 
Emile, Book 3, pp. 185-190. 
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derived from our knowledge of the psycho-physiological conditions human-beings 
require to fulfil their natural needs, desires, and ambitions. That we know that man’s base 
needs, his higher intellectual ambitions, his creativity and innovation requires he be free 
to certain degrees is what gives freedom any moral attachment that it may have.  
We domesticate certain plants and animals into relatively confined spaces that are often 
poor replications of their natural environments; and yet, most people do not believe this 
to be an immoral action that denies these creatures their original liberty in a sense that 
would effectively damn their respective existences. It is to do with what we believe the 
fulfilment of the natures of these creatures requires. We do not appear to believe that 
keeping a dog in a well sized house, with good garden space, regularly feeding and 
hydrating him, constitutes an immoral state of being as against his natural liberty in the 
wild. But when he is trapped in a cage with less food and water than we know he needs, 
his unfreedom acquires the moral objection of cruelty. It is not the confines of the (free or 
unfree) state in which we find the animal, in and of itself, that holds moral status. That 
state is merely subject to moral criticism on the basis of our knowledge of what the 
animal is capable of, and intended by nature to, attaining. We appear to believe that in the 
former condition, the animal has all he needs to fulfil the goals of which his nature makes 
him capable. In the latter condition, we judge in the negative. His free/unfree state 
derives its moral integrity from its tendency towards (or against) the fulfilment of the 
(natural) capabilities of the creature. 
It is not dissimilar when we regard the case of human beings. It is what we believe 
ourselves to know about the capabilities and capacities of humankind when it is in a state 
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of freedom, from which freedom derives its moral claim. The original moral status 
belongs to those other goals for which freedom is required. To be clear, the theoretical 
opposite of the freedom to which this thesis adheres – what Rousseau calls “slavery” – is 
not keeping a man in a cage without the means to sustain his biological well-being 
against his own determination.542 From where the patent immorality of such a state 
derives, I have already made clear. The real opposite is a man, walking as physically 
unencumbered on this earth as he may, who has his thoughts, ideas, ambitions, his mind 
and soul, in the complete control of another. This state of unfreedom – and the opposing 
freedom – is itself inherently neutral. It is, however, when we comprehend the particular 
nature and capacity of the being that inhabits such a state that this status of unfreedom 
comes to require moral judgement. When we speak of a human in such a state, we decry 
the loss of his particular innovation – in thought and in deed – in aiding the virtuous 
existence of the species. So we say that he must be free. And that’s it is moral that he be 
free.  
Given a conception of relative freedom which Rousseau does not countenance, if the 
moral independence of the free man regards nothing in its sights, then his freedom, while 
no one will, nor can they, object, produces no inherent moral good. The case is proved by 
the attitude that the majority take to criminal justice. In the case of a man imprisoned on 
his correct conviction for murder, for instance, it is a rare voice that calls for his 
immediate release on the notion that freedom is an anormative moral claim requiring no 
                                               
542 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Social Contract, pp. 49-52. 
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justification on the part of he who wishes to be free. Instead, most will say that since this 
particular individual has proved himself incapable of using his freedom in aid of ends for 
which we generally deem freedom to be required – and is instead using his time to rob 
others of their own free determination – then it is correct that for a time he be removed 
from the society to which he has found himself unable to positively contribute.  
Freedom or unfreedom acquires moral or immoral status as a result not only of our 
understanding of its relation to the nature of the thing to which it is being given; but, also, 
to the relation it is made to bear by its owner to yet other ends. It is the other goals, in the 
pursuit of which that freedom is deemed a necessary and attendant motivation, which 
bear the original moral claim.  
That freedom, relatively conceived, is a basic – if not the most basic – requirement for 
human endeavour, I, therefore, cannot deny. But that all is for it, and it is for nothing else, 
is not a summation evidenced by the natural world around us. Further, it is only with the 
notion of the relativity of freedom that we may even begin to imagine or sense of what 
end the accumulation of our individual natural dispositions, relating as they do to one 
another, may be in aid; and to which, in political society, participation is positively in 
aim. The true and relative aspects of man’s physical and moral existence which fail to 
satisfy Rousseau, will do very well for us.  
6.3. Participation and the View of Law’s Purpose to the Common Advantage 
The point in nature where Rousseau begins to lay out his scheme in On the Social 
Contract is not the starting point in his conception of natural man. When Rousseau 
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writes: “I assume that men have reached the point where obstacles to their self-
preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces each 
individual can use to maintain himself in that state”, he is not referring to his conception 
of the first stage of natural man; he alludes to a middle point. It is this middle point and 
the characteristics of man’s existence in it that forms much of the substance of the logic 
of the Social Contract. 
“Man was/is born free”, Rousseau protests. While there is little doubt that this premise 
relies on his conception of natural man at the first stage of nature – as savage; dependent 
on nothing but his instinct for what was good and necessary for his basic physical 
preservation543 – it owes much more to Rousseau’s conception of man in the beginning of 
what Rousseau calls “the last stage of the state of nature.”544  
Here is the stage where Rousseau imagines that though man had moved far enough from 
his ‘original’ state to have reached a new disposition, we were not so far evolved as to be 
a menace to ourselves. By this middle stage, “each [man] began to look at the others and 
to want to be looked at himself and public esteem had a value … and that was the first 
step toward inequality and, at the same time, toward vice. From these first preferences 
were born on the one hand vanity and contempt, on the other shame and envy.”545 And 
yet, Rousseau posits that at the beginning of this last stage of nature, a certain and ideal 
kind of balance could still be maintained. 
                                               
543 Op. Cit., Rousseau, Second Discourse, pp. 101-128. 
544 Ibid, p.142. 
545 Ibid, p. 149. 
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For so “long as men were content with their rustic huts … as long as they applied 
themselves only to tasks that a single person could do and to arts that did not 
require the cooperation of several hands, they lived free, healthy, good, and happy 
insofar as they could be according to their nature, and they continued to enjoy 
among themselves the sweetness of independent intercourse.”546 
Beyond this, Rousseau says, “all subsequent progress has been in appearance so many 
steps toward the perfection of the individual, and in fact toward the decrepitude of the 
species.”547 It also appears, for Rousseau, that though prior to this last stage in man’s 
‘natural’ development was all the evidence nature cared to give of how he ought to live 
and be, in being unaware of his freedom man could not be distinguished from a beast and 
thus was not in full receipt of all that made him himself.548 
So here she is, man progressed enough in her potential faculties to be capable of will but 
not so far removed as to be morally ‘dependent’. Capable of “moral freedom” – for now 
she is conscious that she is free549 – but remaining possessed of her natural independence. 
It is out of this framework that Rousseau founds his social contract and upon which its 
logic is made clear. For though the development that took man to the stage of “nascent 
society” was one in which man saw her faculties fully developed, she still being free and 
independent, what reason would she have, “proud and unconquered … to rush into 
                                               
546 Ibid p. 151. See also pp. 146-152. That this is the stage of nature Rousseau conceives as the basis 
for the working of the social contract is made clear when he states: “places where the labour of men 
produces only the bare necessities should be inhabited by barbarous peoples; any polity would be 
impossible there. Places where the surplus of products over labour is moderate are suited to free 
peoples. Those where abundant and fertile soil produces a great deal with little labour demand 
monarchic government, so that the luxuries of the prince consume the excess of the subjects’ surplus, 
because it is better for this excess to be absorbed by the government than dissipated by private 
individuals.” Social Contract, p. 93. 
547 Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p.151. 
548 Ibid, pp. 104-141. 
549 Ibid, pp. 114-115. 
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slavery”550, nevermind to stay in it?  
And so Rousseau posits: “it is, therefore, incontestable, and it is the fundamental maxim 
of all political right, that peoples have given themselves chiefs to defend their freedom 
and not to enslave themselves.”551 But since men brought themselves together and 
progressed to a deplorable state, beyond that happy “and most durable epoch”552, where 
some had acquired so much without which they could no longer do and others had 
nothing, but with none under a common power – mankind “brought itself to the brink of 
its ruin.”553 This necessitated laws and political society.554  
Rousseau reasons that political society, since not being formed originally by nature, and 
being made of free men, is “therefore based on conventions. The problem is to know 
what these conventions are.”555 So we are brought to the ‘general will’, under the 
“supreme direction” of which “each of us puts his person and all his power in common.” 
The general will is the only logical basis for the engagement of free men into a society 
which was their choice to instigate. It is the only thing that can logically underpin the 
existence of “an association that defends and protects the person and goods of each 
associate with all the common force; and by means of which each one, uniting with all, 
nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”556 
                                               
550 Ibid, p. 63. Also pp. 158-168. 
551 Ibid, p. 164. 
552 Ibid, p.151. 
553 Ibid, pp. 155-157. 
554 Ibid, pp. 158-164. 
555 Op. Cit., Social Contract, p. 47. 
556 Ibid, p. 53. 
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Although the general will must regard the common good by the reason of each 
‘associate’, just as the will regards the good of each individual through reason overriding 
passion557, the common good in the social contract is nothing more than an equality of 
public circumstance that enables all members of the state to be privately free and 
independent. As such, the general will regards nothing but what is common to a multitude 
of private interests so that each in obeying the general will promises only to obey his own 
self and the condition of public subjection is equal for all.558  
Since one must already be that which he wishes to be by participation and it is impossible 
to make something from nothing559, so “it is necessary to be free in order to will.”560 
Obedience to oneself by way of participation in the general will is merely the necessary 
means of adhering to one’s will publicly,561 in order that one may be allowed to more 
fully adhere to one’s will in private. When Rousseau says: “for if the opposition of 
private interests made the establishment of societies necessary, it is the agreement of 
these same interests that made it possible. It is what these different interests have in 
common that forms the social bond”, he means two things by the same subject. First, 
                                               
557 Reason, for Rousseau is not theoretical and neither is the will. The will consists in ascertaining 
what is good for you in the aim of your self-preservation on the basis of what you can judge or know 
to be good for you by way of your sensory experience through things and the judgment made of these 
through your natural bodily sense and faculties of the mind. Op. Cit., Emile, books 1-4. 
558 Op. Cit., Social Contract, Book I, Chapters VI-IX, and Book ii, Chapters I-V. 
559 Op. Cit., Emile, pp. 270-275.  
560 Jean Jacques Rousseau (Judith R. Masters Translation), Political Economy (New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 1978) p. 214. 
561 Since Rousseau explains that for the body politic or the State to be rightly constituted its three main 
parts – the government or executive power, the subjects and citizens, and the sovereign or legislative 
power (the latter being nothing but the citizenry when acting as a whole) – must be in continuous 
proportion with one another, meaning that the influence of each individual on the law as a member of 
the sovereign and by her vote is only as a fraction of the whole population whereas the whole force of 
the law on her as a subject remains unchanged. Op. Cit., Social Contract, pp. 79-80, also pp. 54-55. 
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there is a logical concern that the general will must be formed of a common interest for it 
to feasibly bear that name. But more importantly, Rousseau means what he says: that 
there is a singular interest that is common to all men in society, and that is to be free. The 
outcome of the general will as regards the relation of the members of the state to each 
other and then to the entire body is that “this relationship should be as small as possible 
with respect to the former and as large as possible with respect to the latter, so that each 
citizen is in a position of perfect independence from all the others and of excessive 
dependence upon the City.”562 We are again reminded of Rousseau’s yearning in Emile: 
“who knows where one can live independent and free, without needing to harm anyone 
and without fear of being harmed.”563 
What, then, is the common good? Rousseau says, “the general will alone can guide the 
forces of the State according to the end for which it was instituted, which is the common 
good”564, and that “if, when an adequately informed people deliberates ... the general will 
would always result from the large number of small differences.”565 We are given the 
illusion that the ‘common good’ is some substantive number of things. But the end being 
the protection of each man by means under which he “nevertheless obeys only himself 
and remains as free as before,”566 and freedom, to Rousseau, being what we have already 
said it is—it appears that participation and the general will admit of no more substance 
than the proof that one has merely obeyed oneself and the establishment of conditions 
                                               
562 Ibid, Social Contract, Book 2, Chapter 12, p.77. 
563 Op. Cit., Emile, Book 5, p. 457. 
564 Op. Cit., Social Contract, Book 2, Chapter 1, p. 59. 
565 Ibid, Book 2, Chapter 3, p. 61. 
566 Ibid, Book 1, Chapter 6, p.53. 
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that subjugate all equally so that one is so freed from all private dependence as to be 
absolute master in his private domain and wherever his existence is of no concern to the 
community.567 To Rousseau, this is justice;568 and freedom and happiness being one, it is 
the just man alone who is happy.569 Excepting freedom, these other words are empty 
vessels in Rousseau’s conception.  
The object for Rousseau was never society— not community as we understand it— but 
the individual whose place in the community being now necessary must be aided in using 
it in order to preserve his existence apart from it.570 Even if the near inexplicability of the 
general will being “always right and always [tending] toward the public utility”571 is now 
                                               
567 “The right that the social compact gives the sovereign over the subjects does not exceed, as I have 
said, the limits of public utility.” Ibid, p. 130. See also p. 55, p.62. Also Op. Cit., Second Discourse 
pp. 201-202. 
568 Justice for Rousseau, is nothing apart from the law of the political society that gives to each the 
property that is theirs and in accordance to their wills. Justice is a state that, per force, only applies in 
society where is can be said that anyone has any claim to anything or is in need of will. “The laws—
always so occupied with property and so little with persons, because their object is peace not virtue.” 
Op. Cit., Emile starred footnote p.37. Also Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p. 155, p.177, and Op. Cit., 
Social Contract, p. 62. 
569 Ibid, Social Contract, Book 4, Chapter 8, p. 131. 
570 In Emile, Rousseau says: “the most important [morality] for every age, is never to harm anyone. 
The very precept of doing good, if not subordinated to this one is dangerous” pp. 104-105. He goes on 
to demean as the foundation for “human justice”, the understanding that one ought to be motivated by 
the belief that it is good to do unto others as one would have others do unto them. Emile, starred note, 
p. 235. And though he notes this notion is to be found in natural law, in conscience and in soul, it is 
clear that he thinks it the mantra of base men since his Emile will love others purely for themselves 
and not out of his own expansionist self-love, pp. 228-252. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau 
seemingly does a half turn, noting that “instead of that sublime maxim of reasoned justice, Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you, [natural pity] inspires all men with this other maxim of 
natural goodness, much less perfect but perhaps more useful than the preceding one: Do what is good 
for you with the least possible harm to other” p. 133. In the Social Contract, there is quite literally no 
other understanding that holds the whole scheme together but the law of Matthew. See Social 
Contract p.53, also, pp.64-65. It is possible that what Rousseau is attempting by founding the contract 
on the Christian dictum is the establishment of a “reasoned justice” the public achievement of which 
enables the private foundation of that “more useful” adage. In other words, if I give to my brother in 
public what I, there, also receive from him – and which ensures the protection that we require in 
common – then the good that I keep solely for myself will do him the least possible harm. 
571 Ibid, Social Contract, Book 2, Chapter 3, p.61. 
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given a rationale where the ‘public utility’ means nothing more than an equality of 
political circumstance that enables each individual to pursue their own individually 
reasoned will, free of dependence on other individual men, which is the common good, 
there is nothing imaginary about the circularity which Rousseau makes of the law. And 
again, it is the fault of having an absolute freedom in his sights.  
The law, Rousseau reminds us, are sovereign “acts of the general will”572, which in turn 
declare the general will.573 “Any law”, he says, “that the people in person has not ratified 
is null; it is not a law.”574 One may thus be forgiven for mistaking the law’s content to 
matter to Rousseau’s theoretic. Yet, though Rousseau believes in the perfection of a true 
democracy, he knows it to be infeasible, since it is “unimaginable that the people remain 
constantly assembled to attend to public affairs.”575 It is aristocracy, therefore, that 
Rousseau believes is best suited to man in his societal state. As “private property and 
civil freedom are the bases of the community576, and as the people have become 
accustomed to these577, aristocracy becomes the “best and most natural order.”578 Masters 
                                               
572 Ibid, Book 2, Chapter 6, p. 66, also pp. 59-60. 
573 Ibid, p.123. 
574 Ibid, p.102. 
575 Ibid, p. 84-85. 
576 Jean Jacques Rousseau (Judith R. Masters Translation), Geneva Manuscript (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1978) p. 191. See also Op. Cit., Second Discourse, pp. 158-172. Rousseau explains 
that the invention of society has merely given each man civil ownership of what belongs to him. These 
basis of all societies and the differences between them hinging on the disparity of property. And this is 
“civil right”. 
577 “Our politicians make the same sophisms about love of freedom that our philosophers have made 
about the state of nature; by the things they see they make judgements about very different things 
which they have seen. And they attribute to men a natural inclination to servitude due to the patience 
with which those who are before their eyes bear their servitude, without thinking that it is the same for 
freedom as for innocence and virtue—their value is felt only as long as one enjoys them oneself, and 
the taste for the them is lost as soon as one has lost the. Ibid, Second Discourse, p. 164.  
578 Op. Cit., Social Contract, pp. 86-87. 
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is correct when he asserts that “Rousseau knew the impossibility of avoiding some degree 
of social inequality in complex society.”579   
Further, however, Rousseau desires a system that the people will value, and under whose 
laws they can be equally and totally subjugated.580 “The constitution of man is the work 
of nature; that of the State is a work of art.”581 An art that does not permit of what true 
democracy requires: “a people of Gods.”582 While Rousseau believes that we may be 
capable of being like Him in nature by a reason that abolishes personal dependency, for 
free men to live together in society, however, requires that “men like me whose passions 
have forever destroyed their original simplicity, who can no longer … do without laws 
and chiefs; … will respect the sacred bonds of society of which they are members; … 
they will scrupulously obey the laws.”583   
It in no way contravenes Rousseau’s logic for him to give up the right of drafting laws to 
a “legislator” who is not a member of the sovereign584; nor does Rousseau undermine his 
fundamental purpose by asserting that “the wise founder does not start by drafting laws 
that are good in themselves, but first examines whether the people for whom he intends 
them is suited to bear them.”585 And not even when he suggests that “when a law is 
proposed in the assembly of the people, what they are being asked is not precisely 
                                               
579 Ibid, Social Contract, Editor’s note 123, p.152. 
580 Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p.174. 
581 Ibid, p 170. Also Social Contract, p. 99. 
582 Ibid, Social Contract, p. 85. 
583 Op. Cit., Second Discourse, note (i), pp. 201-202. 
584 Op. Cit., Social Contract, pp. 67- 69. 
585 Ibid, p. 70. 
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whether they approve or reject the proposal but whether it does or does not conform to 
the general will that is theirs.”586 It is no less coherent with Rousseau’s ultimate aim 
when he ends by making a redundancy of the law in saying: “whoever judges mores 
judges honour, and whoever judges honour derives his law from opinion. A people’s 
opinions arise from its constitution. Although the law does not regulate mores, it is 
legislation that gives rise to them.587 In other words, laws come from opinion and opinion 
from law. Rousseau never strayed from his use of the law merely as a mechanism to 
establish a peculiar and absolute understanding of private freedom.  
This is achieved because since the “law comes before justice and not justice before the 
law”588, he who, thus, obeys the law is just; and free. 
“Laws, in general”, says Rousseau, being “less strong than passions, contain men 
without changing them, it would be easy to prove that any government that, 
without becoming corrupted or altered always worked exactly according to the 
ends of its institution, would have been instituted unnecessarily, and that a 
country where no one eluded the laws and abused the magistracy would need 
neither magistracy nor laws.”589  
As if law had no more than the negative purpose of keeping men from public sin. For 
Rousseau, the law merely allows for a state of affairs under which all are equally 
obligated in the common sphere, thus enabling, their private independence. So long as the 
law refrains from the extreme of tyranny and embraces a balanced system of taxation, it 
does not logically matter of what substance the laws actually consist in Rousseau’s 
                                               
586 Ibid, p. 110-111. 
587 Ibid, p. 123. 
588 Op. Cit., Geneva Manuscript, p.191 
589 Op. Cit., Second Discourse, p. 173. 
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framework.590  
Though Rousseau states that the “power of laws depends even more on their own wisdom 
than on the severity of their ministers, and the public will derives its greatest influence 
from the reason that dictated it”, this is only to the end that whatever just abstraction can 
be got from them is useful in enabling the obedience of the citizenry. It, therefore, 
remains that “the first of the laws is to respect the laws.”591   
By the logic of a relative freedom as ascribed to by this thesis, no one need be forced to 
obey the law592, the reason for which his hand aided in articulating. He who obeys the 
law is not being forced to be (privately) free so much as by his willing obedience to the 
laws he seeks to make moral use of his relative freedom; and by which, through 
participation, he expresses the position of the law both for himself and for society’s 
understanding.  
In the ideal, we ascertain from our examination of Aristotle593 that the aim of the law is a 
virtuous society, and justice is the practice of “complete virtue … in relation to our fellow 
men.”594 A fuller Aristotelian understanding of justice instructs that the most crucial 
substance the law materialises is a justice, the essence of which, contrary to what 
Rousseau says, exists prior to the laws themselves.595 And it is in attaching man to this 
                                               
590 Op. Cit., Social Contract, p. 92, pp. 97-98. Also Op. Cit., Political Economy, pp. 230-232. 
591 Ibid, Political Economy, p. 215. 
592 Op. Cit., Social Contract, p. 55. 
593 See this thesis, Chapter 5, ‘The Essence of Justice’.  
594 Op. Cit., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5.1, p. 114. 
595 “For the great majority of lawful acts are ordinances which are based on virtue as a whole: the law 
commands to live in conformity with every virtue and forbids to live in conformity with any 
wickedness”, Aristotle states. Ethics, Book 5.2, p. 117. That the law ought to be so does not, however, 
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justice materially that the law, in existing within political society for the ultimate purpose 
of the city’s end in living well, is to be considered authoritative.  
Our examination, and reformulation, of Rousseau offers a suggestion that by way of a 
participation that expresses, and reveals, the relative freedom of each member of the 
political society, the citizenry may more fully view, and feel, this very purpose in the law. 
As each stands in participation, he expresses how the law is concretely related to the aims 
for which she intends to use her relative freedom.  In the communal expression, it is 
shown to all that the law bears moral meaning in relation to each and every one of them. 
It is shown that in aiming to fulfil the needs of one, the law aims to fulfil the needs of 
every other, and all. In other words, in participating, each person presents herself in moral 
dependency on all the others and on the law. The law comes to be seen not in the abstract 
but as bearing a very moral relation to the community in being the practical basis by 
which each, and all, is able to attain their ends within the political society—ends by 
which their relative freedoms are made moral substances.  
It is in participating with each other on the subject of their laws, that a community may 
come to understand itself as such; it is further in the midst of such participation that each 
is made to understand the conception every other has of the relative freedom that they 
seek to make use of in the political society both for their own individual goods and for 
the cumulative good of the society. 
                                               
make it. See also Chapter 5 of this thesis for a fuller discussion of the substance of justice as existing 
prior to its material incarnation in the law.  
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It is by such participation, genuinely conceived, that each may come to understand that 
the laws have an ultimate purpose in guiding both their communal and individual living. 
It is by way of a meaningful participation in coming to a substantive understanding of 
what the laws are, and in examining the material purpose of their creation and 
implementation, that the laws come to be practically understood by the citizenry to have a 
specific purpose that is determined by their very nature as beings relatively free and 
inescapably dependent on one another by the very design and nature of political society. 
This understanding, the view of which a discursive participation enables among the 
citizenry comprises the law’s moral legitimacy. And it is by it, that the laws themselves 
may come, practically, to give to the citizenry its education in the practice of virtue, as 
Aristotle rightly claims the laws must provide.596  
It is by the expression that each makes in defence of his relative freedom – on all sides – 
that participation comes concretely to reveal to the citizenry that law is purposed for the 
benefit of the whole community. In revealing this fundamental understanding to the 
population, participation confirms to them that the law bears a moral legitimacy that is at 
once, prior to the law’s legal encoding and, further, comprises the seemingly disparate 
“non-legal” reasons that we may find when we come to considering the notion of law’s 
authority and whether to obey.  
If it is the case that participation may enable this understanding by each man of the 
sphere of moral action due to his fellows, and which is expressed in obedience to law, 
                                               
596 See this thesis, Chapter 5, ‘The Essence of Justice’.  
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then participation is no hollow trick. Obedience to laws, in whose understanding, the 
citizenry has participated, will be an expression of the latter’s acceptance of the law’s 
moral authority, that is, its purpose in meeting and enabling the ends of the city. This will 
be an understanding that participation has enabled them to see in the nature of the law.  
By participating, the citizenry is actively involved in expressing and preserving itself on 
the understanding of the relative freedoms of each and all, and further in gaining an 
understanding of itself as a genuine community— an understanding on which the laws, as 
a result of participation, depend in eliciting obedience. This is the common moral sense. 
And it is this sense that participation reveals as being contained in the nature of law, 
which is the definition of its morally legitimacy. It is an authority, which when viewed 
and understood by the populace as being contained in a body of laws and in the 
foundations of a legal system, is necessarily prior to, and in fact, explains the acceptance 
– when such an acceptance has indeed been gained by way of participation – of the law’s 
authority, in a plainer, simply legal, sense.  
It has been my aim, in this thesis, to argue that participation reveals in the law a certain 
kind of moral legitimacy that explains voluntary obedience. In this chapter, I have 
attempted to explain why this, in theory, ought to be so. Using Rousseau, I have aimed to 
advance the necessity of participation as attaching to, and making use of man’s, innate 
relative freedom; and further, as concretely revealing the nature of her own relative 
freedom to her by the relative freedoms that are given voice by all others. It is in 
providing the mechanism for this realization that I have suggested that participation gives 
to the citizenry a practical understanding of law’s and of society’s ultimate purpose.  
221 
 
 
By revealing the law’s moral legitimacy, I have further suggested that participation elicits 
the response to law of obedience which evidences the citizenry’s acceptance of itself as a 
dependent community and of the law as enabling the purposes of all within that 
community. If these dynamics hold in theory, perhaps it may be possible to witness, and 
to further examine them in actuality.  
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Chapter 7: Testing Obedience: A Lagos Transport Field Experiment 
This thesis has, so far, attempted to philosophically examine, and to establish how 
participation corresponds with a necessary feature in the nature of men who possess a 
‘relative freedom’.597 Contrary to Rousseau’s absolutist conceptualization of freedom, it 
is man’s freedom in a relative sense that establishes the necessity for – and usefulness of 
– participation in his ability to live in society. It is in participating that he, further, gives 
voice to his relative freedom and interests, by the evidence of which all others come to 
see that law is intended to be in the service of them all as a community, and the moral 
source of its authority is revealed and made clear to them. 
If man, by nature, needs, and makes use of his participation in relating himself to others 
and to the law, an understanding from which I suggest obedience to legally valid law 
arises, then we may add to a legal positivist conception of law that obedience is explained 
by an authority in law that is prior to the law’s formal encoding—an authority contained 
in an understanding of the purpose given to law by nature and by the city-state.  While 
the legal validity of the law, on the plain evidence of its documentation, may be taken as 
a necessary condition for law’s material and formal existence, it neither explains 
obedience/adherence, and nor is the latter a necessary criterion for the existence of law 
itself.  
It is by way of the law’s anterior authority as given it by its very position and purpose in 
society in the first place, that we may explain she who would obey the law even if its 
                                               
597 See Chapter 6 of this thesis, ‘The Puzzle of Freedom.’ 
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abrogation carried no sanction; and she not being a god.598 And it is by the same 
explanation that we may further understand she who, neither being a demon, would give 
here compliance to unfair laws. That the nature of law ought not to be conceived outside 
of the prior nature of political society, I hope to have shown.  
It is the conclusion of this thesis that when the citizenry participates in examining and 
understanding the laws, what each is doing is making use of her freedom, and witnessing 
the freedom that applies to all others. I have attempted to answer what I believe legal 
positivism cannot in explaining obedience/adherence, and in doing so I have posited 
participation as a sufficient condition in explaining obedience/adherence to law, wherever 
such obedience is found. 
In this chapter, I use a field experiment to test, empirically, the major hypothesis that are 
logically derived from this thesis’ philosophic examinations. Several questions arise from 
the preceding theoretical inquiry—the answers to which are better gleaned through 
empirical investigation. If participation by citizens on the law ought to correspond to the 
citizens’ free, and willing, obedience to said laws, then what amount of participation is 
necessary; and how, and in what ways, does it modify the behaviour of participants. What 
even, does participation on law look like?  
In the political science subfield of comparative politics, the use of field experiments to 
test all sorts of public policy related hypotheses is burgeoning. From the study of 
                                               
598 See Chapter 4 of this thesis, ‘Legal Positivism and the Existence of Legal System’. 
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corruption to the effects of direct democracy on the delivery of public goods,599 to 
deliberative theory,600 field experiments have secured a firm footing in political science. 
In India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s groundbreaking work focused on the effect of 
female leadership on policy decisions.601 Also focused around a transport system, Krutz 
and Moehler use a field experiment in Ghana to examine the moderating effects of 
partisan media.602 In Uganda, a field experiment has been used to examine how 
information affects voter choice.603 
In political philosophy, and philosophy in general, the incorporation of survey analysis 
and psychology experiments into philosophical analysis are being utilized by a few.604 I 
am, however, yet to come across any making particular use of field experimental 
methods. More specifically, the use of field experiments to empirically examine parts of 
                                               
599 Benjamin Olken, ‘Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a field Experiment in Indonesia’ in 
Journal of Political Economy (Vol. 115, no. 2/ 2007); Benjamin Olken, Direct Democracy and Local 
Public Goods: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia in American Political Science Review, 
(Vol. 104, No. 2, May 2010) pp. 243-267. 
600 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Towards a Redistributive 
Democracy’ in Politics and Society (Vol. 26, No. 4, 1998) pp. 461-510; Marcartan Humphreys, 
William A. Masters, Martin E. Sandbu, ‘The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations: Results 
from a Field Experiment in Sao Tome and Principe’ in World Politics (Vol. 58, no. 4/ July 2006); 
Karpowitz, C. F. and Tali Mendelberg, ‘An Experimental Approach to Citizen Deliberation’ at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~talim/An%20Experimental%20Approach%20to%20Citizen%20Deliberati
on%20-%20Karpowitz_and_Mendelberg.pdf (accessed 23 June 2013,17:32). 
601 Chattopadhyay R., Esther Duflo, ‘Women as policy makers: evidence from a randomized policy 
experiment in India’ in Econometrica (Vol. 72, Issue, 5, Sep., 2004), pp. 1409-1443. 
602 https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/Conroy-
Krutz%20%26%20Moehler%20XX%20JOP%20Moderation%20from%20Bias.pdf 
603 Buntaine et al, ‘Repairing Information Underload: The Effects on Vote Choice of Information 
Provided by Mobile Phone on Politician Performance in Uganda’ at 
https://mbuntaine.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/bbjnp_repairinginformationunderload_6may16.pdf 
(accessed 14 April, 2017). 
604 Knobe and Nichols, Experimental Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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philosophic logic frameworks and questions using African cases is, so far as I am aware, 
unnecessarily rare.  
7.1. Research Design 
To gain further insight into these more empirical questions, using a newly implemented 
bus transportation system, I conducted a field experiment in Lagos State, Nigeria, 
between January, 2015, and May, 2016. The experiment sought to empirically test the 
effect of different levels of participatory conditions in rule-making on the level of 
obedience given those rules by study participants.  
My field experiment aimed to test my hypothesis that  
1: the greater a people’s direct participation in creating and understanding their 
laws, the greater they perceive of the law’s moral legitimacy. 
and  
2: The greater the people’s belief in the law’s moral legitimacy, the greater their 
free obedience to the law. 
It would be very difficult to test these hypotheses literally as it would require intervening 
in the legal system of an existing state and observing citizens deliberate on the law in 
ways they had not before or, even still more difficult, designing an experimental setting 
in which citizens could be observed deliberating on the laws of a newly-founded state. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to test them using the rules that apply to uses of a 
government service.  
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The transportation system that provided the framework for the experiment was the 22km 
Lagos Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), operated by the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport 
Authority (LAMATA). The BRT runs from the Mile 12 bus stop on the Lagos mainland 
to Tafawa Balewa Square on Lagos Island.605   
The BRT fulfilled the requirements of an approximate experimental setting due to the 
fact that it is a public good, the correct function for which rules are required. My decision 
to use the BRT was proved correct during the course of the experiments as many 
participants appeared to find their involvement in the experiments to be a greater 
signification of the federal government’s care for them. This suggests that it is not a long-
stretch to approximate the rules of a government parastatal to the laws of a state for the 
purposes of this study’s hypotheses. 
                                               
605 http://www.lamata-ng.com/brt.php 
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Figure 1: Map Showing BRT route 
Treatment A: Full Participation (FP): Individuals in FP groupings were asked to attend 
deliberative sessions to discuss and develop the passenger rules of the bus system. Rules 
as applied to, for example, passenger etiquette on bus platforms and in vehicles, treatment 
of transit property; and so on. Participants were not inhibited in any way from whatever 
level of discussion they desired. Two LAMATA officials, who took part in conducting 
group sessions, were asked to give participants a very wide berth. At the end of full 
participation sessions, the rules each group came up with were collected and a set of the 
10 rules that appeared across all FP treatment groups were finalised into a single set of 
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rules that were used to administer the remaining two treatment categories.606 
Treatment B: Semi Participation (SP): The set of 10 rules developed in FP groups 
were expressly presented to those in SP groups by the LAMATA representatives. Under 
the guidance of the officials, participants in SP groups were asked to interact with each 
other regarding the salience of the rules, and to engage in discussion on what they 
thought about the rules and why. At the beginning of each session, participants were 
strictly told that they would not be allowed to alter the rules they had been given.  
In keeping the rules the same across all treatment categories, the aim was to ensure that 
the rules themselves could not be used to explain any divergent behaviour between 
participants across treatment categories.  
Treatment C: Control (C): These randomly pre-allocated participants had the same set 
of 10 rules as were developed in FP groups read out to them individually over the phone. 
Similarly, with SP participants, they were expressly told that they would not be allowed 
to change them. However, they were also not allowed to discuss what they thought of 
them. Control group calls lasted approximately 2 to 3 minutes each. 
Treatment Numbers: The original research design called for 1800 participants, blocked 
by age, gender, and ethnicity, and randomly assigned into to one of the above three 
treatment conditions: full participation, semi participation, and control. Individuals within 
each of the three treatment conditions were to be randomised into 30 subgroups 
consisting of 20 individuals, making 90 subgroups in total. 
                                               
606 For list of final 10 rules, see ‘Appendix A’.  
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The high attrition rates we experienced while conducting the pilot meant that we were not 
able to make these numbers. Although I and two research assistants recruited some 3,445 
participants for the main study, an 85% attrition rate meant 814 participants showed up 
on the days allocated for treatment. Of these, 205 participants made up 19 subgroups 
under full participation, 178 were divided into 21 semi participation subgroups and 431 
control group participants did not need to be randomised into subgroups. While the 
reduction in subgroup numbers did reduce statistical power, we found that having fewer 
numbers within groups – a maximum of 11 – helped to maintain discussion at 
manageable levels. 
After treatments were completed, all participants under all treatment conditions received 
an SMS text notification reminding them of the final set of 10 rules.  
All text and telephone communications with participants were conducted in English and 
in the Nigerian form of West African Pigin, which the majority speak. Where necessary, 
and appropriate, communication also took place in Yoruba, Hausa, or Igbo.  
Recruited participants were also made to sign consent forms, which were also used as 
pre-test surveys to gather basic and confidential demographic information (contact 
details, ethnicity, gender, occupation, and year of birth) .607 At recruitment, each 
participant was also informed that their participation secured them N280 (approximately 
$1.50) worth of bus tickets; buying them 4 bus journeys. These were handed out to 
                                               
607 For consent form and pre-test questionnaire, see ‘Appendix B’. 
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participants at the end of treatments but before post-tests.608 
Using a survey list experiment, we administered the post-test on treatment participants.609 
Two weeks after completing each treatment category, three list surveys were conducted 
in one-to-one telephone calls with each participant across all treatment groups. Using 
OLS regression to analyse the results of the list surveys, we did not get the results 
initially expected. Based on the hypotheses, we expected to measure the highest degree of 
compliance to rules in full participation groupings. However, as I detail in the results 
below, full participation were actually the most recalcitrant group and semi-participant 
the most obedient.  
To enable some qualitative explanation for some of the results from the statistical 
analysis, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with non-randomly selected 
participants during semi-participation and full-participation meetings. These interviews 
allowed me to gain qualitative insight into participant behaviour and decision-making. I 
selected participants for interview based on their ability to effectively articulate their 
ideas during their group meetings. I also selected those who put forward interesting ideas 
that others did not, as well as those who stood out from the group in any interesting or 
obvious way.  
Over the course of about two years, I and a small team at LAMATA 610 came to terms 
                                               
608 A change to LAMATA’s operating partners meant that by the time of the main study bus vouchers 
were no longer in use. Free cashless E-cards were given to participants instead. 
609 For list surveys, see ‘Appendix C’. 
610 The team was composed of Mrs Abiola Oseni, LAMATA’s Corporate and Legal Secretary; Mrs 
Seun Sonoiki, the organisation’s Legal Counsel; and Dr Frederic Oladeinde, its Technical Adviser and 
head of the Transport Planning Unit. 
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over the details of the experiment, including the parameters of LAMATA’s aid. This 
would include the provision of security, two LAMATA officials (one male, one female), 
to act as the organization’s official representatives during the experiments, and the 
provision of a government school. Located in Maryland, the school was near the middle 
of the BRT corridor— roughly equidistant from participants recruited at the end of the 
bus route at TBS as from those who lived or worked near the beginning at Mile 12. It 
was, further, agreed that any rules brought up by participants would have the possibility 
of becoming official rules of the BRT system611.  
7.2. Pilot 
In being a public good, the use of which requires basic rules generally adhered to, the 
BRT provided a solid framework for testing my hypotheses. However, it was necessary 
to conduct a pilot in order to find out what external and internal problems we might face. 
We ran a pilot study in late July/early August.  
For the pilot, which lasted the course of about one week from recruitment to post-test, I, 
and three Ph.D. students from the University of Lagos – one of who later dropped out – 
recruited 286 participants over the course of three days. We started recruitment at Mile 
12, which was one of the largest, and easily the most bustling of the BRT terminals. We 
also recruited from the slightly smaller bus terminals at Ketu, Ojota, Anthony, Fadeye, 
Obanikoro, TBS, Onipan, and Christian Missionary Society (CMS). Most of these 
                                               
611 I will be meeting with Mrs. Oseni in late 2017 to brief her on the results of the project and see if 
the passenger-use rules that emerge can become official rules of the system.  
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terminals were chosen for the level of passenger density they offered. However, they also 
allowed for a great deal of diversity across socio-economic status. This was essential in 
order for the study sample to be as representative of the Lagos BRT-using population as 
possible. So whereas at TBS, an area of Lagos that is home to the city’s middle and upper 
classes, we were able to recruit professionals whose jobs required, at minimum, a 
university education, in areas such as Onipan, Ojota, and Obanikoro, on the other hand, 
we were able to recruit craftsmen, electricians, car mechanics, and panel beaters.  
Being focused on bus stops meant that experiment participants would not include 
members of the upper-middle and upper classes, as in Nigeria, these tend to move around 
in personal cars with their own drivers. As such, this project does not claim to speak to or 
entirely represent the entire Lagos population, but nor would it want to. That it is 
representative of the bus using population in Lagos, however, is of far greater 
significance to the external validity of its results.  
The pilot afforded a number of lessons for the main study. Self-selection into the study 
would be a problem as many passengers regularly volunteered themselves up for 
recruitment without being approached. High attrition rates would also be an issue. Of the 
nearly 300 participants recruited for the pilot, there was a turnout of 19 people—a 94% 
attrition rate. This resulted in us doubling the numbers we aimed to recruit from about 
2000 to nearly 4000 for the main study. It also became clear that using SMS text 
messaging to administer the post-test list surveys would not work. Many found list 
surveys very hard to understand and a proper explanation could not be given using the 
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limited number of characters allowed by messaging services. For the main study, list 
surveys were administered in one-to-one phone calls.  
Finally, the pilot also led us to modify the original research design as we realized that it 
was almost impossible to invite control group participants to physically attend meetings 
and prevent them any discussion—this had been part of the original research design. As 
such, I modified the design so that control group would simply be told the rules over the 
phone.612  
7.3. Main Study 
Recruitment for the main study began on the 28th of September, also at Mile 12. We 
recruited just shy of 3,445 participants by the end of November, 2015. Using a 
randomized block design, recruited participants were blocked by gender, and according 
to which of the six geo-political zones or regions in Nigeria they were from (South South, 
South West, South East, North Central, North West, and North East). After blocking, 
each participant was then randomly assigned into one of three main treatment groups – 
Full Participation (1), Semi Participation (2), and Control (3). Within each main 
treatment category, participants were then randomised again into subgroups within 
treatment so that all participants were randomly allocated between treatment groups 1.1 
                                               
612 Although being able to administer a pure control would have been beneficial in terms of research 
design, it would not have been practically feasible. Neither would it have made much theoretical 
sense; given that in order to test the difference between participants’ obedience to a set of community 
rules, each participant had to be working with, and be aware of, said rules. There would be no way of 
incorporating a ‘pure’ control because at some point control group participants would have to be made 
aware of the rules. 
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through 1.30, 2.1 through 2.30, and 3.1 through 3.30613.  
Although the attrition rate for the main study remained high, it was a significant 
improvement from 94% in the pilot phase to 85% for the main study. Of 1614 people 
randomised into full participation treatment, turnout was 205; of 1153 people randomised 
into semi participation treatment, turnout was 178; and of 977 randomised into control, 
we were able to contact 431. Nevertheless, the rates of attrition did have something of a 
knock-on effect on sub-group numbers. Statistical power was reduced by the fact that 
participants in each treatment category had to be re-shuffled into a smaller number of 
subgroups than the research design’s original 30. There were 19 subgroups in full 
participation treatment, and 21 in semi participation. Each subgroup treated a maximum 
of 11 people, at which the level of debate was easily managed.  
At the beginning of January, 2016, text messages were sent, by subgroup allocation, to 
participants informing them of the date, time, and location of their meetings.614 The text 
messages were sent to participants in English, Nigerian Pigin, and Yoruba, two weeks 
before, then one week before, and on the morning of, their meetings. Due to the project’s 
limited resources, treatment group meetings were staggered so that we held between four 
and six meetings within FP treatment cohort every Saturday until all subgroups had been 
                                               
613 The sub grouping of control treatment had no research design value and was only done to aid 
myself and the assistants in providing manageable lists of participants we could each work through 
effectively and efficiently. Unlike FP and SP treatments, control group participants would have no 
interaction with one another.  
614 Nigeria is a country where most people have at least 2 mobile phones, text messaging was the best 
way to facilitate basic communication with passengers after they had been recruited. Bulk text 
messages were sent using the online messaging platform SMS GATOR (www.smsgator.com). 
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treated before administering the next set of groups under SP.  
Because of the research design’s need to have the rules be the same, as established by FP 
groups, across all treatments, full participation groups had their meetings first. Meetings 
began on Saturday the 23rd of January, 2016, two at a time. At the end of each set of two, 
we took 30 to 45-minute breaks so that the next groups scheduled to arrive would not run 
into those leaving. It took five Saturdays each to conduct both FP and SP meetings.  
7.3.1. Administering Treatment and Qualitative Observations: Full Participation 
Once those in full participation groups had been checked in by having the text messages 
we sent them on their phones verified (it was important that only those that had been 
assigned to particular treatment groups were allowed in), they were shown into a 
classroom where chairs had been arranged in an informal semi-circle so participants were 
facing one another. My two research assistants started off each of their group meetings by 
welcoming participants and reiterating that they were here to engage with LAMATA 
regarding their concerns over the buses and to come up with rules of passenger bus use. 
The two LAMATA officials would then take over and explicitly state that they were there 
as LAMATA authorities and to listen to the participants. Both LAMATA representatives 
were given strict instructions to let the conversation flow freely and not in any way 
inhibit the discussion through which FP groups came up with the rules they believed 
ought to apply to passenger use of the buses. I was able to observe that this obtained in all 
FP group sessions. FP sessions lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes each.  
What was most interesting to observe was how grateful many participants appeared to be 
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simply for being allowed to be there. In one full participation meeting, a nurse said that 
she had swapped out her hospital shift just to be there. In another semi-participation 
meeting, a young woman had skipped a family-friends’ wedding to be part of the study. 
These were extreme instances of people who felt the need to be there but they portrayed 
what seemed to be a general sense of participants believing that they were “privileged” to 
be allowed any influence over the matter of how the BRT operated. Many implored that 
such meetings become a regular, perhaps monthly, feature of LAMATA’s engagement 
with the bus-using public. 
This was the same in semi-participation groupings; and I observed many participants 
telling my research assistants, as well as the LAMATA officials, that they were grateful 
for being allowed to take part. It had never happened to them before— the sense that 
those in governmental authority or officialdom should be interested in what they thought.  
Nevertheless, in the FP meetings, the interaction between participants and the LAMATA 
officials were generally adversarial. But between the passengers themselves, there was an 
air of camaraderie. As they discussed what would become the system’s rules, participants 
would side with each other to the point one could be mistaken for thinking some 
members of the groups were close blood relations. Whenever there was disagreement on 
a particular rule, within a few minutes, dissenters would have been brought on board by 
the more vocal members in the group. This was particularly evident when a rule was 
proposed which, had it already been instituted, those objecting to its implementation 
would already have run afoul.  
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For example, it came up in some full participation groups that passengers should not be 
allowed to get buses to stop at places that were not official bus stops. What was most 
interesting in this case, and in many others like it, was the extent to which objecting 
participants could be persuaded against what they had previously believed to be their own 
individual interests. One explanation is that the strength of reasoning of some of the other 
participants was indeed persuasive—as one participant explained, if everybody was 
allowed to stop the bus wherever they wished, it would take far longer for the buses to get 
to where they were supposed to be going and there would be no schedule by which 
passengers could adequately plan their journeys. Another is that the ‘band of brothers’ 
atmosphere that tended to prevail led dissenting participants not to want to be seen as 
being ‘difficult’ or as outside the group. Both explanations may have played a part.  
The problem of self-selection into the study was apparent in many meetings. As a result 
of the nature of full participation meetings where participants were, in many senses, in 
charge of the floor, the problem of self-selection was most evident in these meetings. In 
the case of one particularly boisterous woman whose personality type meant that she was 
not given to listening to the opinions of others, it was clear that she was the type of 
person who would have attended our meetings had they been held several hours away 
from her home for no material incentive whatsoever. In her case, however, and despite 
her large view of herself, the oppressive nature of her manner was only tolerated by the 
group for the first 20 minutes of her group’s session. Without offending her – which I 
think many participants sensed would be mortally dangerous – and largely by appealing 
to her ego (many respectfully referring to her as ‘madam’ or ‘mummy’), group 
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participants effectively got her to shut up.  
More positively, self-selection made itself apparent in full participation groups in the 
form of individuals with strong—though not heavy-handed persuasive skills. Such 
individuals were effectively able to carry more timid members of their groups along. One 
gentleman was a particularly inspiring sight. When others would question why a 
particular proposal ought to become a rule – and often a proposal made by someone other 
than himself – he would, with an effective personal story be able explain to the group the 
salience of the proposed rule far better than the proposer herself. Like ‘mummy’, he was 
also the kind of person who would have paid us to spend his Saturday morning in such a 
setting. Unlike her, however, many would have declined payment just to be in his 
presence.   
The problem of self-selection into the study, however, meant a wider practical concern 
over the statistical results from the list surveys. It could be that the kind of people who 
would not only say yes to being included in this kind of project but, also, further turn up, 
were likely to be the kind of individuals who either had a very high sense of their own 
opinions, or who had a particularly high sense of civic duty or both. And as such, there 
might be a concern that our results would be a consequence of these personality traits and 
not a result of our treatments. Although this might be the case in comparisons with 
control group participants who did not have to show up for treatment, in comparisons 
between semi-participation and full participation treatment groups, it should be resolved 
by the fact that such persons were randomly allocated to treatment. As such, the results 
documented below, comparing full participation should be attributable to the effects of 
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the study’s treatment.  
Qualitatively, in the interviews with FP participants who I had purposefully selected after 
watching their ‘performance’ in group meetings, there was a clear sense conveyed that in 
the prospective relationship between the rules and their obedience to them would be a 
two-way street between clear-headed authorities that would be responsible for 
promulgating rules in order that people may know what they are, and in the avoidance of 
‘chaos, and an engaged citizenry responsible for appraising whatever sensibility the rules 
may have. My observations of full participation meetings suggested that there was a clear 
sense of duty among participants that whatever else, it was participants’ job to let 
LAMATA know what would make a good rule and what would make a bad one.  
One gentleman I selected for interview as a result of a comment he made during his FP 
group session that “whatever the regulator should set as the rule ought to be what 
passengers seek to follow,” submitted that those in authority must have “a listening ear”. 
If the authorities were to promulgate a “senseless rule”, he said, they would soon quickly 
get “a reaction” from passengers. A good rule, he intoned, had to be composed of a 
balance between the authority’s organizational objectives, and the group interests of 
passengers. The importance of passengers being involved in the process of rule-making 
was, he suggested, so that in the event of rule-breaking, other passengers who witness the 
rule-breaking would be able to explain why it was a good rule that had been broken.   
At the end of all full participation meetings, a list of 10 rules, made up of each rule that 
appeared in every one of the 19 full participation group meetings, was drawn up.  
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7.3.2.: Semi Participation 
SP groups were also checked-in, welcomed, and thanked for their attendance by the 
research assistants. After which, group participants were then walked through each of the 
10 rules that had emerged from FP meetings by the two LAMATA officials. The list of 
10 rules were written-up on the classroom chalkboards prior to the start of each SP 
meeting.  
Unlike the arrangement in FP meetings, SP participants were made to sit in chairs more 
traditionally arranged to face the front of the classroom. Participants were given clear 
instructions by the LAMATA officials that although they were there to discuss what they 
thought of these rules, they would not be allowed to change them. The aim in SP 
meetings was to convey to participants that their influence over the rules would be 
limited and that while their participation was crucial and welcome, they were also subject 
to the authority of LAMATA and its representatives. My observation was that discussion 
in SP groups was a lively but far more structured affair. Semi participation meetings 
lasted approximately 50 to 70 minutes each. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in SP meetings participants did not appear angered by the fact of 
a pre-prepared set of rules that they could not change. Indeed, unlike in full participation 
groups, many SP participants took out, or requested, writing materials on which to note 
down the particulars of the discussion as it went along with each rule being the focal 
point; suggesting that they enjoyed or were genuinely engaged with the structure of the 
meetings.  
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When I asked selected interviewees how they felt about the fact that the rules had been 
pre-prepared and could not be changed, interviewees saw it as a sign that the authorities 
had done the initial legwork of thinking about what was needed for the proper 
functioning of the bus system. What seemed to be more important to those I interviewed 
was that passengers be allowed to examine and reflect on them. 
Without these structural differences in the FP and SP treatments, it would be very 
difficult to account for the differences in the behaviours of participants in semi-
participation meetings as compared to full participation meetings, given that participants 
were randomly allocated to treatment. Without the structural differences in the way the 
treatments were organised, it would also be very difficult to explain the different tones in 
the relationship between the different sets of participants and LAMATA officials and also 
between each other.  
Unlike in full participation meetings where LAMATA officials were not allowed to 
disrupt or direct group discussions and participants were given a sense of almost total 
control over proceedings, in semi participation meetings, participant discussion on each 
rule commenced only after the purpose of the rule (as had emerged from full participation 
meetings) had been elaborated on by the LAMATA officials. After each rule had been 
discussed, an official would direct the focus of the group to the next rule on the list, and 
so on.  
My observation was that at one and the same time, passengers with dissenting views in 
SP groups held on to their view far more strongly when it came to disagreeing with one 
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another whilst also being far more compliant to the instructions of the officials than their 
full participation counterparts. One instructive instance in one semi-participation group 
was when it came time to discuss the rule that passengers should get up for pregnant 
women, disabled passengers, and the elderly (Nigeria’s is a culture where respect for 
those significantly older than you is taken very seriously; for the Yoruba for instance, this 
respect is inbuilt into the language, and one does not address anyone who is not in your 
age range by their first name). The young people in the group utilised the safety of the 
public space to challenge why it should automatically be assumed that young people may 
not need their seats even more so than some of the elderly. It was put forward by one 
participant that a sick young person, for instance, may require hers or his seat far more 
than a strong healthy old person; the unfairness of their youth seemed to strike younger 
members of semi-participation groups particularly hard. And despite being in the 
minority, they would not budge. They could see the sense of getting up for pregnant 
women, particularly when they were asked to place themselves in the position of 
pregnant women or in the position of their spouses if they were not themselves women; 
but the elderly could deal with it and stand.  
It was not infrequently that SP participants would find themselves having to move on to 
discussing the next rule even though they were not quite convinced about the positive 
attributes of the rule they had previously been discussing. This was very different from 
full participation meetings where at least one person in each meeting seemed to think of it 
as their duty to ensure that those that were as yet unconvinced as to the salience of a 
particular rule were made so before moving on. I observed that in full participation 
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meetings, the groups saw the LAMATA officials as adversaries while those in semi-
participation meetings rather seemed to find the adversary in each other. Note that 
participation here did not end with participants all agreeing as to the sanctity of individual 
rules—this was particularly the case in semi-participation groups where the groups view 
of the law’s authority over them, nevertheless, turned out to be the strongest. 
A young woman had been particularly irritated by the assumption of the more elderly 
members of her SP group meeting that young persons should rise for them on the bus and 
she refused to yield her position that this ought not be the case.  This was the opposite of 
a young man who had not initially been convinced that getting up for pregnant women 
should be a rule but changed his mind upon being questioned by another member of the 
group about how he would feel if he saw his pregnant wife struggling while standing on a 
bus with no one willing to give her a seat. When I interviewed both of them, however, the 
fact that the rules had already been determined meant that the rules would have to be 
“bent to". “It is already a set down rule; like the constitution”, the young woman said.  
One further consequence of the different treatments on the in-group behaviour of 
participants seemed to be that where in full participation groups, participants’ objections 
or dissents to the proposed rules were squarely thrown at each other, in semi-participation 
groups, challenges to rules were laid squarely on the LAMATA officials. Also, where the 
camaraderie in full participation groups was almost palpable, in semi-participation groups 
this feature was not there. In fact, quite the opposite as, on several occasions, semi 
participation individuals would take the side of the LAMATA authority and begin 
cautioning fellow participants who misbehaved by attempting to suggest new rules 
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particularly when the rules they wished to suggest were already on the chalkboard.  
At the end of the SP meetings, participants were sent text messages thanking them for 
attending. The list of 10 passenger bus use rules were also sent out via text message. The 
same procedure was also carried out on the completion of FP meetings.  
7.3.3.: Control 
At the beginning of March, I and my research assistants began administering control 
groups over a period of about four weeks. Using a call script615, we spoke, over the 
telephone, to the individuals who had been randomly pre-allocated into control group. I 
was able to ensure that research assistants did not deviate from the control call script by 
arranging for all calls to be made from the same room. 
Each control phone call began by reminding participants who we were and at which bus 
stop we had met them. They were then given a briefing – lasting approximately one 
minute – of the regulatory issues that LAMATA was currently addressing with regards to 
the BRT. Finally, control participants were slowly read the list of 10 rules of passenger 
bus use on which they were not allowed to comment. After which, we asked each 
respondent to briefly outline three concerns about which they wanted the LAMATA 
authorities to be informed. We included this part in the script to ensure that control group 
participants would be willing to take our phone calls when the time came for 
administering their post-tests, having not been invited to a physical meeting or been 
allowed to comment on the rules. On the 30th of March, when the control phone calls had 
                                               
615 For call script, see ‘Appendix D’. 
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been completed, participants were sent text messages, as in semi-participation and full 
participation, containing the list of 10 rules. Of 977 recruited study participants 
randomised into control group, we were able to get a hold of, and administer control 
treatment to, 431 participants.616  
7.4. Post-Test and Statistical Analysis 
The post-test for the study was carried out using three list surveys. The nature of this 
experiment made the list survey technique the most fruitful way of getting as honest as 
possible answers from participants. Because many participants knew who I and my 
research assistants were and all had met us at least once during recruitment, as well as the 
nature of the FP and SP treatments in which participants had spent significant time with 
each other as well as the LAMATA authorities, in responding to the post-test, they might 
have been led to lie or to give the answers they believed we wished to hear.  
The major benefit to this study of using list surveys is the anonymity they offer 
respondents. By giving respondents a range of possible answers, out of which they are 
directed to give you a total number of options that apply to them, they are relieved of the 
need to give a direct response, thereby mitigating their need or desire to lie.617 
In administering the list surveys for this project, I introduced a protocol into the surveys 
                                               
616 The attrition rate we experienced for control group was attributable to a combination of reasons. 
Some simply never picked up their phones after several attempts over a number of days. Others hung 
up on us. Yet others had given fake numbers at recruitment. 
617 Jeffrey Lax et al., ‘Are Survey Respondents Lying About their Support for 
Same-Sex Marriage? Lessons from A Recent List Experiment’ at  
http://polisci.columbia.edu/files/polisci/u230/Lax%20Phillips%20Stollwerk%20List%20Experiments_
update.pdf (accessed 15/4/2017); See also, Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai, Statistical Analysis of List 
Experiments at http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/listP.pdf (accessed 15/4/2017). 
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that would involve each researcher spending a few minutes at the beginning of each 
survey call carefully explaining to participants the method by which they were to give 
their answers. This was essential as we found during the pilot study that many 
respondents were very unfamiliar and confused by the list survey technique. For the main 
study, we took the time to explain to each person that they were not to call out the 
specific options they were choosing or not choosing. We explained that they were to 
listen to the questions in full then silently work out HOW MANY of the listed options 
they had done and only tell us the total number. We further gave two examples of how to 
answer correctly before proceeding to the real questions.618 Depending on whether they 
had been randomly assigned either the treatment or control question within each list 
survey, (each respondent got three separate questions in total), the list surveys asked the 
following: 
List 1 Control: Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done 
sometimes when using the BRT: 0, 1, 2, or 3?  
A. I only get on buses that arrive to the shelter completely empty. 
B. I get on the bus when there are some empty seats remaining.  
C. I get on the bus when there is no more seating but there is standing available 
List 1 Treatment: Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done 
sometimes when using the BRT: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4?  
A. I only get on buses that arrive to the shelter completely empty. 
                                               
618 For the preliminary examples we used, see ‘Appendix C’. 
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B. I get on the bus when there are empty seats remaining.  
C. I get on buses when seating and standing are full up.  
D. I get on the bus when there are no empty seats remaining but there is standing 
available 
List 2 Control: Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done 
sometimes when using the BRT: 0, 1, 2, or 3?  
A. Watch the television on the bus 
B. I read a book   
C. I sleep 
List 2 Treatment: Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done 
sometimes when using the BRT: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4?  
A. Watch the television on the bus 
B. I read a book  
C. Open the windows when the AC makes me cold.  
D. I sleep 
List 3 Control: Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done 
sometimes when using the BRT: 0, 1, 2, or 3?  
A. I keep to myself and stay quiet 
B. I talk on my phone 
C. I talk to the person sitting next to me 
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List 3 Treatment: Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done 
sometimes when using the BRT: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4?  
A. I keep to myself and stay quiet 
B. I talk on my phone 
C. I tell other passengers about my religion 
D. I talk to the person sitting next to me 
 
Each question was designed so that the list items are negatively correlated in each case 
(i.e., “I keep to myself and stay quiet” is negatively correlated with the other items in list 
3). As a partial result of this, it is unlikely that anyone answers either ‘0’ or the maximum 
number of items in a list. This would effectively give away their answer regarding the 
sensitive item; and we see from the floor to ceiling tests in Table 2, that this aspect of the 
list experiment design proved successful. 
Less successful was the performance of my research assistants who – up till the point of 
conducting the list surveys – had been exceptionally hardworking. Despite supervising 
the research assistants very closely, while carrying out the list survey experiments I found 
out at what should have been the end point of the project that two of the researchers had 
been making up answers to the survey questions whenever they we unable to reach a 
respondent over the phone. The researchers were immediately dismissed. I then 
personally called each respondent across all treatments to make sure they had been 
administered a survey, for those who had not, I administered the surveys on my own. 
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With the purpose of the list surveys being to see whether or not those who do actually 
participate adhere to proposed rules, and whether there is a difference in the average 
numerical response from participants in different treatments, individual level data from 
the list surveys were analysed in Stata using difference in means testing and OLS 
regression with standard errors clustered at the group level. 
Table 1 suggests that randomization worked and that the high attrition rates suffered by 
the project did not affect the balance of the data. The breakdown of 81% male to 19% 
female is essentially the same in each treatment condition. By ethnicity, the absolute 
majority across all three treatments – ranging from a 63% to a 68% composition – are 
Yoruba. The second largest ethnic group in the population sample are Igbos. They are 
distributed from between 15% and 18% across each of the three treatments categories. 
The other ethnicities, which appear in individually much smaller numbers, are also 
relatively evenly spread across treatments. We get a similarly even picture across 
treatments when we look at ‘status’. This demographic category was assigned to each 
individual based on their self-reported occupation. 
The gender balance of the population sample is not reflective of the Lagos State 
population. According to the last national census in 2006, females composed 48.2% of 
the Lagos population.619 However, it is not surprising that the population sample is 
overrepresented by men. Even at recruitment, it proved quite challenging to get women to 
agree to participate. Many expressed to us that that meetings being held on a Saturday 
                                               
619 http://nigeria.opendataforafrica.org/apps/atlas/lagos (accessed: 29/9/2016). 
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would be highly problematic for them. For those who worked during the week, it would 
be their only day with the family, with Sundays reserved for church. For many female 
market traders, Saturdays were peak trading days and for stay at home mothers, “were we 
going to come to their homes to look after their children for them?”, was a regular 
question women would pointedly lob at us.   
Table 1: Demographic breakdown of population sample by treatment category 
 
Full Participation Semi Participation Control Total 
Frequency 
(f) 
Percentage 
(%) f % f % f 
GENDER 
Male  166 80.98 145 81.46 350 81.21 661 
Female 39 19.02 33 18.54 81 18.79 153 
Total       814 
STATUS (based on reported occupation) 
High status 4 2 1 .6 11 2.5 16 
Middle Status 117 59 101 58 219 51 437 
Low Status 76 39 72 41 197 46 345 
ETHNICITY 
Yoruba 140 68.2 113 63.4 273 63.3 526 
Igbo 37 18 27 15 73 17 137 
Urobho 6 3 1 .6 11 2.5 18 
Hausa 0 0 2 1 2 .5 4 
Others 22 12 35 20 72 17 129 
 
Table 2 indicates that the data for list survey 1 is quite balanced. Most control responses 
in list 1 are ‘2’, whilst the bulk of treatment responses are ‘2’ and ‘3’. With only 7.8% of 
respondents answering ‘1’ and 8.3% answering ‘4’ respectively. This means the 
responses are evenly distributed to avoid large ceiling or floor effects. For survey list 2 
and survey list 3, the distribution of responses indicate that those questions could have 
been better designed. Indeed, the design of list question 3, in particular, may hint at why 
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we were not able to get any statistically valid results from those responses. In hindsight, 
choosing to test the rule that passengers should not engage in religious proselytizing on 
the buses was unlikely to get us enough of a difference in response values between 
control and treatment questions. Despite the documented religiosity of Nigerians in 
general620, with only 389 individuals answering to the treatment question in list 3, the 
numbers in such a small sample who were either in religious professions or were 
religious enough to engage in public preaching on public transportation was always going 
to be quite small. As table 3.3 confirms, the number of participants admitting to the 
sensitive item in list three is miniscule. For semi-participation individuals, it is zero.  
Table 2: Frequency of responses by list survey 
                               List Survey 1                            List Survey 2                             List Survey 3 
                           Control         Treatment           Control          Treatment           Control        Treatment 
Response 
Value 
f % f % f % f % f % f % 
0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1 44 11 30 7.8 160 39 126 33.9 83 21 84 21.6 
2 258 65 171 44.5 187 46 166 44.6 193 49 179 46 
3 93 23.5 151 39.3 60 14.7 78 21 114 29 119 30.6 
4   32 8.3   2 .54   7 1.8 
             
Total 395  384  407  372  390  389  
*Note: This table displays the number and percentage of respondents for each value of Y, the number of 
items that the respondent supports in the list experiment, for both the control and treatment group. 
Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
In a list experiment, we measure the difference in the average response given by 
participants randomised to receive the treatment question containing a sensitive item as 
against the average response given by those randomised to receive the control question in 
                                               
620 Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria, the Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998). 
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the same list experiment. The increased difference in the means measured between both 
sets of responses is taken as an estimate of the proportion of the sample admitting to the 
sensitive item in the treatment question.  
The hypothesised expectation was that the average response to the treatment question 
across all three lists would be lowest within full participation treatment. If the expectation 
proved correct that participants in this group would admit in the lowest numbers to the 
sensitive items in treatment questions, we would expect to see the lowest difference 
between the average response to control and treatment questions within each of our three 
lists by full participation respondents. Using a difference in means test, we found nearly 
the opposite.  
Looking at the simple mean responses to our list questions, we found that full 
participation respondents were most likely to admit to the sensitive item across all three 
lists. For list survey 1, Table 3.1 shows a .46 increase in the average response value to the 
treatment version of the question by full participation respondents as compared to the 
average response value to the control question. This is compared to a .27 increase by 
semi-participation respondents, and a .33 increase by control participants. The trend of 
participants administered with the full participation treatment appearing to be the most 
disobedient, whilst semi-participation individuals appear to be the most obedient to the 
rules remains the same across all three list surveys.  
As such, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The data does not support the 
understanding that increased levels of participation in rule-making by citizens, results in 
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greater obedience to those rules by the citizenry. The picture that appears to emerge is 
that there is a level of participation that when combined with an authoritative presence 
enables higher degrees of obedience to rules. However, high levels of participation in 
rule-making with little to no authoritative structure appears to have the opposite effect of 
eliciting disobedience and rule-breaking.  
 
Table 3.1: Means difference for list survey 1 
Experiment 
Category 
Control Mean (Av. 
Response Value to 
Control Question) 
Treatment Mean (Av. 
Response Value to 
Treatment Question) 
Difference-in-
Means 
p value  
Full 
participation 
1.95   2.41   .46     0.0000           
Semi 
Participation 
2.31    2.58  .27     0.0064           
Control 2.14    2.47     .33     0.0000           
 
Table 3.2: Means difference for list survey 2 
Experiment 
Category 
Control Mean (Av. 
Response Value to 
Control Question) 
Treatment Mean (Av. 
Response Value to 
Treatment Question) 
Difference-in-
Means 
p value  
Full 
participation 
1.69      1.88       .19      0.0593                 
Semi 
Participation 
1.83    1.86  .03       0.7833                    
Control 1.74 1.88      .14      0.0526                       
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Table 3.3: Means difference for list survey 3 
Experiment 
Category 
Control Mean (Av. 
Response Value to 
Control Question) 
Treatment Mean (Av. 
Response Value to 
Treatment Question) 
Difference-in-
Means 
p value  
Full 
participation 
2.00    2.16     .15    0.1512                    
Semi 
Participation 
2.16 2.16       0   1.0000                 
Control 2.08     2.09     .01     0.8500                    
 
Despite the trend across all three list surveys in which full participation appeared the 
most recalcitrant and semi-participation the least, the difference in means test for list 
survey two and three were not statistically significant.  
Table 4 shows that for list survey 1, both with and without demographic controls, the 
difference between the means differences registered by full participation treatment and 
that registered by semi participation treatment is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. It 
is important to note that these are the results when we compare full-participation to semi-
participation—that is, treatment groups that would have been equally affected by self-
selection bias, and which should therefore not serve to complicate their comparison.  
At a 90% confidence interval, when we control for group fixed effects –i.e.: the 
possibility that being in particular subgroups within treatments had an effect on 
individual responses – the number of full participation respondents admitting to the 
sensitive item in list one is 25 percentage points higher than those admitting to the 
sensitive item in semi-participation treatments. And when we look at the results just by 
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males in favour of whom our sample is heavily skewed, respondents admitting to the 
sensitive item in full participation increases to 26 percentage points more than those in 
semi participation.  
I consider the 0.1 level appropriate for hypothesis testing with this data as a result of our 
smaller than expected sample size. List experiments offer the most robust results with 
very large sample sizes, which maximise statistical power. Precisely because the format 
of questioning does not allow respondents to give direct answers, but rather indirect ones 
that preserve their anonymity, large sample sizes are needed to obtain more precise and 
statistically significant results at the .05 level.621 Unfortunately, due to the small size of 
our budget and our inability to offer significant financial incentives to participants, we 
were not able to get as high a number of participants as the original research design 
recommended; and as such we were unable to administer the number of treatment groups 
as we would have liked. 
Table 4: Comparing means difference between full and semi participation (list survey 1) 
 Full vs Semi 
participation 
controlling for group 
fixed effects 
Full vs Semi 
participation w/ added 
controls 
By Males 
Interaction 
coefficient 
.2544871 .2499567 .2649582 
p value 0.072 0.093 0.094 
 
                                               
621 Adam N. Glynn, ‘What Can We Learn with Statistical Truth Serum? Design and Analysis of the 
List Experiment’ at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/aglynn/files/sts.pdf, (accessed 15/4/2017), p. 3.  
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Table 5 shows that for list surveys 2 and 3, the difference in mean responses as registered 
by those in full participation as compared to the difference in means responses registered 
in semi participation is statistically insignificant. In other words, I cannot distinguish 
whether the fact that respondents in full participation treatment were 17 percentage points 
more likely to respond to the sensitive item in list 2 than semi participation respondents 
was a result of treatment or that of random chance. List survey 3 reports even lower 
levels of statistical significance when full participation responses are compared to those 
of semi participation.  
Less than the treatment, I believe the list question and the sensitive items we chose to test 
may provide more of an explanation as to why we see interesting results for list 1 and not 
so much for lists 2 and 3. In the case of list 1, the sensitive item of boarding already full 
buses was an activity that many people would likely engage in regardless of our 
intervention thus giving us higher numbers against which to test the effects, if any, of the 
project treatment. The sensitive items in list 2 and 3 respectively, of either opening the 
windows when the air conditioning was on or engaging in religious preaching are 
activities that I do not think many would have been engaged in even prior to our project, 
giving us not very much ‘difference’ to measure in the aftermath of administering 
treatments.  
This is supported by the data in table 3, which shows that in the control treatment 
category an estimated 33% admit to doing the sensitive item in the first list survey, but 
only an estimated 14% admit to the sensitive item in the second list survey, and only an 
estimated 1% admit to the sensitive item in the third list survey. Although not a pure 
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control, looking at the proportion of those in the control treatment admitting to the 
sensitive items provides the best estimate of what share of people engage in the activities 
described by the sensitive items in general, not accounting for the project’s primary 
interventions.  
Table 5: Comparing means difference between full and semi participation (lists 2 & 3) 
  
7.5. Understanding Participation and Authority in an Empirical Setting 
Observing the treatment sessions did little to suggest to me that people were merely 
proving themselves to be already free—the use to which Rousseau puts participation in 
his own philosophic framework. In semi participation sessions where participation in an 
authority-heavy structure worked to elicit the highest levels of compliance among 
participants, participation appeared to have an effect in altering not only the relationship 
participants had with one another, but of influencing the relationship between participants 
and the authoritative structure that was present in the form of the LAMATA officials.  
Even where participants did not necessarily agree with the opinions of others – as was the 
case of the young woman who did not wish to give up her seat for the elderly – they were 
still informed of the thinking behind the rules with which they might not have agreed. But 
whereas had the young lady been in a full participation setting, this ‘information’ as 
coming from other participants may not have served either to fundamentally change her 
List Survey 2  w/ Fixed 
effects 
w/ added 
controls 
 List Survey 3 w/ Fixed 
effects 
w/ added 
controls 
 Interaction 
coefficient 
.1733153 .2170523    Interaction 
coefficient 
.1049071 .0014193 
p value 0.271 0.189  P value 0.500 0.993 
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perspective or elicit in her a respect for the rule though she did not agree with it, the more 
authoritative structure of SP meetings meant that participants viewed the rules in a 
stricter sense as things with which they could disagree but by which they had, in the end, 
to abide. It suggests that in practice, as much as in theory, there is a case to be made for 
combining an Aristotelian understanding that laws should be authoritative with the notion 
also that the citizenry’s ability to deliberate on rules they know to have the backing of a 
positive authority, lends them a further moral understanding of the law’s ultimate 
purpose. A purpose that I have argued in previous chapters is, in a sense, prior to the 
law’s positive encoding. 
My observations during the study were that participation at work appeared to enable a 
process of understanding among individuals that was different to the kind of 
understanding that can be attained in solitary abstraction. The understanding of each rule, 
and the practical reasoning each individual expressed in group meetings meant that a 
tangible understanding was being attached to the practical well-being of others. It seemed 
that participation makes those who participate feel that in ascertaining why a rule should 
be one at all, i.e.: it’s purpose, there must be a balance between the interests of all to 
whom the rule must apply.  
This perception was particularly acute during discussion of the rule that passengers 
should not request unofficial bus stops. What would be the point of a bus route, were this 
procedure to be followed? One person, or maybe two or three might get off where they 
wanted, but what of everybody else? And while the three may not be too worried at that 
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point about the consequences of their actions for others, could they be so sure they would 
not one day soon be on the negative end of such a procedure?  
What participation also seemed to do was inform participants that there is thought behind 
the system; a thought to which they now had access. By participating, they established 
and confirmed that the (transportation) structure, within which many live, and execute, a 
good portion of their daily lives, was not just a mish mash of incoherently cobbled 
together regulations plucked out of thin air. By the process of participating, group 
members appeared to be gaining the impression of a system behind which there were a 
series of answerable ‘whys’, and to which their own individual and communal interests 
mattered. In other words, participation made the presence of the rules immediately 
relevant to any specific interest each person may have had in following them—that is, 
participation revealed a moral relation between the rules and participants. 
Watching it in action, participation did not seem to me to be mere theatre, the importance 
of which, so far as participants were concerned, lay in nothing more than turning up. For 
many, it altered their perspective of fellow passengers. Lagos went from being a place in 
which each person is morally isolated from the next in having wholly separate interests, 
ambitions, and needs, to one in which a genuine community could now be imagined. 
Several participants I interviewed noted that they had not realised that so many ordinary 
Lagosians, as themselves, genuinely cared about others or about the community. 
Participation allowed individuals to see or to properly sense the interests and aspirations 
of others. Those who seemed to imagine themselves to be titans, morally free to do as 
they pleased – like our ‘madam’ in the FP setting – were relatively quickly brought to an 
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understanding that their freedom only existed in relation to those of others.  
Even in the full participation meetings where the authoritative presence was purposely 
lax, participants clearly acknowledged that the notion of law without an enforcing 
authority was nonsensical. This sentiment was even more clearly understood in semi-
participation groups by the way these had also been purposely organised. “Where there is 
no law, there is no offence”, was a phrase that came up multiple times. It was for the 
authorities to promulgate what the rules where so that the community might know them, 
and likewise know of the punishment for breaking them. But where an authority might 
try to enforce bad rules, many were clear that it was the position of citizens to express to 
“a listening authority” whether a rule was good, or tended against the interests of the 
population. 
Putting together my qualitative analysis of the experiment gathered by observing all 
treatment meetings together with my statistical analysis, the experiment allows for an 
analytical conclusion that is closely in line with the philosophical examinations of this 
thesis. Authority by itself, and without the participation of the citizenry, is to create a 
system, the balance of which benefits neither the system nor those who must live in it. In 
such a system, the citizens find their own reasons, in isolation, to obey or to disobey. And 
without any deeper understanding of law’s purpose given to them by the very existence 
and exposition of their fellow citizens, they obey those that suit them and find reasons to 
circumvent those rules that they do not, for the moment, like. 
Participation without authority on the other hand, appears to produce one overwhelming 
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ill, general and unmitigated disobedience, the general consequences of which must 
simply be the dissolution of any communal political society. When there is a good 
balance between participation and authority, however, it may very well be that those rules 
the utility of which participants needed little convincing, will be more stringently abided 
by thus enabling the better function of the system itself. And of the others, they will be 
encouraged by the perspective of those others who see their purpose. Most importantly, 
in enabling citizens to understanding for what end-purpose the rules are there at all, 
participation allows for law to be understood as relating morally and authoritatively to 
participants; an understanding previously lacking or absent. 
It is quite possible – and likely – that the behaviours of many of the participants I 
observed were a specific result of the interactions they were having within their groups 
and also of the particular personalities of each individual within groups. I have, 
nevertheless found it analytically useful to attempt to observe some of the empirical 
approximations of the philosophical framework that has been the main focus of this 
thesis. It has enabled me to quite literally see, and abstract, how participation comes to 
alter the moral relationship of those who participate on the rules of public living by 
enabling the understanding by each of all others; and further of also altering the moral 
relationship between participants and the rules on which they participate. Rules, which 
crucially come to be understood as not only existing to guide, but more importantly to 
enable the communal living of the whole citizenry.  
Further, it is participation that may explain the special sense of authority, beyond its mere 
existence, or ability to coerce, that the law comes to have over a population in the first 
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place. Where a citizenry has itself to account for the very foundations of its legal system, 
the accepted authority the law, together with its sources, comes to have over the system’s 
officials, including lawyers and judges, will be empirically observable for many centuries 
after the system’s establishment.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Law’s Moral Legitimacy and the Significance of 
Participation 
What explains the voluntary obedience of a given citizenry to the laws of their state? 
What explains that aspect of the law that is contained in its especial ability to compel 
certain behaviours in adherence to its instructions—an adherence, which in many cases is 
obtained irrespective of sanction? In short, what explains the laws authority over men 
living in political society? This thesis has attempted to answer these questions by 
bridging three different methodologies—textual, historical, and empirical. In doing so, I 
have aimed to establish an understanding of law’s moral legitimacy as the explanatory 
force behind obedience. The conclusion of my examination has been, in short, that when 
we obey the law we do so not because the law simply is, but with reference to an 
understanding that the law intends to govern with a view to the common advantage.  
This, I suggest, is an intention contained in law that is born of law’s specific position 
within political society and which is given it by the very nature and meaning of political 
society. As such, I suggest, the moral legitimacy of law is prior to the authority it receives 
simply from being laid down as law. I have attempted to explain that it is by participation 
that a given population comes to this understanding of law in a practical sense. I have 
suggested that when citizens participate in examining their laws, a mechanism through 
which the relative freedoms of each is exposed, they will come to see the law’s nature as 
having a practical and purposeful relation to each and every one of them. They come to, 
by the process of participation, critically understand that in applying to each one of them, 
the law applies to them all. They gain the sense, in other words, of their individual selves, 
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as parts in the whole of a community, the entire benefit of which the law is in aim.  
I have attempted to lay out this understanding as a challenge against a legal positivist 
understanding of law. In chapter 4, I highlight how the logical flaw in legal positivism is 
that its main premise is essentially a tautology. In circular fashion, legal positivism gives 
us an understanding of law’s authority, which in being too narrowly focused, takes the 
effect of law’s being viewed as authoritative – the observable fact of adherence by 
officials and the general population – as the foundation of its definition of legal validity.  
Even when we come upon more refined versions of the legal positivist understanding as 
given by those such as Joseph Raz, we are still left with the question of what precisely is 
the conceptual difference between law’s legal validity as given by the fact of its sources, 
and the acceptance of that validity as authoritative. It is either that this thesis is missing 
something, or positivism itself is prone to collapsing two distinct conceptions into one 
and giving each as the explanation of the other, or possibly both. 
What legal positivism acknowledges as being the many non-legal reasons persons may 
come up with for obeying the law, which itself only gives its own validity as an 
‘exclusionary’ recommendation, are not, in fact, so disparate as they may think. For they 
fall under a category of reasoning concerning the law’s ultimate purpose in advancing the 
interests of political community. It is a reasoning category of legitimacy that explains 
why both citizens and officials of the system choose to accept the law on the basis of its 
own view of its own validity as given by its sources. This category of reasoning I have 
referred to as law’s moral legitimacy, and in it is contained an understanding not only of 
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law, but of the nature of the political society that I explain in Chapter 5 that Aristotle 
gives us. The nature and purpose of political society, in being the basis of material law’s 
very existence in relating political society and justice to man, gives law an authority that 
is distinctly related to the moral nature of the state.  
This understanding, I suggest, is what is missing from the Nigerian context. A context, 
which I elaborate in Chapters 2 and 3, as having developed historically in absentia of 
sufficient Nigeria influence on, and participation in, the basis of its own legal system. 
The result of which, I believe, continues to be evidenced in a malfunctioning legal 
structure till this very day. The fact that the legal system in Nigeria nevertheless exists, 
first provides a practical illumination of the problem with legal positivism’s circularity. 
But it further enjoins us, given an understanding that the fundamental nature of humanity 
in Nigeria is the same as it is everywhere else, to provide philosophical basis for what is 
lacking in that country—that is, a fuller understanding of the nature of law’s authority.  
If it is by participation, as the reformulation of Rousseau’s conception in Chapter 6 
entices, that we express freedoms that are made moral by what we know of man’s 
capacities; capacities which in turn give each man’s freedom a relative relation to every 
other, then it may be by participation that we reveal ourselves to one another as a distinct 
community in which we are all inextricably dependent. What we come to understand of 
law in such a setting is its purposed position to us all. And when we obey it, we do so in 
reference to the material of justice that we understand it to provide to the community. For 
in participating, we reveal our relations to one another and the law’s relation to each of us 
separately and as a whole; this is the moral legitimacy of law from which obedience is 
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derived.  
But the law itself must have a narrower sense of authority. The experiment detailed in 
Chapter 7 offers the crucial lesson that in eliciting the notion of law’s being morally 
legitimate in light of its purpose to the communal advantage, the law must be viewed 
even more practically as enforceable by the appropriate officialdom.   
8.1. Possible Criticisms and Unresolved Issues:  
The nature of this thesis opens up multiple avenues for valid critique from political 
philosophers, legal theorists, and from areas of comparative politics, including, but not 
limited to deliberative theory, and African studies. The most obvious criticism may be 
that because human beings may choose to disobey the law for many rationally-
determined reasons –  even if they have indeed participated in them or the participation of 
their forebears has engendered a sufficient respect for the legal system’s foundations in 
future generations – participation may not be sufficient to override the innumerable 
everyday calculations that people make and that leads to disobedience even in those 
whose respect for the legal infrastructure is profound.  
This thesis is making nothing like so general a claim that when a people participate in the 
making and examination of their laws, or when the participation of a body of citizens has 
been fundamental to the development of a country’s legal infrastructure, the citizens and 
officials there will at all times obey and adhere to all laws and all rules on the basis of 
that participation. Indeed, I have acknowledged622 that it is a concretely possible 
                                               
622 See footnote 287 in Chapter 4 and footnote 57 in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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consequence for participation to lead to individually iniquitous laws, which even the most 
morally upstanding of citizens may choose to disobey for multiple reasons. This is 
because the purpose this thesis envisages of participation is not to make the laws 
objectively good, but to bring the reasoning of the fundamental purpose of their very 
existence closer to the understanding of those who will be subject to obeying them. 
Participation, by this thesis’ conception gives the law a specific type of moral authority 
that is gained by the citizenry’s ability to better comprehend the aim to which the body of 
their laws tends in affecting the lives of each and every one of them.  
Further, if, and when there is an objective justice in the laws, participation enables the 
citizenry to comprehend what it may be and what utility it is to them and their fellows, 
and thus why it is to be upheld, and this understanding is itself a material kind of justice. 
And when there is not, participation also allows, by the voices of all, for this absence to 
be shown. It is possible that, in the mechanism of participating, the quantity of 
individually good laws will be increased, or at least laws that are not harmful to one 
section of society against all others, but this is not the most primary aim of participation 
as envisaged here.  
It is, indeed, in envisaging the caution against confusing participation’s role in enabling 
acceptance of the law’s authority with that of adherence to the law based on its other 
possible merits derived independently of participation (or disobedience based also on any 
number of demerits independently determined as being contained in the law itself) that 
the field experiment I undertake in Chapter 7 of this thesis was careful to ensure the rules 
were kept the same across all treatment groups for both theoretical and methodological 
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purposes.  
This point is further emphasised by my examination of the historical case in Chapters 2 
and 3, upon which I conclude that the mistake should not be made that what this thesis is 
saying is that there is something wrong with British laws, in and of themselves or that, by 
extension, left to their own devices, the Nigerians of the time would have come up with 
laws substantively different in many cases. My examination concludes, rather, that the 
case highlights the problem of non-participation in creating a legal system, the authority 
of which few respect or to which they adhere as a result of the manner of its 
implementation and development.  
To be clear, the more narrow aim of this thesis has been to establish that where indeed 
obedience to a body of laws by a specific citizenry is found, and more importantly, 
adherence to the system’s rules by officials, participation explains why these accept the 
law’s legal authority based on the evidence of its sources, regardless of what the law 
itself might actually be and whether or not they have other additional reasons for taking 
the law to be authoritative in a moral sense. The reason participation enables this account, 
I have aimed to suggest, is on the basis of a type of moral authority that it engenders by 
way of the understanding of law and its relation to citizens and their relations to each 
other, and which is prior to the law’s legal authority.  
It is an authority that is moral, not because of moral laws (although it may be so), so to 
speak, but because it is an authority derived from a population’s understanding of the 
law’s purpose in engaging, and enabling them, their relative freedoms and in allowing 
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them to better understand the just interests of others. This does nothing to deny the fact 
that there will still be, even in these systems where the foundations of the legal systems 
are veritably traced to the population that lives under them, those who for various moral, 
and otherwise practical, reasons choose to disobey the law.  
More challenging are the epistemological and ontological concerns raised by my attempt 
to marry multiple methodologies in undertaking this examination. Is it likely that my 
empirical concerns with the workings of participation and my endeavour to reveal 
something about the effects of participation, or lack thereof in this case, has meant I have 
defined the more philosophical conceptions pertinent to this thesis—justice, freedom, 
morality—in ways that have compromised my ability to explore them more 
philosophically.  
For example, there is a resulting, and obvious, discord between the argument of this 
thesis and that of Aristotle’s, and which may be cause for some unease in my use of 
Aristotle.623 Aristotle is concerned with good laws in a way that this thesis is not. To 
explain the latter, it is not that I do not countenance either the necessity or advantage of 
laws that are internally ‘good’ and ‘just’; I, however, cannot logically claim that 
participation necessarily leads to their production. It does not automatically proceed from 
my understanding, and observation, of participation that in being an expression of their 
                                               
623 There is no other philosopher who most fully conceptualizes the moral necessity of the state. 
Where many philosophers, from Locke onwards saw some value in the state, most viewed it as the 
product borne of the weaknesses of nature. It is Aristotle who enables us to view the state as a moral 
necessity that nature itself gives us—not to be overcome, but to be better understood. This, I think is 
not an understanding, this thesis can do without.  
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relative freedoms, participants then go on to found a consensus understanding of the 
interests that are common to them all and further use this as the foundation for 
establishing an understanding of the objective good that must be contained in any 
relevant law serving that particular common interest.  
This is problematic because where for Aristotle, the citizenry is habituated to good laws, 
obedience in my thesis arises irrespective of what the particular laws might actually be, 
so long as participants are shown through the participatory mechanism that the law aims 
to cater to the interests of the community as a whole, by showing them that those interests 
there stand validly against one another. It is in this way that I suggest that participation 
reveals, simply by presenting the evidence of each person’s relative interests and 
freedoms to every other, that the law serves an ultimate purpose in the service of the 
entire community, and thus gives the citizenry a particular, and deeper understanding of 
law beyond its merely legal authority, and which accounts for obedience.  
This problem is partially the result of my aim not to base my theory in a conception of 
natural law for the at once simple, and not-so-simple, reason that the discussion between 
natural law theory and legal positivism is many decades long. A challenge to legal 
positivism situated purely in natural law is not one that I believe can be sustained on 
many more original ideas than have already be levelled by many others. Certainly, 
wherever such original ideas based in natural law exist, I do not have them.  
It is, secondly, also the result of having the plain evidence of outward obedience most 
clearly in my theoretical sights. An uncoerced obedience which, at the empirical level, 
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cannot be denied to have been obtained in many societies, democratic and non-
democratic alike, to laws that cannot be claimed to bear even minimal relations to 
morality. I have sought to elaborate an understanding that could explain obedience to 
good laws as well as it could to bad ones.  
Further, while I have partially used empirical motivations in operating a philosophical 
theory, I do not believe that the latter is, as a result, left theoretically incoherent and 
without philosophical merit. For in a participatory setting that is necessarily based on the 
conception of freedom that I set out in chapter 6, even though men of low moral 
reasoning too are free relatively, it is highly unlikely for them to positively conclude on 
the sustainability of inherently bad laws. And in such case, they may compel the 
authorities to review said laws.  
It remains, however, that for this thesis, participation is not a necessary condition of 
making laws of inherent moral goodness, to which obedience is elicited on the primary 
evidence of that goodness. As such, ‘moral legitimacy’ and ‘moral goodness’ come to be 
two different things as a result of this thesis’ conceptions. It requires deeper philosophical 
work and thought to examine whether – given that I want obedience to remain the thesis’ 
distinctive concern and therefore reliant, in a sense, on observable perspectives – an 
understanding of moral legitimacy and moral goodness can indeed be brought together on 
the basis of my existing framework. It is very possible that they cannot and that my 
inability to enter into an assertion of morally good law is the very result of my mixed 
approach in which the impulse of philosophy is pushed back by an insistence on 
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empiricism.624 To attempt to discern the ontological basis of moral truths – i.e.: the nature 
of society’s ‘good’ and the meaning of just society, just legal outcomes, and inherently 
moral laws – I would need to engage in a more purely philosophical reckoning that 
required expanding my understanding of participation far beyond what is empirically 
testable or philosophically justifiable with recourse to Aristotle, or jettison the principle 
of participation all together.  
There are two further problems that arise from my thesis. One is the issue of my 
conflation of participation by previous generations in the foundations and establishment 
of a society’s legal system with participation by the currently existing population. It is not 
clear to me that this problem is easily solved; for the two are naturally connected, with 
the former having a distinct bearing on the present nature and acceptance of a legal 
system by citizens now alive. But I acknowledge that this does not go on to mean that the 
participation of the existing citizenry is then solved, or contained in, the participation of 
their forebears. It, further, raises such practical questions as: how often is the citizens’ 
participation on the law required to maintain the understanding among the population of 
                                               
624 As Strauss notes, “the attack on natural right in the name of history takes, in most cases, the 
following form: natural right claims to be a right that is discernable by human reason and is 
universally acknowledged; but history (including anthropology) teaches us that no such right exists; 
instead of the supposed uniformity, we find an indefinite variety of notions of right or justice… One 
cannot understand the meaning of the attack on natural right in the name of history before one has 
realized the utter irrelevance of this argument.” Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 9. See also Michael Moore, ‘Moral Reality’ in Wisconsin Law 
Review, (1982) pp. 1061 -1156. 
It is in agreement with what Strauss says that “In the first place, ‘consent of all mankind’ is by no 
means a necessary condition of the existence of natural right” that this these posits ‘moral legitimacy’ 
not as the inherent product of participation but as something contained in law’s purpose prior to its 
revelation, through participation, to the citizenry. It is my focus on the citizenry’s view however that 
means that I am unable, within the logical parameters of this thesis, to make any further claims about 
the ‘good’ that is to be contained in said ‘morally legitimate’ law. Ibid, Strauss, p. 9.  
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law’s purpose in the sake of the whole community? Must citizens, past or present, have 
participated on all laws within the legal system to sustain this view or only the most 
important ones? If the former, is such a level of public engagement in complex societies 
feasible? And if the latter, which, and who decides the ones to be counted as most 
important?  
The second issue is brought to light by Nigeria’s military history, which highlights an 
avenue for further and deeper examination: how is it to be logically possible for the main 
argument of this thesis to be compatible with different types of correct regimes? It should 
be seen that this thesis’s argument is not necessarily aligned with a bias towards modern-
day iterations of liberal electoral-democracy, which may themselves not fulfil the 
standards of participation in law set by my argument. Nevertheless, as with John 
Rawls’625 own examination of justice, my understanding of participation is implicitly 
predicated on an assumed view of a fundamental equality among the entire population—
an equality that is not even realised in many supposedly republican societies. 
As such, while I would like it to be plausible for multiple types of governing regimes to 
be made consistent with the theory of participation put forward here, I recognise that this 
would require further thought. This is perhaps a problem that is clearer to Habermas and 
thus explains his maintenance of participation within the distinct, and enforceable, 
framework of liberal-democratic regimes.  
                                               
625 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd Edition (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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Appendix A: Passenger Use Rules 
1. No littering/dropping refuse on board the bus 
2. No jumping Queue 
3. No large loads/market cargo should be brought on board 
4. Do not request unofficial bus stops 
5. Do not open the windows on air conditioned buses 
6. Get up for disabled/aged/pregnant people 
7. No fighting inside the bus or at bus shelters 
8. Don’t sit on the floor/by the door of the bus 
9. No preaching on the bus 
10. Do not get on already full buses 
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Appendix B: Consent form: 
This project is part of dissertation research being conducted by myself, Eniola 
Anuoluwapo Soyemi, a Ph.D candidate in the Political Science Department at Boston 
University in the United States. With the aid of Ph.D students from the University of 
Lagos, Abayomi Sharomi, Oyewusi Oluwafemi, and Taiwo Adeniran; and with support 
from the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority.  
The project wishes to understand whether people’s participation in making rules (for the 
BRT system) will influence whether or not they think the rules are the kind of rules they 
should not or should believe in. 
The project will take up a few minutes of your time in asking you to respond to a few 
questions now and may invite you back in a few Saturdays time to take part in discussion 
meetings about the rules of the BRT for passengers. These discussion meetings may last 
anywhere from 30 minutes to 1 hour. You will be told the time, place, and date of the 
meetings through text message. If you are invited back to participate in a meeting, you 
will receive a mobile phone call to ask you some questions a few weeks after the end of 
the discussion meetings. If you are not invited back for a meeting you will also receive a 
mobile phone call. There will be light refreshments at all discussion meetings for those 
invited to attend. 
At the end of discussion meetings you may be selected for an interview with me. 
Interviews will last 45 minutes to 1 hour. You may refuse to take part in these interviews. 
If you agree to be interviewed, you are free to subsequently withdraw or to refuse to 
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answer any questions you are uncomfortable with during interview. Your participation in 
this project will not directly benefit you. But many of the issues you discuss in the groups 
will be seriously considered by LAMATA and some may become the official rules of the 
BRT for bus passengers. 
This project will compensate you for your time in the amount of N280 worth of BRT 
vouchers. The vouchers are simply a means of reimbursing you for your time. They will 
not in any way be used to convince to say or to do anything that you do not truly believe 
or want to do.  
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are free to refuse to take 
part without causing any problems to me or to anybody else. Your name will be known 
only to myself and my research team. If you do voluntarily agree to participate, you will 
be made anonymous for the purposes of examining any information you provide us and 
your name will not appear in any further reports. Your personal details will be 
electronically coded and physical copies kept in a locked file cabinet in my home. There 
is, however, the risk that some confidentiality of information may be lost. 
If you have any issues or concerns with the way this project is conducted you can freely 
contact me on 07010503734/soyemi@bu.edu or my university on +1 617 538 6115/ 
irb@bu.edu or Professor Taylor Boas on +1617 353 4214 /tboas@bu.edu.  
Please tell me if you would like to participate in this study.  No  □  Yes  □ 
Signature:                                                                                
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QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Name: 
Mobile Phone Number(s): 
Over 18: □ 
 
Gender: 
Male             □                       Female     □ 
 
Ethnicity/Tribe:  
Urhobo     □       Tiv      □      Hausa      □     Igbo     □      Yoruba      □        
Other:                                        
 
State of Origin:  
Lagos □   Osun  □   Ogun  □   Kwara   □    Ondo □   Delta    □   Anambra   □   Ebonyi     
□    Ekiti   □  
Other:                                                                                      
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Appendix C: List Surveys  
Example 1: 
If I was asked how many of these things have I sometimes eaten for lunch in the past 
month:  
a. Eba and okro 
b. Amala and Ogbono soup 
c. Rice and stew 
d. Boiled pork 
My answer would be 3 out of 4 of these things because I have sometimes eaten eba (a) or 
amala (b) or rice (c) but in the past month I have not consumed any boiled pork. So 
answer is 3. 
 
Example 2: If I was asked how many of these things have I done sometimes when I go to 
the market: 
a. Buy vegetables 
b. Negotiate prices with market traders 
c. I accept the first price the trader gives me 
My answer would be 2 out of 3 because when I go to the market I usually by vegetables 
and I always negotiate a price. I never accept the first price any trader gives me so I can’t 
choose the third option so my answer is 2.  
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Question 1 
Control: 
Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done sometimes when using 
the BRT: 0, 1, 2, or 3?  
D. I only get on buses that arrive to the shelter completely empty, with no other 
single person on board. 
E. I get on the bus when there are some empty seats remaining.  
F. I get on the bus when there is no more seating but there is standing available 
 
Treatment: 
Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done sometimes when using 
the BRT: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4?  
E. I only get on buses that arrive to the shelter completely empty, with no other 
single person on board. 
F. I get on the bus when there are empty seats remaining.  
G. I get on buses when seating and standing are full up.  
H. I get on the bus when there are no empty seats remaining but there is standing 
available 
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Question2 
Control: 
Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done sometimes when using 
the BRT: 0, 1, 2, or 3?  
D. Watch the television on the bus 
E. I read a book   
F. I sleep 
 
Treatment:  
Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done sometimes when using 
the BRT: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4?  
E. Watch the television on the bus 
F. I read a book  
G. Open the windows when the AC makes me cold.  
H. I sleep 
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Question 3 
Control: 
Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done sometimes when using 
the BRT: 0, 1, 2, or 3?  
D. I keep to myself and stay quiet 
E. I talk on my phone 
F. I talk to the person sitting next to me 
Treatment: 
Over the last one month, how many of these things have you done sometimes when using 
the BRT: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4?  
E. I keep to myself and stay quiet 
F. I talk on my phone 
G. I tell other passengers about my religion 
H. I talk to the person sitting next to me 
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Appendix D: Control Group Script 
Good Afternoon Ma/Sir 
AM I speaking with xxx 
This is xxx calling from the Lagos Brt Project 
We met you las year at a bus stop…. 
I am just calling to inform you of the regulations that LAMATA is currently considering 
in order to improve the BRT service.  
They are addressing the irregularities with bus validators and e-cards 
 They are addressing the training of ticketers and BRT ground staff  
They are addressing issues with bus maintenance and the provision of more buses  
There are also some rules regarding us passengers specifically. Please take a note of 
these. (repeat 2 or 3 times as necessary): 
1. No littering/dropping refuse on board the bus 
2. No jumping Queue 
3. No large loads/market cargo should be brought on board 
4. Do not request unofficial bus stops 
5. Do not open the windows on air conditioned buses 
6. Get up for disabled/aged/pregnant people 
7. No fighting inside the bus or at bus shelters 
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8. Don’t sit on the floor/by the door of the bus 
9. No preaching on the bus 
10. Do not get on already full buses 
DO you have anything that you want us to take back to the people at LAMATA? Please 
tell me 3 things that you want LAMATA headquarters to know regarding any concerns 
you have…. 
 
Thank you Ma/ Thank you sir. Please look out for our call again in the next few weeks. 
We will be calling you back to do a short survey.  
 
Thank you 
Have nice day. 
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Appendix E: “An Ordinance to Amend the Aliens Restriction Ordinance” 
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Source: National Archives file: CO/583/244/22- Ordinance No 24 of 1939: “An 
Ordinance to Amend the Aliens Restriction Ordinance.”   
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Appendix F: Nigeria Gazette, No 57, Vol 29, Lagos 29th September 1942 
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Source: National Archives file: CO/583/255/9 Nigeria Gazette, No 57, Vol 29, 
Lagos 29th September 1942  
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